AFRICA/CHINA: MORE ENGAGEMENT IS A TWO-SIDED COIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 002858

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PINR EAID XA CA NZ AS CH TW UK
SUBJECT: AFRICA/CHINA: MORE ENGAGEMENT IS A TWO-SIDED COIN

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Jim Donegan, reasons 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C//REL TO FIVE EYES) China's increasing engagement with
African governments is a two-sided coin. China more readily
works on its Africa partners' behalf in the United Nations
(sometimes in unhelpful ways for the West),and it also
provides significant direct investment and infrastructure
creation projects that enable the West's goal of expanding
Africa's private sector economies. London-based Africa
Watchers (from the UK's Cabinet Office, UK's Foreign Office,
and the Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and U.S. missions)
informally compared notes at an Embassy London-hosted
discussion on China-Africa relations on November 12. Below
is a summary of the major points:

A) The Byzantine, top-down, and opaque nature of China's
bureaucracy makes officials-level coordination and follow up
on initiatives agreed at the political level difficult. The
UK and NZ approach has been to ratchet Africa up the
bilateral political agenda while simultaneously pursuing on
the ground cooperation on development projects to demonstrate
concrete coordination. Officials are also trying to build
working-level, non-political bridges with the Chinese
bureaucracy to foster a better understanding of the Chinese
system and to create a relationship capable of withstanding
political shocks. In multilateral fora in Asia, NZ has tried
to make China's engagement more constructive by preempting
discussions about China-Taiwan relations.

B) China works bilaterally with African countries (rather
than through Africa's regional organizations) and coordinates
bilaterally with donor countries (rather than through
multilateral development mechanisms). China appears to be in
multilateral listening mode on Africa, coming to the right
meetings (Sudan Consortium, the Africa Clearing House, etc.)
and making limited commitments (signing up to the Millennium
Development Goals' Call to Action). The UK noted improved
interactions with China in the run-up to the High-Level MDG
event and "growing space for dialogue" more generally on
development. With China's increasing bilateral partnerships
on development, it will likely be forced to become more
involved on the multilateral development agenda, albeit very
gradually.

C) China is image conscious in Africa. It often funds
prestige projects (like stadiums and monuments) in African
countries that traditional development partners will not.
China is becoming more aware that its labor practices and
cheap goods are often not popular with African populations,
while African governments are seeking to develop strong
relations with China.

D) Increasing engagement with China is attractive for African
governments. China's non-interventionist political and
unconditional development policies, support in the UN,
bilateral loan offers, military and technical support, large
infrastructure projects, and economic demand for Africa's
natural resources all turn African leaders toward Beijing.

E) China's greater engagement poses some risks for
traditional donors. Undermining aid effectiveness,
challenges to good governance and transparency initiatives,
future debt relief problems (from China's bilateral loans),
and trade competition all have the potential to cause
setbacks in Western development objectives.

F) While not focused on traditional effectiveness, Chinese
aid does seek a return on its investment. It provides levels
of direct investment and infrastructure projects that the
West does not. In some ways, this focus complements the
West's current development focus on capacity- and
institution-building.


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