Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LUSAKA827
2008-08-19 15:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lusaka
Cable title:  

WITH MWANAWASA'S DEATH, ZAMBIA'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Tags:  POL PREL ZA 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 191526Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6147
INFO SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
CIA WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 000827 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2018
TAGS: POL PREL ZA
SUBJECT: WITH MWANAWASA'S DEATH, ZAMBIA'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE
BEGINS

REF: LUSAKA 825

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for Reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 000827

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2018
TAGS: POL PREL ZA
SUBJECT: WITH MWANAWASA'S DEATH, ZAMBIA'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE
BEGINS

REF: LUSAKA 825

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for Reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Zambian Government's (GRZ's)
announcement of President Mwanawasa's death (reftel) sets in
motion seven days of national mourning, but also marks the
beginning of Zambia's presidential race. According to the
Zambian Constitution, elections must be held within 90 days,
meaning before November 17. In the absence of a party
Vice-President to succeed Mwanawasa, the ruling Movement for
Multi-party Democracy (MMD) is divided into three camps,
consisting of veteran MMD politicians ("true blues"),members
of the Mwanawasa family, and moderates who might support a
bid from Vice President Banda. Meanwhile, opposition parties
are using the GRZ's new wage bill as a pretext to campaign
jointly against the MMD. Opposition party leaders believe
that an early election will be to their distinct advantage,
given the confusion within the MMD. Opposition leaders had
been campaigning restrainedly until now, but had been acting
as if presidential elections were an inexorable certainty.
End Summary.

--------------
MMD Torn by Infighting
--------------


2. (C) Cabinet's insistence during Mwanawasa's
hospitalization that the President was showing
improvement--and its insinuation that he would resume his
duties before long--may prove damaging to MMD's credibility
in the short-term. Perhaps even more harmful, however, is
that Cabinet's state of denial made it difficult for MMD
members to hold open discussions about party succession.
Health Minister Brian Chituwo's August 8 remarks that
Mwanawasa's recovery might be protracted unleashed a flood of
criticism from other parliamentarians and MMD officials that
revealed chords of genuine disunity within the party. MMD
Spokesperson Ben Tetamashimba, seeking to quell the row,
reminded party members that "no MMD members, irrespective of
position, should discuss the President's illness unless
quoting the State House website."


3. (C) As a result of its virtual gag order, MMD's succession
dialogue moved underground. On August 17, Northern Province
Minister Lameck Chibombamilimo told reporters that
"government leaders are holding 'dark corner' meetings" to
discuss the President's ailing health and vie for party
leadership. According to various accounts, the MMD party has
divided into three factions: MMD veteran politicos ("true

blues"),members of Mwanawasa's immediate and extended
family, and moderates who support Vice President Banda as a
"compromise candidate." The "true blues," as the activists
who democratically ousted President Kenneth Kaunda from
office in 1991, view themselves as the rightful heirs to the
MMD presidency. Although MMD National Secretary Katele
Kalumba enjoys strong popular support within the party,
particularly at grassroots level, his indictment for acts of
corruption may prevent him from entering the presidential
race and may resign him to the role of MMD "king maker."


4. (C) Perhaps out of personal ambition--as well as a fear of
political retribution from former President Frederick
Chiluba, Kalumba, and others who were the subject of
Mwanawasa's campaign against corruption--an element of the
MMD would like to see the party leadership stay within the
Mwanawasa "family tree." This circle allegedly includes Home
Affairs Minister Ronnie Shikapwasha, Justice Minister George
Kunda, and Defense Minister George Mpombo. Shikapwasha, a
one-time Foreign Minister and religious pastor with
considerable public appeal, may have all the credentials to
take the reins. In the past, First Lady Maureen Mwanawasa
also has shown some interest in the presidency, although her
efforts to test the waters revealed modest levels of public
support.


5. (C) A "moderate" faction within MMD reportedly views Vice
President (and Acting President) Rupiah Banda as a practical
compromise between the party's other two competing elements.
An long-time statesman with an accomplished career and close
ties to Zambia's revered first President Kenneth Kaunda,
Banda potentially could draw in a wider net of voters.
Banda, however, still belongs to the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) and has signaled little interest in
changing parties. MMD stalwarts are likely to strongly
contest any efforts to relegate MMD leadership to an
outsider. Banda suggested to the Charge in July that he is
not interested in a presidential run because he is no longer
young and healthy. United Party for National Development
(UPND) leader Hakainde Hichilema discounted this, however,
telling the Charge in early August that Banda "is an African
politician," implying that Banda harbors tacit political
ambitions.

--------------
For HH, the Race Began Long Ago
--------------


6. (C) Since losing the 2006 presidential election, Hakainde
Hichilema ("HH") has been actively campaigning in preparation
for the 2011 elections. He expressed a great deal of
confidence to Charge during an August 12 meeting regarding
his popular support, explaining that in 2006 he had captured
one quarter of the votes despite coming out of relative
obscurity and campaigning for less than two months. Now, in
his second year of campaigning, he professed support in rural
areas not usually considered UPND "domain," including
Northern and North-Western Provinces. He also explained that
he had been approached by a number of senior politicians from
other parties who are prepared to either join his camp or
lend their support to his campaign. Hichilema explained in
some detail his plans for Zambia's economic development,
based on private-sector led growth, and noted that some of
his change agenda is too progressive even for his own party
members. Whether HH wins the election or not, he is apt to
raise the level of debate among presidential candidates,
given his clear vision and strategy for lifting Zambians out
of poverty.

--------------
PF Divided but not Conquered
--------------


7. (C) On August 18, Charge met with Patriotic Front (PF)
leader Michael Sata, who came in second in the 2006
presidential elections with 29 percent of the vote. Sata
acknowledged that his party is still divided between those
who are participating in the National Constitutional
Conference--against Sata's decree--and those who are not.
Despite his party's disarray, Sata has joined forces with
UPND to protest new legislation proposed by Cabinet that will
increase Parliamentarian and senior GRZ officials' salaries
by as much as four-hundred percent. The two unnatural allies
seem to share little more than a desire to confound the MMD.
Sata--a loose cannon at the best of times--speaks of his
presidency as a foregone conclusion and excoriated MMD
Cabinet members for allegedly unconstitutional behaviors. PF
Member of Parliament Given Lubinda told Poloff that PF will
not seek the support of Chiluba, as it had in 2006. Lubinda
blamed Chiluba for the discord within the PF party. He
acknowledged that Sata is a populist with strong
anti-investor rhetoric, but assured poloff that Sata is too
intelligent to pursue the policies that form the basis of his
campaign and popularity.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) The MMD's rose-tinted assessments of Mwanawasa's
recovery, right up until his death on August 19, may have
been wishful thinking as the party endeavored to buy time to
preserve the status quo and to address discreetly succession
issues. With 89 days (or less) to go before presidential
elections, they are apt to feel the squeeze from the
ambitious Hichilema, or the cunning Sata. Without
Mwanawasa's respected paternal guidance, election officials
and candidates may not feel subject to the same level of
electoral discipline as in the 2006 general elections.


9. (C) The GRZ is obviously not prepared to run a full-scale
presidential election within three months. Its clumsy and
ham-handed efforts will be painted by Sata and HH as
electoral fraud. Therefore international observors and donor
funding to ensure that the elections are as free and fair as
possible within the given constraints will be crucial to the
legitimacy of any new Zambian government.


KOPLOVSKY