Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LONDON1159
2008-04-24 11:14:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy London
Cable title:  

HMG AND DOD INTEL FLIGHTS: HOUSTON, WE HAVE A

Tags:  MARR MOPS PINR PREL UK 
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VZCZCXYZ0010
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLO #1159/01 1151114
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241114Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8364
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHLO/USDAO LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T LONDON 001159 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR PM ACTION TEAM AND EUR/WE/UK
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PINR PREL UK
SUBJECT: HMG AND DOD INTEL FLIGHTS: HOUSTON, WE HAVE A
PROBLEM

REF: A. LONDON 1115

B. LONDON 1064

C. TREMONT-PMAT EMAIL APRIL 16

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4, b/d.

S E C R E T LONDON 001159

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR PM ACTION TEAM AND EUR/WE/UK
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PINR PREL UK
SUBJECT: HMG AND DOD INTEL FLIGHTS: HOUSTON, WE HAVE A
PROBLEM

REF: A. LONDON 1115

B. LONDON 1064

C. TREMONT-PMAT EMAIL APRIL 16

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4, b/d.


1. (S/NF) Summary and action request. According to FCO and
MOD contacts, HMG ministers are adamant that future requests
to use UK territory to conduct DOD intel flights must be made
"government-to-government" in "formal" (policy) channels,
rather than through the working-level mil-mil channels
currently used. British contacts outlined the proposed
procedures for requesting use of UK territory for intel
flights to PolMilOff and Air Attache April 22. Recognizing
that there is inadequate time to gather the newly requested
information before proposed May-August operations, HMG has
agreed to roll over approvals given to January-April
operations; any changes to January-April operations should be
brought to Embassy London's attention immediately. Embassy
assesses that this requirement indicates an element of
distrust in the U.S.-UK mil-mil relationship. Embassy
requests guidance for responding to the UK proposal. End
summary and action request.

New Clearance Procedures Outlined
--------------


2. (S/NF) Following up on the HMG letter contained in ref a,
MOD and FCO contacts outlined for Embassy London PolMilOff
and Air Attache April 22 a proposed system for requesting use
of UK territory to conduct DOD intel flights that scraps the
currently used mil-mil channel for such requests. MOD noted
that the mil-mil channel had become routine and technical,
when in fact these flights carried political risks and
sensitivities for HMG. The requests, therefore, need to be
pushed up to a "formal" (read: policy) level so that
Ministers could make the appropriate assessments in line with
UK regulations. In HMG's view, the mil-mil channel has
worked fine for routine operations, but when complicating
factors are introduced, i.e. politically sensitive issues or

other combatant commands are involved, HMG is unable to
obtain the information that it needs to carry out its
required legal and policy reviews. HMG, therefore, requires
a unified USG request in writing conveyed through the U.S.
Embassy in London. MOD contacts asserted that MOD PolDir Des
Bowen and HMG ministers are adamant that this process is
necessary.


3. (S/NF) Emboffs pushed back hard on establishing a more
"formal" approvals process, arguing that the proposal adds a
significant layer of bureaucracy to a system, that for the
most part, has worked efficiently and effectively in the
past. MOD disagreed; contacts cited instances in which
Operations HIGHLAND WARRIOR and CEDAR SWEEP had been
conducted from the UK Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri
without the proper ministerial approvals. These flights
entail political risk for HMG that require policy-level
approval. In addition, HIGHLAND WARRIOR had raised tensions
with the Cypriots, jeopardizing the UK's hold on Akrotiri.


4. (S/NF) Given these oversights, and other lapses that
proved embarrassing to HMG (i.e., renditions through Diego
Garcia and improperly documented shipments of weaponry
through Prestwick Airport in Scotland),MOD wants to
establish a file for each operation that will constitute an
"audit trail" of approvals on which HMG can rely if called
upon to explain itself. MOD proposed that, instead of the
consolidated map and the table on these flights that it
currently receives from EUCOM, MOD would like a map and
one-page paper on each operation that contains the following
information:

a) The information currently contained on the table;

b) The purpose of the operation;

c) Any 3rd party awareness of the operation;

d) Any intel-sharing we intend to conduct;

e) Whether the operation is part of a wider agreement (e.g.
Camp David Accords, UN resolution); and

f) A couple of sentences on political and legal risks from

U.S. political and legal advisors. (Embassy note. HMG does
not expect us to be cognizant of its political sensitivities,
but believes our assessment of political and legal risks will
flag any issues for which HMG might need to seek more info or
do its own assessment of. End note.)


5. (S/NF) MOD noted that after receiving this info for each
operation, Embassy London would then follow up every four
months (on the same schedule EUCOM currently uses) to ask for
renewal of an operation's approval and/or outline any changes
we intend to make from the previous approval.


6. (S/NF) Emboffs argued that the Embassy in London has
little of value to add to these operational requests; but FCO
and MOD contacts insisted that the Embassy in London could
sensitize Washington to HMG's needs and ensure the
information conveyed was adequate.

Upcoming Intel Operation Clearances
--------------


7. (S/NF) MOD recognized that too little time remained before
the beginning of May-August operations to implement this new
procedure and gather the additional information. HMG,
therefore, had already extended its approval of the
January-April program through the end of May. MOD, however,
advised that the package for the next period should be
received by HMG no later than May 24 so it can coordinate
ministerial approval by June 1. (Note: Any changes from the
previous program of flights (January-April) to the ones we
expected to begin May 1, should be notified to Embassy London
immediately so we can work those separately. End note.)

Comment and Action Request
--------------


8. (S/NF) Embassy believes these proposed requirements
suggest a new element of distrust has crept into the U.S.-UK
mil-mil relationship. More broadly, they suggest a new
unwillingness to take ANY political risk for the sake of our
mil-mil cooperation after the oversights cited in paras. 3
and 4 put the UK's access to Akrotiri and its relationship
with Cyprus on thin ice and the renditions revelation proved
highly embarrassing for the Brown government. The British
proposal for intel flights may be disproportionate, but is
almost certainly an indication of the Brown government's
sensitivity to any criticism over sensitive U.S.-related
intel missions at a time Brown is facing increasing domestic
political woes.


9. (S/NF) Embassy London cannot yet assess the resource
implications for its PolMil and/or DAO officers should this
proposal be implemented, but in the worst case scenario, an
additional staff member may be required. Embassy requests
guidance for responding to MOD's proposal.

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