MISSILE DEFENSE: HMG CONCERNED POLAND WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000111

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND T
DOD FOR USDP AND MDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL NATO UK PO
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: HMG CONCERNED POLAND WILL
UNDERCUT PROGRESS AT BUCHAREST; PLANS TO RE-ENGAGE ON UK
PARTICIPATION


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) This is a State action request -- see para 9.


2. (C) Summary. HMG is concerned that public statements by
Warsaw since the Polish elections are causing other NATO
Allies to begin to question whether NATO should approve MD
work at the Bucharest summit in April. HMG suggests the U.S.
Government and UK warn the Poles that their wavering is
affecting this important NATO decision. Although currently
focused on beefing up Allied support for MD at Bucharest, HMG
also hopes to re-engage the USG imminently on its own
potential participation in the U.S. MD system. End Summary.

Polish Wobbliness Making Berlin Nervous
--------------


3. (C) HMG is concerned that U.S. and UK efforts to secure a
positive NATO decision to pursue MD at the Bucharest summit
in April could be undermined by ambiguous messages from
Warsaw about Poland's commitment to MD. Libby Stockel, FCO
desk officer for MD, told polmiloff January 9 that UK
diplomats at NATO were "sensing nervousness" among other
Allies since the Polish elections, given the Polish
government's "stock-taking" on MD. The UK had planned to
work with the USG, Czech Republic, and Poland to lobby other
nations before the summit on the merit of NATO pursuing MD
cooperation with the United States. Given the preponderance
of evidence in NATO studies supporting the utility of NATO MD
work and the near certainty of the U.S. system proceeding
anyway, HMG expected the French and Germans to agree to move
forward and the other Allies to then fall into line. But
recent statements by Polish officials suggesting uncertainty
about finalizing arrangements with the United States on
participation in the third interceptor site have caused the
Germans, in particular, HMG says, to express nervousness
about the prudence of NATO moving forward on MD work.


4. (C) Stockel, acknowledging that she had little insight
into how the U.S.-Polish negotiations were going, wondered if
the USG planned to tell the Poles that their public wavering
was affecting NATO's decision making She noted that a NATO
decision to pursue MD was certainly in Poland's interest, but
the Poles seemed unaware that they were having this effect on
squeamish NATO Allies. UK diplomats also reported to London
that Polish diplomats at NATO did not seem to be picking up
on this trend and advising Warsaw appropriately. Stockel
thought such a message from the USG to the GOP would help.
HMG was also considering delivering such a message but did
not want to do so without checking with Washington.

UK Participation in MD
--------------


5. (C) Regarding UK participation in the U.S. MD system,
Stockel acknowledged that U.S.-UK discussions had lost
momentum. She explained that the mid-2007 flurry of talks on
potential participation had been driven by a perception in
HMG that the UK needed to make a quick decision on hosting
all or part of the third interceptor site or risk losing out
to Poland and/or Czech Republic. Once the U.S. negotiations
with those countries began and it became clear that UK
participation was more likely to be something along the lines
of a test site, the urgency dissipated. Since then, HMG has
been focused on ensuring NATO makes the "right" decision in
April, which gives cover for all Allies.


6. (C) While acknowledging that PM Gordon Brown's currently
weakened political position makes consideration of the
sensitive domestic issue of hosting MD sites even less
palatable for HMG, Stockel emphasized that MD has "ALWAYS"
been a sensitive issue. While various Cabinet-level meetings
on the topic had taken place on MD, to Stockel's knowledge,
none of the hard decisions on participation had been made,
other than to emphasize that command and control of UK-based
assets would be a critical issue for negotiation.


7. (C) HMG, however, was planning on re-engaging with the USG
soon on potential UK participation. In fact, a UK delegation
was supposed to be in Washington January 10 to meet with the


Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and OSD, but had to cancel
because of a January 10 House of Lords debate on the HMG
announcement that it had approved the use of U.S. assets at
Menwith Hill in the MD system. Critics were arguing that HMG
had slipped the notification into a packet of announcements
just prior to Parliament's winter recess in hopes of avoiding
a debate over it. Stockel commented wryly that was actually
what the HMG had aimed to do, but she was confident the
debate would put to rest some of the unwarranted hysteria
about MD.


8. (C) FCO subsequently reported that the January 10 House of
Lords debate was "interesting but long" (three hours). Most
of the peers' complaints and questions were on alleged HMG's
lack of transparency with Parliament about its dealings with
the United States on missile defense, including about the use
of Menwith Hill, i.e. questions on process rather than
principle. Peers' questions about missile defense in general
indicated the "usual ill-informed questions from the usual
suspects," but did give HMG an opportunity to set the record
straight. FCO believes to some degree peers were frustrated
that HMG did not have anything new to say, because there have
been no major UK developments since the last full debate on
missile defense in the House of Commons five years ago.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The Brits are concerned about the Poles primarily
because they do not have insight into the status of U.S.
negotiations with Warsaw. (FCO Director for Defense and
Strategic Threats Simon Manley noted to Charge in a January 8
meeting that he would be in Washington January 24-25 and was
keen to meet with A/U/S John Rood on the Arms Trade Treaty;
Embassy recommends this meeting as an opportunity to update
HMG on the status of MD negotiations with the Czech Republic
and Poland.) Wanting to be helpful in securing a positive
outcome on MD at Bucharest, which will provide Allies, not
least among them the UK, domestic political coverage for
participating in MD, the UK hopes the USG and UK can jointly
get the Poles back on message. The good news is that HMG has
not given up hope of being part of the MD club, even if just
as a test site; the bad news is that with no looming deadline
for deciding on participation, the UK will have the time and
space to mark out tough negotiating positions.


10. (C) Action request for State: Please advise on whether
HMG should press Warsaw to tone down its public statements
intimating uncertainty about hosting the third interceptor
site or risk weakening support for missile defense (MD) among
NATO members.

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