Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MADRID376
2008-03-31 16:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR DEZCALLAR ON NATO SUMMIT,

Tags:  PREL NATO SMIG MK GR BO CU SP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9300
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0376/01 0911645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311645Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4559
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0173
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY 0059
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0135
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5343
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0260
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000376 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, EUR/UMB, PRM/ECA, AND WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO SMIG MK GR BO CU SP
SUBJECT: MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR DEZCALLAR ON NATO SUMMIT,
KOSOVO, BELARUS, RESETTLEMENT OF CUBAN MIGRANTS, AND
COLOMBIA

REF: A. MADRID 371

B. MADRID 372

C. STATE 32646

D. STATE 30007

E. STATE 31278

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b),(d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000376

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, EUR/UMB, PRM/ECA, AND WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO SMIG MK GR BO CU SP
SUBJECT: MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR DEZCALLAR ON NATO SUMMIT,
KOSOVO, BELARUS, RESETTLEMENT OF CUBAN MIGRANTS, AND
COLOMBIA

REF: A. MADRID 371

B. MADRID 372

C. STATE 32646

D. STATE 30007

E. STATE 31278

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b),(d)
.


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Chief of Mission Llorens met March 31
with MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar, making the
case for a more robust Spanish effort in Afghanistan, urging
that the Spanish weigh in with Greece on Macedonia's NATO
membership, encouraging Spanish recognition of Kosovo and
support for the EU mission there, seeking support in the face
of Belarus's attempts to reduce the U.S. diplomatic presence
in Minsk, and asking that Spain assist in resettling Cuban
migrants protected in Guantanamo. They also discussed Latin
America, in particular Spain's support for Colombia. End
summary.

NATO Summit
--------------


2. (C) On Afghanistan, the DCM urged Spain to consider how
it, along with other countries engaged there, could increase
its contribution. He noted the U.S. had committed an
additional 3,200 Marines and stressed the need for everyone
to do more. Dezcallar said Spain would not be in a position
to announce any new contributions in Bucharest, noting that
the Spanish government was being formed even as the summit
took place. However, he said that once the new team of
ministers was in place, Spain would not close the door on any
option. Regarding the possibility of sending additional
police trainers (refs a and b),Dezcallar indicated this was
something Spain could consider. He expected the EUPOL
mission to grow and that Spain would be a part of that. He
was emphasizing in his own public remarks that failure was
not an option in Afghanistan. He was concerned that the
Government of Afghanistan still lacked capacity and said the
international community must work harder on "Afghanization."
It was important for the Spanish public that the mission have

a development and capacity building face, not just a military
face. Dezcallar hoped Presidents Bush and Zapatero would
have an opportunity to speak informally in Bucharest,
understanding that the Spanish had not requested a formal,
bilateral meeting.


3. (C) Regarding Macedonia (ref c),the DCM asked that Spain
weigh in with Greece to urge that it not block Macedonia's
membership bid. He stressed the importance to NATO, the
Balkans, and Europe of enlargement at the Bucharest Summit.
He pointed out that Macedonia had joined a number of
international organizations under the provisional UN
designation FYROM. Dezcallar said the GOS would continue to
do all it could to persuade Greece not to make the name issue
a sticking point. He mentioned he had recently spoken to his
Greek counterpart on the subject, but, unfortunately, the
Greek position seemed firm. He emphasized that Spain wanted
to see Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia enter NATO. Dezcallar
raised Ukraine, saying Spain would not oppose a consensus in
favor of MAP if such consensus developed.

Kosovo
--------------


3. (C) Noting the Spanish elections were now past, the DCM
asked when Spain would recognize Kosovo. Dezcallar said
Spanish recognition of Kosovo would not be "easy." Spain
wanted to wait and see how the situation evolved on the
ground and hoped a Serbian-Kosovar understanding would
develop. He said linking Serbia more closely to Europe would
be important (and mentioned that the Netherlands seemed to be
a stumbling block in that regard). He said northern Kosovo
was likely to be a particularly difficult problem. The Serbs
there would never accept Kosovo's independence and could not
be forced to do so. It was an issue Serbia and Kosovo must
resolve. Dezcallar mentioned that the performance of the
Kosovar leaders thus far had been "stupendous." Regarding
recent statements by FM Moratinos that Spain would withhold
its personnel from EULEX, the DCM asked about the status of
Spain's contribution to the mission. Dezcallar said Spain

MADRID 00000376 002 OF 002


remained committed to the EU mission but would not send
personnel until the UN transferred the UNMIK mandate. He
noted domestic Spanish criticism, saying it was difficult for
the government to support institution-building in a state
Spain did not recognize. Dezcallar said the GOS wanted
stability in the region and to avoid the European paralysis
of the 1990s, but the GOS continued to have reservations
about legality. President Zapatero said in December that
Spain would support an EU mission in Kosovo and contribute,
but the transfer of the UNMIK mandate to EULEX was a hurdle.
In any case, he said the number of Spanish personnel in
question (15-20) was a small part of the overall effort.

Belarus
--------------


4. (C) The DCM urged U.S.-EU solidarity in the face of
retaliation by the Government of Belarus (ref d) and
described the sorts of things the GOB was doing to U.S.
Embassy Minsk. He stressed that the U.S. was only trying to
win the release of political prisoners and that the U.S. and
EU needed to stand together on this. Dezcallar seemed
surprised by the situation. He said U.S. influence in
support of democratic change in Belarus was important.
However, he said that Spain had limited influence in Minsk
and depended heavily on the Poles in relations with the GOB.

Cuban Migrants and Latin America
--------------


5. (C) On resettlement of Cuban migrants from Guantanamo (ref
e),the DCM asked that Spain assist by accepting some of the
Cubans presently at Guantanamo, noting that Spain had done so
in the past. He pointed out that at least two of them had
relatives in Spain willing to assist. Dezcallar received the
non-paper and promised to give it careful study, saying that
if Spain had helped in the past it could perhaps do so again.



6. (C) On Latin America, the DCM praised Spain for recently
signing an agreement with Colombia making that country a
Spanish strategic partner. He noted the recent positive
visits of President Uribe and President Garcia of Peru, and
urged that Spain and the U.S. remain closely engaged on how
they could encourage positive change in the region.
Dezcallar said continued U.S.-Spanish cooperation was vital.
He noted Spain had been very engaged during the recent
dispute between Colombia and Ecuador. He opined that Uribe
had won a great victory in getting the world to take another
look at the FARC and see it for what it was. He said respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity was important, but
Spain, because of ETA, understood the problems presented by
terrorists who abused borders. He hoped Uribe's latest
initiative on a hostage release would be successful.
Dezcallar stressed that the U.S. and Spain should continue to
collaborate on Cuba. Spain too wanted to see the dissidents
freed (he noted Zapatero's recent letter in support of the
dissidents) and a political opening on the island. It was
only on methods that we differed. The DCM agreed that the
U.S. and Spain, despite their differences, needed to maintain
a regular dialogue on Cuba.
AGUIRRE