BANDA AND MMD WEAKENED, BUT STILL IN CHARGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 001076


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ZA
SUBJECT: BANDA AND MMD WEAKENED, BUT STILL IN CHARGE

REF: A. LUSAKA 1065

B. LUSAKA 1060

C. LUSAKA 1059

D. LUSAKA 1058

E. LUSAKA 1057

F. LUSAKA 1028 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Donald Booth, reason 1.4, b/d.


1. (C) Summary: Newly elected Zambian President Rupiah Banda
won the October 30 presidential by-election by a small margin
-- just 35,000 of 1.8 million votes cast, or less than two
percent. His vote totals in several provinces showed sharp
declines from those received by his ruling Movement for
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) predecessor and late President
Levy Mwanawasa in 2006. The proportion of support MMD won in
2008 dropped to 39.5 percent from 42.3 percent in 2006.
Banda took more than 55 percent of the vote in only four of
the nine provinces. Patriotic Front (PF) candidate Michael
Sata's support rose from 28.9 percent in 2006 to 37.6 percent
in 2008, even increasing his actual vote totals in two
provinces despite the low (45 percent) voter turnout. United
Party for National Development (UPND) candidate Haikande
Hichilema won only 19.4 percent of the votes cast compared to
24.9 percent in 2006, failing once again to expand the
party's reach outside of its southern strongholds and
throwing his future as party leader into question. Banda's
narrow victory -- as well as the likely registration of
hundreds of thousands of young, presumably PF-supporting
voters in the next three years -- foreshadows challenges for
the ruling party in the 2011 presidential and parliamentary
elections. Banda's narrow margin of victory also suggests he
will be indebted to his backers within the party, raising the
specter that he could face threats to his authority and the
possibility of not being renominated in 2011, if he decided
to try. However, the new President retains several key
advantages that make it premature to count either him or his
party out in the next election. End summary.

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BANDA LIMPS HOME IN FACE OF STRONG SATA CHALLENGE
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2. (U) Enthusiasm for Rupiah Banda's candidacy was lukewarm
among nearly all Zambians, and provincial numbers bear this
out clearly. In only four provinces -- Copperbelt, Eastern,
Lusaka, and Southern -- did Banda receive more than half the
votes that Mwanawasa received in 2006. Furthermore, Banda
lost three of these provinces -- carrying just his home
province of Eastern, the only province where he received
almost the same amount of votes Mwanawasa received. While
Banda also won Central, North-Western, and Western provinces,
his margins of victory were markedly lower than those of his
MMD predecessor Mwanawasa and are attributable to the near
absence of support for Sata in these areas. Overall support
for MMD fell from 42.3 percent in 2006 to 39.5 percent in

2008. Banda won just 61 percent of the number of votes that
late President Mwanawasa received in 2006, although some of
the decrease is accounted for in low voter turnout of just 45
percent compared to 71 percent in 2006.


3. (U) On the other hand, PF candidate Michael Sata retained
a significant amount of his support from 2006, an impressive
feat considering that Zambia's 45 percent voter turnout
constituted just 63 percent of the actual votes cast in 2006.
In only Luapula and Lusaka provinces, both of which PF won
by significant margins, did Sata garner less than 80 percent
of the votes he received in 2006. Sata also won Northern
(the only province to flip from the MMD to the PF camp from
2006) and Copperbelt provinces, and he actually increased his
vote tallies in Eastern and North-Western provinces, albeit
from relatively low bases. His overall support increased
impressively from 28.9 percent in 2006 to 37.6 percent in
2008, at the expense of Banda but even more so from the
Hichilema camp, whose support fell from 24.9 percent to 19.4
percent in the last two years.

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BANDA AND THE INCUMBENT'S ADVANTAGE
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4. (SBU) Although the trends were clearly moving against him,
Banda's ability to leverage the MMD's organizational and
resource strengths trumped PF, which was unable to turn its
strong showing at pre-election rallies into votes at the
ballot box. Embassy observers found MMD provincial
operations to be relatively well-resourced and
well-organized. They were particularly effective in
deploying party agents to polling stations, something with
which PF and UPND struggled in many rural areas. Bias by the
state-supported media and Banda's willingness to use
government resources and personnel for his campaign further
helped seal the deal. According to opposition party
representatives, the ruling party also engaged in at least
some incidences of gift-giving up to and during election day,
distributing Kw5,000 notes (approximately $1.50),sugar, and
cooking oil, although we have no independent corroboration of
this and no doubt that PF engaged in the same sorts of
activities at some level.


5. (SBU) Most importantly, however, it was events leading up
to October 30, not election day itself, that conspired
against Sata. The disenfranchisement of up to 600,000 young
voters before the election caused by the ECZ failure to
register new voters on a continuing basis following the 2006
election (reftel F),appears to have been the decisive factor
in the MMD's victory, as it is highly likely this group would
have voted in large numbers for Sata. While unable to vote,
youths flocked to Sata's rallies in the days and weeks prior
to the election, giving his candidacy the appearance of
tremendous strength. They were not allowed, however, to turn
this support into votes on election day itself.

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HICHILEMA COLLAPSE RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS FUTURE
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6. (SBU) UPND candidate Haikande Hichilema was hoping to
capitalize on his unexpectedly strong showing in 2006, but
his campaign never got off the ground or expanded upon UPND's
traditional southern base. Hichilema won just 51 percent of
the vote that he took in 2006, with his overall support
dropping more than five percent, and took only his
traditional Southern Province base. In Eastern Province,
Hichilema took just a dismal nine percent of what he polled
in 2006 -- in large part because his electoral ally two years
ago, former President Kenneth Kaunda's United National
Independence Party, abandoned him for the MMD this time
around. He also took just 14 percent of his 2006 total in
Northern Province, where UPND representatives told Poloffs
that they had received almost no resources with which to
campaign. In the face of this collapse, Hichilema's future
as party leader is unclear. A UPND representative in
Northern Province told Poloffs before the poll that Hichilema
was considering minimizing his political involvement if he
lost in order to refocus on his extensive business holdings,
a comment Hichilema had personally made to DCM and Poloff in
August.

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LOOKING FORWARD: BANDA MUST WALK TIGHTROPE...
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7. (C) A victory is a victory, but Banda's narrow margin
could pose problems for him during the next three years and
hinder his renomination chances, should he seek to run in

2011. Poloff on November 2 had a chance encounter with Eddie
Samakai, the former head of the Zambia State Insurance
Company and a self-described MMD fund-raiser -- at least, he
said, until the fundraising operation "became compromised"
and had to be shut down (NFI). In discussing the election,
Samakai, who is planning to run for Parliament in 2011, said
the tight poll is going to tie Banda's hands for the next
three years, as many people in the party will argue that
their campaign assistance put Banda over the top and seek
patronage of some sort. There are a lot of people to reward,
Samakai noted, and Banda will be beholden to supporting many
of his advocates' pet projects. As for 2011, Samakai said
"the dogs are already circling" to succeed Banda after his
weak showing, making it highly unlikely he will win
renomination.

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...WHILE SATA BIDES TIME, BUILDS MOMENTUM
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8. (C) Sata's narrow defeat, however, puts him in the catbird
seat for 2011, assuming his health will permit another
presidential bid. He will turn 74 years old in 2011.
Registration over the next three years will bring hundreds of
thousands, and possibly more than one million, additional
young voters who will turn 18 before 2011 onto the registers.
If PF can retain its strength with this group, the MMD will
have a real fight on its hands in the next poll. Should
Hichilema or a new UPND leader see the utility of joining
forces with Sata (or a new PF leader),the chances of a PF
victory would appear even stronger.

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COMMENT: MMD DOWN, BUT ADVANTAGES REMAIN
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9. (C) While it is clear that the MMD has a lot of work to do
to shore up support in the next three years, the party
retains several key advantages, particularly its access to
state resources come election time. No matter who the
candidate is in 2011, he or she will enter the race with a
leg up. Similarly, the possibility that Banda could assuage
his MMD rivals and finagle the 2011 nomination cannot be
dismissed. Although we concur with Samakai's assertion that
many in the party will need to be rewarded for their support,
the President inherits extensive patronage powers and
relatively unchecked authority that he most likely will use
to his advantage. It is worth remembering that few had high
expectations of Mwanawasa's ability to govern or survive
politically when he was elected in 2001, yet he was able to
win reelection easily in 2006.


BOOTH