IRAN: UK EXPECTS A FOURTH UNSCR WILL BE NECESSARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001595

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018
TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP UN IR UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: UK EXPECTS A FOURTH UNSCR WILL BE NECESSARY

REF: MAY 30 EMAIL EMB LONDON (GAYLE)-DEPT (NEA/IR AND
P STAFF)

Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connel
ly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: FCO working level contacts in informal
conversations argue the likelihood that Iran will not respond
in a useful fashion to Javer Solana's scheduled offer June 14
on behalf of the P5 1 will make a fourth UNSC resolution on
Iran necessary. FCO contacts argue that whether a fourth
resolution contains any new sanctions will be relatively
unimportant, but that such a measure would have important
symbolic value, and impress Iran, and should therefore be
pursued, despite the likely reluctance of China. End summary.


2. (C) HMG believes a fourth UNSC Resolution on Iran will
become necessary following the kind of ambiguous
non-response, or even outright rejection, with which HMG
expects Iran will greet Javier Solana's scheduled June 14
tender of the P5 1 offer, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office's Multilateral Team Leader Will Gelling told London
Iran Watcher (Poloff) June 6.


3. (C) When Poloff expressed surprise, Gelling agreed that
obtaining another UNSCR on Iran would require enormous
diplomatic efforts, especially with the Chinese, who,
according to Gelling, had specifically warned P5 1 partners
that UNSCR 1803 would be the last one China could support.


4. (C) Gelling countered, however, that it would not be
necessary to persuade the Chinese to accept any tough new
measures against Iran, since even a resolution devoid of
additional sanctions would have significant symbolic value.
Gelling argued that, tangible economic pressure aside, the
Iranians, because of their national pride and dislike for any
appearance of international isolation, are more susceptible
to international opprobrium than Western policy makers often
appreciate. Gelling reasoned that the special Iranian need
to be seen internationally in a positive light is a
vulnerability Western policy makers should not overlook; the
psychological dimension of Iran's relationship with the
outside world, in HMG's view, gives multilateral measures,
especially in the Security Council, a special status and
impact.

Embassy Comment
--------------


5. (C/NF) Gelling's comment appeared to track closely the
comments of UK Political Director Mark Lyall Grant during his
meeting, on a range of topics, with USUN Ambassador Khalilzad
May 30 (ref). It also tracks generally with informal working
level statements made previously to Poloff by Grant's staff,
and to Poloff more than once by the FCO's Iran Coordinator
Antony Philippson, prior to UNSCR 1803's March 2008 passage,
on the likely future trajectory of P5 1 efforts.


6. (C/NF) Gelling's June 6 comments about Iranian
perceptions and the symbolic value of UN resolutions are
difficult to prove or disprove, but in general reflect a line
of argument HMG has made since the beginning of the P5 1
process about Iranian psychology and Iran's continuing,
longer-term search for prestige in the eyes of the world.






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