Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LONDON132
2008-01-15 17:43:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy London
Cable title:  

HORMUZ STRAITS INCIDENT: ALLEGEDLY AN IRGC

Tags:  KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL IS IR LE SY UK KR 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000132 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018
TAGS: KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL IS IR LE SY UK KR
SUBJECT: HORMUZ STRAITS INCIDENT: ALLEGEDLY AN IRGC
INITIATIVE

REF: A. 07 LONDON 3983

B. 07 LONDON 3700

C. 07 LONDON 3310

Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000132

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018
TAGS: KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL IS IR LE SY UK KR
SUBJECT: HORMUZ STRAITS INCIDENT: ALLEGEDLY AN IRGC
INITIATIVE

REF: A. 07 LONDON 3983

B. 07 LONDON 3700

C. 07 LONDON 3310

Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary. A long-time Embassy contact, reportedly
relaying information from a close friend who is an active
duty member of the Iranian military, told Poloff the Deputy
Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Naval
Forces) independently planned and led the January 6 feint by
IRGC surface craft against US Navy warships in the Straits of
Hormuz. The IRGC Commander, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi,
reportedly was "the voice on the bridge" which made English
language contact with the bridge of U.S. warships. Fadavi is
said to have a reputation for brilliance and ideological
extremism, and to be professionally jealous of his immediate
superior, IRGC (Naval) commander Abbas Safari. After the
incident, Fadavi was reportedly taken by former overall IRGC
commander Rahim Safavi to Tehran to brief Supreme Leader
Khamenei. This account of what prompted the IRGC to confront
U.S. Navy ships in the Straits, if true, may suggest that
senior IRGC officers enjoy significant de facto autonomy and
may in future be willing to stage further dangerous
provocations of U.S. forces, perhaps without prior
national-level guidance from Tehran. End summary.

Fadavi: The Bridge-to-Bridge Voice
--------------


2. (S/NF) A long-time Embassy contact, active in Iranian
expatriate media, relayed to Poloff the gist of his exchanges
since January 6 with an old friend of his inside Iran whom
this contact says is an active duty officer in Iran's regular
armed forces. Embassy contact said his officer source
generally described the January 6 incident in terms similar
to U.S. Navy public statements and stated the IRGC operation
was from start to finish conceived, ordered, and led by the

Deputy Commander of IRGC naval forces, Ali Fadavi. Rear
Admiral Fadavi during the incident was, according to the
officer source, in another IRGC vessel which stood off from
and controlled those IRGC craft feinting at the USN ships.
Fadavi, like many IRGC senior officers, is trained to speak
some English, and reportedly was himself the voice which
spoke bridge-to-bridge during what the officer source said
was intended as a simulated attack on the U.S. warships. The
officer claimed that, had U.S. ships opened fire, Fadavi, in
his stand-off command vessel, would likely not have been
among the IRGC casualties.

Claim: Confrontation Fadavi's Idea Alone
--------------


3. (S/NF) The officer source claimed that Fadavi's plan to
confront U.S. warships had not been previously known to the
Iranian Navy or to civilian authorities in Tehran, but that
the foray did not surprise Iranian military circles, due to
Fadavi's service reputation for brilliance, boldness, and
anti-Western extremism and ideological fervor. The source
reported that it was widely assumed in IRI naval circles that
Fadavi conceived of and planned the operation himself,
without any senior authority or encouragement. (Embassy note.
The Embassy contact, a well-informed Iran observer, strongly
seconded this version of events. End note.) Fadavi did so,
according to this version of events, to bolster his
reputation among senior officers for charismatic leadership
and to inspire the rank and file. The source further
speculated that Fadavi also had in mind the broader, purely
political goal of trying to deflect attention from President
Bush's visit to the region. The officer source later advised
that some time after the attack Fadavi had been taken by
General Rahim Safavi, former IRGC overall commander and
currently military advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, to

LONDON 00000132 002 OF 003


Tehran to brief the Supreme Leader in person (Embassy
comment: Such a briefing opportunity suggests Supreme Leader
approval, vice disapproval, at a minimum after the incident.
End comment)

Possible Professional Jealousy
--------------


4. (S/NF) Fadhavi reportedly has four years longer in
service than the head of the IRGC Naval Forces, Abbas Safari,
Fadhavi,s current immediate superior. Khamenei this past
fall reportedly tapped the younger Safari for overall command
ahead of his chronological senior Fadhavi due to the elder,s
personal extremism, a trait which Khamenei felt made the
younger Safari the safer choice. Fadhavi was reportedly very
frustrated at having been passed over for command of his
service in this fashion.

Fadhavi Experience: Syria, Lebanon, DPRK
--------------


5. (S/NF) At the time of Fadhavi's appointment to be IRGC
deputy naval commander, Khamenei reportedly also gave him a
second, simultaneous post by way of consolation: Shared
command of a bi-national Iran-Syria military intelligence
branch. This branch is reportedly responsible for
operational coordination between the two countries and is
headquartered on Autobahn Mazeh in Damascus; Fadhavi,s
appointment may be in part related to his reported presence
in Lebanon during the summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and
Israel. Additionally, Fadhavi, an Iran-Iraq War veteran, was
reportedly one of 70 IRGC officers sent to North Korea in the
mid-1990s for submarine training.

Comment: Confront USG to Boost
Prestige, Isolate Moderates
--------------


6. (S/NF) It is impossible to infer with confidence from
this limited, second-hand version of events alone whether
top-level Iranian political leadership approved the January 6
operation before the fact. The officer source, again
seconded by Embassy contact, argued that although most
Iranian commanders recognize the realities of, and do not
actively seek, all-out war with the United States, a limited
armed clash producing some casualties would have been, for
Admiral Fadavi, a very positive outcome of the Hormuz Straits
confrontation. This analysis is plausible to the extent such
an outcome would have enabled IRI hard-liners to underline
within Iran the irredeemable hostility of the U.S.
Government, always a talking point for those who want to
apply principles of the 1979 revolution to current policy,
and would have boosted for many the IRGC's domestic image as
Iran's leading defender. Antagonism with the West, Iranian
victimhood, and the need to aggressively defend the
Revolution are the touchstones used by hard-liners to
marginalize rivals and define and legitimize a militant,
ever-vigilant IRGC. This domestic dynamic appeared to
operate during the March 2007 UK naval detainees stand-off,
when Ahmedinejad initially used the crisis to bolster his
visibility as a foreign policy leader and to show his ties to
the IRGC naval units which had seized the UK personnel.

Embassy Contact: Caveat
--------------


7. (S/NF) Embassy media contact, though his name is withheld
in this report at the request of other USG authorities at
post, is well-known to Department (refs a, b and c); this
contact has an interested view of events in Iran and has in
the past been flagged by some USG observers for erroneous
claims. Poloff depends on context and informed conjecture to
judge the relevance and plausibility of this contact's claims
on a case-by-case basis.

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