ZAMBIAN ELECTIONS: A RELATIVELY LEVEL, BUT ROCKY,

S E C R E T LUSAKA 001023


NOFORN

STATE FOR AF/S AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ZA
SUBJECT: ZAMBIAN ELECTIONS: A RELATIVELY LEVEL, BUT ROCKY,
PLAYING FIELD

REF: A. LUSAKA 986

B. LUSAKA 980

C. LUSAKA 974

D. LUSAKA 973

E. LUSAKA 950

F. LUSAKA 970

G. LUSAKA 906

H. LUSAKA 888


Classified By: Ambassador Donald E. Booth, reasons 1.4, b/d.


1. (C) Summary: With a scant two weeks before the October 30
elections, political parties, civil society, the media, and
government are turning up the volume for the scramble toward
the finish line. Accusations of "vote-buying" abound, albeit
with minimal evidence to support claims that what has
transpired has crossed over from inappropriate to criminal.
The election is certainly the ruling party's to lose, as the
Acting President and Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)
candidate Rupiah Banda has submitted to populist, but
economically inadvisable, pressures by lowering fuel prices,
increasing fertilizer subsidies, and promising more of the
same. But leading opposition candidate, the Patriotic
Front's Michael Sata, is not immune from similar accusations,
as he apparently promises to provide FREE fertilizer to
farmers and to convert car loans for tribal chiefs into
grants if voted into office. United Party for National
Development (UPND) candidate Hakainde Hichilema (known as HH)
has published a platform promising a business-driven approach
to Zambia's economic problems, a platform in which voters
have shown virtually no interest. Media bias is evident but
cuts both ways (for PF and MMD, ignoring HH almost entirely)
and flaws in the Electoral Commission of Zambia's (ECZ)
procedures are legion but appear to amount to incompetence
rather than conspiracy. Contrary to a very peaceful, some
say passive, Zambian tradition, the main opposition parties
are warning of unrest if the GRZ "rigs the election,"
ominously adding that Banda could not possibly win a fair
race. Embassy will be watching closely to see if the
population is motivated by these incitations. End Summary.

The Thin, Gray Line Between Government and MMD
-------------- -


2. (C) Although the Zambia Electoral Code of Conduct of 2006
prohibits use of Government transport for campaign purposes,
it "does not apply to use by the President or Vice President
in connection with their respective offices." Some contacts
believe the MMD is flaunting this guideline, noting that
Banda's U.S. and British image consultants arrived at a rally
in a Ministry of Health vehicle. Even legitimate government
expenditures are difficult to track in Zambia, however, so
evidence of illegitimate expenditures would be nearly
impossible to expose. Minister of Lands Bradford Machila
told PolEconOff that each MMD minister is responsible for
campaigning for Banda in his/her home constituency, but noted
the process for requesting reimbursement from MMD coffers is
so difficult that he chooses to use his own resources. The
Code of Conduct also prohibits offering inducements to
voters, but distributions of T-shirts, traditional printed
cloth (chitenge) with party logos, and occasionally corn meal
are fairly commonplace and are expected by the electorate
from all parties. The Code likewise requires the police to
act with neutrality, but an October 16 headline in "The Post"
claims that the police tried to prevent a Sata rally "for
security reasons," implying (without offering evidence) that
Banda was using security resources to stifle opposition.


3. (C) The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has been running
quarter-page ads in a government-sponsored broadsheet noting
that "Giving gifts, money, or food during election campaigns
is corruption" and asking voters to call a toll free line to
report suspected cases. We are not aware of any of these
accusations gaining traction. While the ACC seems to limit
its mandate to cases of gifts and bribery, the ECZ seems too
overwhelmed with the task of conducting a by-election on ten
weeks notice to conduct investigations on improprieties that
may fall in its domain, e.g. MMD use of government resources.

Media Bias for Everyone!
--------------


4. (C) The Zambian media, not known for high quality in the
best of circumstances, cannot be relied upon to investigate
accurately claims of impropriety or corruption before
publishing them. Furthermore, all newspapers have their own
agendas. A recent survey of the two government-supported
broadsheets in Lusaka, "The Times" and "The Daily Mail,"
revealed that both papers posted headlines supportive of
Banda and/or his policies on a daily basis. The
government-supported national TV channel, ZNBC, is equally
unapologetic in its support of Banda, and, to add bad taste
to bias, shows a four-to-five minute music video about Banda
every night after the news broadcast. The privately owned
"The Post," on the other hand, for weeks has waged an overt
war on Banda, in support of Michael Sata, nearly landing its
editor in jail for defamation of character. Only HH seems to
be treated the same by both sides of journalism, getting
equally negligible, although not necessarily negative, press
in all three papers.

Try as it Might, the ECZ Just Can't Please
--------------


5. (C) Meanwhile, the ECZ valiantly tries to pull together a
by-election on ten weeks notice, but seems oblivious to the
importance of "presentation" and the negative perceptions
emerging as a result. The ECZ has made little effort to
explain why 600,000 extra ballot papers have been printed,
other than to say the ballot papers are printed in books of
50, so each of Zambia's 10,000 voting streams could have has
many as 49 extra ballots when the numbers are rounded up to
the nearest 50. But opposition parties point out that
explanation only accounts for 490,000 extra ballots. These
critics argue that the use of the 2006 voter registration
rolls means those who have turned 18 years old since 2006, as
well as anyone who has lost their voter card since 2006,
cannot vote. Because 100 percent turnout is
next-to-impossible, so many extra ballots seem unnecessary.
(The NGO Anti-Rigging Zambia ((ARZ)) brought a case against
the ECZ requesting that it compile a new registry to avoid
disenfranchising possibly 3-400,000 people or more, but the
High Court dismissed the case, agreeing with the ECZ that
such a task was impracticable given the short timeframe and
limited resources with which ECZ is forced to operate.) The
PF and UPND are making hay of the ECZ's missteps. When party
agents arrived at the airport to witness the arrival of the
ballot papers and noted that the papers were divided into two
shipments, they cried foul, arguing (weakly) that the ECZ
divided the ballots into two shipments to make them harder to
track. When the ballot boxes arrived October 15, PF cadres
demanded that the extra papers should be burned right at the
airport before they could be distributed. MMD
representatives discovered PF agents disguising themselves as
ECZ officials and addressing election monitors. When they
turned the PF agents over to the police, a scuffle ensued
among MMD, PF and UPND members, nearly resulting in
fisticuffs. Only the Heritage Party remained out of the
fray, illustrative of its relevance (or rather lack thereof)
in the election.


6. (C) The parties then came to an agreement to distribute
the extra ballots to the districts "just in case" (but not to
the polling stations),beginning October 20 after draft rules
could be gazetted. The PF Secretary General Edward Mumbi
confirmed to us October 17 that PF has since withdrawn its
agreement to this solution after discovering a district
official loading unverified ballots October 16 into a
government vehicle for transport to Kalabo district. PF has
gone to the High Court to seek an injunction against ECZ
distribution of any extra ballot papers until security
measures are put into place.


7. (C) The parties were no better behaved at an October 10
meeting with the ECZ, at which ECZ officials seemed
unprepared and not very articulate. A United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) readout of the event says the
meeting was "characterized by general suspicion" with
unsubstantiated allegations leveled by all sides and
participants whose main goal appeared to be causing
disruption. Some participants, particularly UPND, resorted
to issuing threats that they would urge their cadres to
pursue violent behavior if their proposals were not adopted
(comment: language inciting violence in also against the Code
of Conduct).

MMD in a Panic?
--------------


8. (S/NF) The PF claims that MMD is in a panic over the
possibility that it might lose for the first time since its
creation in 1991, basing this assertion on reports that Banda
has hired British and American image consultants to counter
his lack of charisma. Minister of Lands Machila told
PolEconoff that MMD is concerned about voter apathy and lack
of turnout given the seasonal heat. This concern is fueled
by MMD's belief that PF is flush with money. Sensitive
reporting indicates that Banda's presidential campaign is
internally fractured, that Banda's senior advisors harbor
significant concerns that the campaign is stalled, and that
senior MMD officials believe Sata's chances of victory are
real and growing. The internal security service likewise
appears concerned that Banda may not carry the day, although
most indications suggest the security service is not intent
on interfering with the election.

10 (C) On the other hand, according to Machila, MMD does not
consider UPND a threat. Lack of polling data makes gauging
candidates' popularity difficult, but with MMD's long history
and its ability to implement populist incentives such as
lower fuel prices and higher fertilizer subsidies on the eve
of the election, while opposition parties can only promise
such things, it would seem the momentum is with Banda.


11. (C) Well connected embassy sources in the provinces say
PF is gaining ground in Luapula and Northern Provinces,
primarily because of MMD's poor relations with the local
chiefs stemming partially from a High Court decision that
nullified a local election due to undue influence by local
chiefs. The decision was seen as an affront to the chiefs
themselves on the part of the ruling MMD, whose losing
candidate pursued the court case. An informal survey of
people in Central Province also indicated they were changing
their allegiance from MMD to PF because they hoped PF would
provide the promised jobs that Mwanawasa could no longer
deliver. PF is also thought to be gaining ground in Western
Province, where the influential Lozi chief has complained
that MMD has expended huge amounts of public funds
"constructing" the Mongu-Kalabo Road, with nothing tangible
to be seen for it.


12. (C) Machila also deemed it unlikely there would be a
large cabinet reshuffle if Banda wins. Furthermore, he
believed Finance Minister Magande, the Zambian darling of the
IMF, would stay on, despite Magande's challenging Banda for
the MMD nomination. In a September meeting with the Charge
(ref D),Magande unreservedly lambasted Banda, but did so
without other Zambian officials being present.

Possibility of Violence Remote, but not for Lack of Trying
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Despite MMD's apparent lack of concern about UPND.
the feeling is not mutual. At the October 10 meeting with
the ECZ, the UNDP report says "UPND continuously threatened
violence" and an October 15 article in "The Post" reported
that "UPND Warns of Instability if MMD rigs October 30
Election." A UPND official said MMD had stolen the elections
in 2001 and 2006 and that "In 2008, we must be ready to die
in defense of our vote. UPND is ready. Banda can only win a
rigged election. They are going to see different Zambians
this time. UPND has crossed the Rubicon." A UPND cadre told
PolEconoff that such rhetoric was designed to stir interest
in voting. PF leader Michael Sata has said he will not stop
violence if fraud is suspected; already a bit long in the
tooth, he may see this election as his last chance at the
presidency. Scattered sensitive reports about small arms
entering the country intended for Sata partisans and possible
political intervention by the Zambian military in response to
a Sata victory thus far appear unsubstantiated.

A Foreign Policy-Free Zone
--------------


14. (C) Lacking in all the hoopla is virtually any reference
by any candidate to foreign policy. The candidates have
avoided any discussion of former President Mwanawasa's tough
stance on Zimbabwe and their own views on the situation
there. In one exceptional and opportunistic foreign policy
turn, Sata abandoned his embrace of Taiwan and his criticism
of Chinese investment and was photographed with both arms
around Chinese businessmen saying he would welcome Chinese
and other foreign investment (noting later that he would
require a 25 percent Zambian stake in any foreign
investments).

Comment
--------------


15. (C) There is certainly no shortage of irregularities in
the lead-up to this election, but they are due at least as
much to lack of capacity as ECZ partisanship. Skepticism of
the government and the ruling party is rampant at the best of
times, and opposition parties are going to play that tune in
the hopes of motivating what appears to be a fairly apathetic
electorate. The perception that the ECZ is purposely or
inadvertently paving the way for another MMD victory is
undoubtedly raising tensions among opposition parties who see
the MMD further perpetuating itself, ironically, as the only
viable political party since the dissolution of the one-party
state in 1990. Whether or not historically peaceful Zambians
will answer the opposition's call to arms if an MMD victory
seems contrived remains doubtful. Both the 2001 and 2006
elections were less than perfect and passed relatively
peacefully, so anything other than sporadic violence in 2008
would reflect deeper dissatisfaction with the status quo
among Zambians than has been evident to us to date.


BOOTH