FOLLOW-UP WITH GOS ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000203

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR A/S FRIED, PDAS VOLKER, DAS DICARLO
EUR/WE FOR ALLEGRONE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018
TAGS: PREL UNMIK UN YI KV SP
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP WITH GOS ON KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 16319


B. MADRID 186

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Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since FM Moratinos' comment (repeated by
President Zapatero) that Kosovo's declaration of independence
was "illegal," the Ambassador and DCM have had numerous
conversations with senior GOS officials including Deputy FM
Bernardino Leon, National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana,
MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar, and Chief of Defense
Felix Sans Roldan. While Leon stuck to his guns on the issue
of legality, he, Casajuana, and Dezcallar made clear that
they wanted to keep our disagreement private, as befits two
allies who are both keenly interested in maintaining
stability in the Balkans. Helpfully, the GOS was quick to
condemn the February 21 violence in Belgrade. Our
interlocutors have been at pains to make clear that
regardless of their views on Kosovo's declaration of
independence, Spain intends to continue its participation in
KFOR and in EU efforts to help Kosovo. They hope to lower
the public profile of this issue, although that will be a
challenge with an election on March 9 and two presidential
debates between now and then. Ironically, although
Zapatero's socialist party (PSOE) and Mariano Rajoy's Popular
Party (PP) agree on very little, both view Kosovo's
declaration of independence negatively (former President
Aznar published an op-ed February 22 making the case against
independence). END SUMMARY.

//DEPUTY FM LEON//


2. (C) Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon
summoned Ambassador Aguirre to a meeting with Leon, Political
Director Rafael Dezcallar, and Director General for North
America Pepe Pons February 21 to discuss recent U.S./Spanish
disagreements on Kosovo. The Ambassador expressed strong
disagreement with the description of Kosovo's independence as
illegal (ref B) and noted that several other major European
nations agreed with our assessment that the UDI did not
violate UNSCR 1244. He reiterated the case for Kosovo's
independence and emphasized that it set no precedent for
other separatist or territorial disputes. After years of
exhaustive but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to reach a
negotiated settlement, independence was the only way to
ensure continued stability in the Balkans.


3. (C) Ignoring the long history of failed negotiations with
Serbia and the impossibility of achieving a UNSCR in the face
of Russian intransigence, Leon argued that a separatist
movement cannot declare itself independent without either a
negotiated agreement with the parent state or the explicit
authorization of a UNSC Resolution. The GOS considers these
two means as the only internationally acceptable methods for
a separatist state to gain its independence. Absent either
one, the separation is not "legal." Leon said this position
was doctrinal among both the ruling PSOE and the opposition
PP, and that both major Spanish parties are fundamentally
concerned about the principles of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Leon acknowledged that many nations
have a valid reason for recognizing Kosovo's independence -
the belief that the risk for instability in Kosovo and the
region is too great to ignore and there is no other option.
Nevertheless, Leon argued that this argument of necessity did
not convey legality. If it did, the door would be opened for
any separatist group to seek independence by securing the
approbation and recognition of a finite number of foreign
states. Such a mistaken belief was already becoming fodder
for Basque and Catalan separatists and was certain to help
separatist parties gain some parliamentary seats in the
Spanish elections, causing problems for whoever wins.


4. (C) Continuing the conversation in the wake of the
violence in Belgrade the night of February 21, the Ambassador
called Leon February 22, telling him that while the U.S.
found the arguments about legality untenable, this was a
disagreement that should be conducted in private. To
facilitate this, he strongly urged that Spanish officials
avoid gratuitous comments about legality and focus instead on
the need to work together for stability in the Balkans. The
Ambassador suggested the GOS condemn the attack against the
U.S. Embassy and other embassies in Belgrade. Leon quickly
agreed that both governments had an interest in taking a step

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back and lowering the tension. He said that he would
recommend that the Spanish government issue a condemnation of
what happened in Belgrade (see text of statement below).

//CASAJUANA, DEZCALLAR, CHOD SANZ//


5. (C) Following the Ambassador's conversations with Leon,
Deputy Chief of Mission Llorens spoke February 22 with
Presidential National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana.
Casajuana emphasized that the GOS strongly condemned the
attack on the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. The DCM mentioned
that Ambassador had asked Leon to issue a statement;
Casajuana agreed the GOS should do so and promised to
follow-up. Turning to the broader issue, Casajuana noted the
many conversations between GOS and USG officials here and in
Washington on the subject of Kosovo in recent months. He
said Spain had been clear about the domestic sensitivities
regarding a UDI but perhaps Spain, in an effort to make clear
its willingness to work with the U.S. and preserve EU unity,
had sent confusing signals and left the impression that
Kosovo was merely an issue in the context of the Spanish
elections. In fact, he said, Kosovo independence was
problematic for more fundamental reasons having to do with
Spain's own regional tensions. This would be true with or
without an election pending. The imminent election made this
a highly political issue and simply reduced the government's
room for maneuver. Waiting until after the election would
not necessarily have changed the government's position, but
having independence declared before the election did force
the government to adopt a more dogmatic public stance.


6. (C) Nevertheless, Casajuana insisted Spain wanted to be
constructive. He noted Spain's commitment to KFOR and to the
EU effort in Kosovo. He said there was not even any
discussion within the GOS of backing away from either,
despite the fact that this put the GOS in an awkward spot:
on the one hand they were forced to say publicly that they
did not support Kosovo's UDI but on the other hand they were
continuing to support Kosovo. The DCM told Casajuana the GOS
should refrain from gratuitous public remarks about things
such as "illegality." As recent events in Belgrade showed,
the situation in the region was delicate, and it was to no
one's advantage to say anything that might contribute to
tension. He said the U.S. did not want to make this a
U.S.-Spain issue, and that would be more easily achieved if
the public remarks were more restrained. Casajuana said he
understood but noted he could not guarantee that nothing more
would be said publicly. (NOTE: The presidential candidates
have televised debates scheduled for February 25 and March 3.
END NOTE.)


7. (C) The DCM also spoke with MFA Political Director Rafael
Dezcallar February 22 (following the conversation with
Casajuana). Dezcallar called to express outrage over the
violence in Belgrade, which he described as "barbaric,
savage, and distressingly reminiscent of the horrible events
in the Balkans in the 1990s." Dezcallar said Spain may
disagree with the U.S. on the underlying issue, but
nevertheless the U.S. was an ally, and the GOS was committed
to work with the U.S. and the EU to maintain peace and
stability in the Balkans. He said a GOS statement condemning
the violence would be forthcoming. The DCM advised that A/S
Fried had been briefed on the Ambassador's conversations over
the last 24 hours with Leon. It was obvious that the U.S.
and Spain strongly disagreed on the question of recognizing
Kosovo, but that for its part the U.S. wanted this to remain
a private disagreement among allies. Nothing was served by
turning this into a bilateral issue. The DCM urged that the
GOS avoid any further gratuitous public statements. He noted
in particular that Spanish questioning of the legality of
Kosovo's declaration was unhelpful.


8. (C) In a February 22 conversation with the DCM, Chief of
Defense General Felix Sanz Roldan echoed what Casajuana had
said about Spain's commitment to KFOR, saying Spain had no
intention of pulling out, and in fact he was preparing the
normal six month troop rotation. He said all the signals he
had gotten from the government were "business as usual."
Sanz added that he suspected Spain would eventually recognize
Kosovo but only after the elections and after enough other
countries had done so that the government could do so without
exciting too much negative comment in Spain.


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//MFA CONDEMNS BELGRADE VIOLENCE//


9. (U) The MFA issued a statement February 22 roundly
condemning the acts of violence in Belgrade against various
embassies and those who perpetrated them, who were described
as "extremists who should not have any place in a modern
Serbia." The statement manifested support for the Serbian
Government and its President noting they had rejected the
acts of violence. The statement said the GOS called on EU
countries to join forces do everything necessary to put into
effect the conclusions reached by the Council of Foreign
Ministers of the EU February 18 in which was recorded the
commitment of the EU to stability in the Balkans and its
availability to play a leading role in strengthening that
stability.

//AZNAR: THE KOSOVO MISTAKE//


10. (U) Former Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar wrote a
February 22 op-ed entitled "The Kosovo Mistake" in
conservative daily La Razon. Aznar wrote, "It has to be
said: recognizing Kosovo is a mistake that will have grave
consequences... NATO did not go to war in 1999 to ensure the
independence of Kosovo... NATO embarked upon its intervention
to preserve tolerance and consolidate multi-ethnic states...
Anyone who believes the opposite is mistaken, and anyone who
says the opposite, if they were familiar with the
deliberations that took place at the time, is lying... The
Americans, for their part, seem to be tired of having to take
care of and manage this region and would prefer to think that
by giving free rein to the Kosovars the pressure will let
up... Recognizing independence means accepting in the
international sphere a principal of self-determination of
peoples and alteration of borders in Europe without a
consensus. Not only has our experience with these issues
been catastrophic in the past, but this violates the
principles that the EU, for example, has defended for over
five years. Furthermore, it establishes a very bad precedent
for the future... The theory that by accepting the unilateral
declaration of independence we would be establishing a better
basis for the future is more than questionable. For the time
being, this whole issue has turned into a major mistake, and
it is our own fault." (NOTE: Full text sent separately to
EUR/WE Spain desk).

//COMMENT//


11. (C) We believe the GOS is trying to back away from
public confrontation with the U.S. on this issue. Certainly
the violence in Belgrade and their genuine concern over it
has something to do with this. The GOS hoped
(unrealistically) that independence would come after March 9.
While it is not clear (perhaps not even to them) what they
would have done then, they at least would have been able to
consider their moves more calmly. Instead, they had to react
on the campaign trail in the midst of a hotly contested
general election. In any case, they now seem anxious to
lower the volume. That would be a good thing. With the PP
taking a hard line against Kosovo's declaration of
independence, and some Basque and Catalans welcoming what
they see as a precedent, anything the Zapatero government
says publicly on this issue will be negative from our point
of view. Casajuana is correct about the cognitive dissonance
evident in the government criticizing independence while
continuing to work with KFOR and the EU in Kosovo. The less
this is highlighted here, the better. Also, if this does
become perceived as a U.S. vs. Spain question, it will make
us an election issue (which we have so far largely avoided)
and will probably play to Zapatero's benefit with the voters.
While we expect the GOS will try to tone things down, we
should not be surprised if Kosovo comes up again here
(perhaps in the February 25 or March 3 debates). If it does,
Zapatero and Rajoy are likely to say something negative about
independence. END COMMENT.
AGUIRRE