Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LONDON1116
2008-04-18 15:42:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy London
Cable title:  

UK REACTION TO IRAN SANCTIONS DEMARCHES

Tags:  ECON EFIN KNNP IR UK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2007
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLO #1116/01 1091542
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181542Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8312
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1155
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001116 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018
TAGS: ECON EFIN KNNP IR UK
SUBJECT: UK REACTION TO IRAN SANCTIONS DEMARCHES

REF: A. STATE 29344

B. LONDON 989

C. STATE 29098

D. STATE 30247

E. STATE 29431

F. STATE 37414

G. GAYLE/JOHNSON-DEPT E-MAILS

Classified By: SANDRA CLARK, A/ECON MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR REASONS 1.4
B&D

PLEASE SEE ACTION REQUESTS IN PARAGRAPHS 3, 5 & 7

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001116

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018
TAGS: ECON EFIN KNNP IR UK
SUBJECT: UK REACTION TO IRAN SANCTIONS DEMARCHES

REF: A. STATE 29344

B. LONDON 989

C. STATE 29098

D. STATE 30247

E. STATE 29431

F. STATE 37414

G. GAYLE/JOHNSON-DEPT E-MAILS

Classified By: SANDRA CLARK, A/ECON MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR REASONS 1.4
B&D

PLEASE SEE ACTION REQUESTS IN PARAGRAPHS 3, 5 & 7


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY The UK is actively considering its options
in its efforts to contain Iranian nuclear proliferation, and
appreciates the information we provided on Banks Melli,
Saderat and Mellat, according to Patrick Guthrie, Head of the
Financial Sanctions Unit of HM Treasury, and his Deputy, Pete
Maydon. They seek additional information on Saderat-Hamas
activities. Guthrie also noted that the UK implemented UNSCR
1803 on/about March 4, and asked whether the U.S. had done
the same. END SUMMARY

UNSCR 1803 REQUEST FOR IDENTIFIERS


2. (S/NF) We provided Ref A request for background and
identifiers information on the entities and organizations
listed in Annexes I and II of UNSCR 1803 to Guthrie and
Maydon, who immediately asked whether the U.S. had
implemented the list yet. Guthrie noted the UK had
implemented the list immediately following adoption of the
resolution. He was also concerned that any identifiers and
background information turned up in this process be
immediately shared with the UN. Guthrie had just met with UK
banks who described their difficulty in working with what
they described as "limiting identifiers" - such as having one
commonplace name - and the need to simplify the process in
order to ensure continued private sector buy-in. HMT also
asked how the U.S. was able to sign up to the UNSCR in New
York if we did not have all the identifiers and background
information necessary at that time for our domestic
designation. Guthrie said the UK would submit any
identifiers the UK turned up to the UN. Note: As reported in
Ref B, we delivered this request previously to the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) which said they were treating
our request as "a high priority."


3. (S/NF) ACTION REQUEST: Post would greatly appreciate a

summary of the U.S. process to gather identifiers and
background information, both in general and specific to this
resolution, that we can share with the UK. Explanation of
how and when we implement UNSCRs, and what information is
necessary for domestic designations, as well as anything on
the reasons for our delay would be helpful. End Action Request

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON BANK MELLI, BANK MELLAT AND BANK
SADERAT: AND HAMAS


4. (S/NF) The UK is very interested in any information the
U.S. can provide regarding Bank Saderat's transactions with
or on behalf of Hamas. Guthrie said the UK is able and very
willing to pursue Hamas connections. He explained that HMT
tried to go after Saderat for Hamas connections previously,
but the case was rejected by the Attorney General's office
for having insufficient evidence (problems with proving
Saderat either "knew, turned a blind eye, or reasonably
should have known" it was dealing with Hamas.) HMT would
like to re-open the case if new or fuller information is
available - particularly regarding the statement in Ref C
saying "In the past year, Bank Saderat has transferred
several million dollars to Hamas." Cases against Hizbollah
are more difficult for the UK to bring, as the EU and UK
sanction only the political/military wing of Hizbollah and
not the social/charitable group; so any evidence of
wrongdoing would have to be proven to flow only in the
political/military circles, according to Guthrie.

IRAN'S USE OF BANK MELLAT SEOUL FOR PROLIFERATION


5. (S/NF) HMT will follow up with the Financial Services
Authority, the banking regulator, on any further action HMG
can take against Bank Melli-Hong Kong if South Korea closes
Bank Mellat (Ref D). Guthrie said the UK has taken a hard
look at Melli and other Iranian banks and found nothing
illegal happening in or through the UK branches; nor have
they found regulatory violations. Guthrie speculated the
Iranian banks are trying to keep as clean as possible in the
UK, repeating previous statements by HMT and FSA officials.
Guthrie said he thought it unlikely that activity would shift
to Melli Hong Kong due to a closure of Bank Mellat in Seoul,

LONDON 00001116 002 OF 002


but asked for any information on Korean assistance on this,
noting it could help HMG efforts. ACTION REQUEST: Please
provide any information on South Korean assistance in
tackling Bank Mellat in Seoul and preventing a diversion of
business to Bank Melli HK. End Action Request

TEMPORARY DENIAL ORDER REGARDING TRANSFER OF BOEING 747s TO
MAHAN AIR


6. (S/NF) Guthrie claimed the Temporary Denial Order for the
Boeing 747 in Seoul to Iran's Mahan Air (Ref E) was not in
HMT's portfolio, as it did not represent a breach of UK
sanctions law, nor a breach of UK export controls. When
pressed on whether HMG could do anything regarding the UK
parent company, to whom the profits from such a sale revert,
Guthrie speculated that the Department for Business
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform could send a letter to the
Bally Group, but that HMT was unable to help - despite
recognizing the overall policy implications involved.


7. (S/NF) Armed with additional information of UK legal
commitments under UN, EU or domestic law, along with
declassified information on the mala fides of Mahan Air and
its partners, post could revisit the issue with the FCO.
ACTION REQUEST: Please provide a declassified UK releasable
version of information on Mahan Air and the IRGC which we can
turn over to the UK, as well as information on specific legal
commitments or statements the UK has made re: export controls
on planes, etc. End Action Request

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON IRANIAN-RELATED ENTITIES IN FINCEN
ADVISORY


8. (S/NF) We delivered Ref F to HMT and the Financial
Services Authority to remind the UK that we are intensely
interested in the two UK-based Iranian banks and to show
their links to sanctioned entities. HMT offered no immediate
comment, but thanked us for providing the information.

Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LEBARON