Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LONDON1135
2008-04-22 12:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy London
Cable title:  

(C) AN UPDATE ON HMG EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL UN UK EU SA CH ZI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1029
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 0086
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0156
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1157
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001135 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND EUR/WE/UK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN UK EU SA CH ZI
SUBJECT: (C) AN UPDATE ON HMG EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
FOR ZIMBABWE

REF: LONDON 1014

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001135

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND EUR/WE/UK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN UK EU SA CH ZI
SUBJECT: (C) AN UPDATE ON HMG EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
FOR ZIMBABWE

REF: LONDON 1014

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The head of the Foreign Office's Zimbabwe
section indicated on 21 April that time is running out for
Robert Mugabe. Ineffective African mediation efforts may
still yield positive results if all interested parties,
including the African Union and the United Nations,
coordinate with the Southern African Development Community. A
proposal that respected African elder statesmen meet with
Mugabe face-to-face is another "regional" tool worth bringing
to bear. As violence within Zimbabwe is on the rise, the FCO
also is proposing that HMG, the U.S., and France work to
pursuade China to halt all arms shipments to Zimbabwe for the
time being. In light of the lacklustre mediation shown by
South African President Mbeki, Prime Minister Brown is
scheduled to meet with ANC President Zuma on 23 April to
discuss Zimbabwe. The ongoing crisis there continues to
remain of very high interest to the Prime Minister's office,
according to the FCO Zimbabwe section chief. End summary.


2. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on 21 April to discuss the
latest developments in Zimbabwe, FCO Zimbabwe Section Chief
Ben Llewellyn-Jones predicted that the current political
stand-off could not last indefinitely and that Mugabe would
be forced to leave office sooner or later. Finding the
proper political levers to make this happen sooner is proving
to be increasingly difficult, however, as HMG is "hitting the
limit" of available options with individual actors or groups.
In light of South African President Thabo Mbeki's moribund
efforts to resolve Zimbabwe's crisis, for example,
Llewellyn-Jones noted that PM Brown will hold a brief
30-minute meeting with ANC leader Jacob Zuma on 23 April.
Zuma's past experience in dealing with prickly regional
negotiations could well be useful, but corruption allegations

and other "political baggage" Zuma carries illustrate that no
particular African political figure can seemingly tackle the
problem alone.

Send In The AU Team
--------------


3. (C) Although the Southern African Development Community's
(SADC) recent mediation efforts also have fallen short
(reftel),and the regional UN representative in Harare
appears to be doing Mugabe's bidding, Llewelyn-Jones
maintained that Western nations should strongly encourage the
United Nations and the African Union (AU) to engage more
heavily on Zimbabwe. If SADC, AU, and even the local UN
representative carry the same message that HMG, the USG, and
the European Commission have been pushing recently, the
message would resonate more convincingly with Zimbabwe's
ruling elite. As another useful "regional" tool the SADC and
AU could bring to bear, Llewelyn-Jones suggested that an
entourage of respected African elder statesmen should visit
Mugabe personally with the requisite assurances for his
safety and immunity from prosecution, if he agrees to step
down.

Fending off the Chinese
--------------


4. (C) Llewellyn-Jones expressed unexpected delight that
several of Zimbabwe's neighbors had thus far prevented the
docking and unloading of the An Yue Jiang, a Chinese ship
carrying arms and ammunition intended for Zimbabwe. He was
not sanguine that Angola would act in the same way. In light
of increasing reports of violent confrontations within
Zimbabwe, he suggested that, through the UN Security Council,
the P-3 (U.S., HMG and France) should push the PRC to halt
all arms shipments to Zimbabwe for the foreseeable future.

Elections Theft Rewarded?
--------------


5. (C) Llewellyn-Jones agreed that the initial "shock" of
Mugabe's presumed electoral defeat has clearly worn off.

Mugabe and his cronies gain more confidence with each passing
day that the crisis continues, increasing the violence
directed at opponents and ratcheting up pressure throughout
the country while the voting "recount" proceeds at a snail's
pace. Meanwhile, although Morgan Tsvangirai's repeated
lobbying and concurrent regional travels have succeeded in
keeping international attention focused on his homeland,
Llewellyn-Jones wondered whether the MDC chief's extended
absence from Zimbabwe would end up costing him
ever-increasing political capital.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Zimbabwe continues to be of strong media interest in
the UK and Llewelyn-Jones remains "without a doubt gainfully
employed" in light of what he described as intense and
repeated daily inquiries on Zimbabwe from the Prime
Minister's office.

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