Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LJUBLJANA413
2008-09-11 14:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ljubljana
Cable title:  

SLOVENIA PREDICTS "BORING" SEPTEMBER 15-16 GAERC

Tags:  PREL EUN PGOV PHUM ZL ZI SOCI YI TU GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0743
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLJ #0413/01 2551407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111407Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6895
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0022
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0013
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0220
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000413 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV PHUM ZL ZI SOCI YI TU GG RS
SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA PREDICTS "BORING" SEPTEMBER 15-16 GAERC

REF: STATE 96598

Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000413

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV PHUM ZL ZI SOCI YI TU GG RS
SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA PREDICTS "BORING" SEPTEMBER 15-16 GAERC

REF: STATE 96598

Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On September 11, Emboff delivered our points in
advance of the September 15-16 GAERC meeting (reftel) to MFA
European Correspondent Aljaz Arih, who commented that this
would be a "pretty boring GAERC." Arih said there would be
Council Conclusions on Somalia, which would be the GAERC's
most important decision, and on Zimbabwe, and Belarus. The
most important move on Georgia would be approving the
monitoring mission, to be called EUMMGeorgia. Arih predicted
a difficult decision on the draft declaration announcing the
entry of force of the SAA for Serbia. Turkey was not on the
agenda. End Summary.

Georgia
--------------


2. (C) Arih said that Slovenia was very happy with the
outcome of the EU troika's September 8 meetings, and hoped
that the September 8 agreement would be implemented. He
noted Slovenia's concern about avoiding problems of different
interpretations of the agreement. Arih clarified that
although Slovenia still had not taken a final decision on how
many monitors it would send to Georgia, the number would
likely be between 6 and 8; they would participate in the
EUMMGeorgia. Slovenia also favored strengthening cooperation
with Georgia in the framework of the European Neighborhood
Policy, including strongly supporting visa liberalization and
a free trade agreement.

Zimbabwe
--------------


3. (C) Arih commented that there would not be much new on
Zimbabwe and that Slovenia's position was in line with our
points. He noted that Slovenia felt it necessary to find the
right balance between pressure and encouragement. The
Council Conclusions would express concern over the situation
there; state that non-recognition of the June 27 election

results was legitimate; refer to further measures if there
was not any progress; support African efforts; focus on
humanitarian action; and note that the EU stands ready with
positive measures if there is progress with the transition.

Somalia
--------------


4. (C) Arih stated that approving an EU naval operation for
Somalia would be the most important decision for the FMs at
the September GAERC. He noted that it would not be an ESDP
mission, but a military coordination of naval operations of
EU member states willing to send vessels to the region. He
added that the operation would be called EUNAVCO. Arih also
reviewed the Council Conclusions for Somalia: welcoming the
progress in the political process under UN mediation;
expressing the EU's readiness to help with the police
mission; expressing concern about the deterioration of the
humanitarian situation, and launching EUNAVCO. He said that
Slovenia wanted an inclusive approach to finding a solution
to the crisis in Somalia and supported the UN Special
Representative.

Serbia
--------------


5. (C/NF) According to Arih, the main purpose of the FMs'
discussion was to decide about the interim agreement for
Serbia. He predicted that it would be difficult because the
Netherlands was still not on board. Arih said that the draft
declaration announcing its entry of force stated that Serbia
must continue to cooperate with ICTY and hand over the last
two fugitives. It also noted that the start of the SAA's
ratification process would be based on Serbia meeting those
conditions. Slovenia strongly supported the entry of force
of the SAA for Serbia.


6. (C) Arih commented that it was difficult to predict what
FM Rupel would say on the Western Balkans, explaining that

LJUBLJANA 00000413 002 OF 002


Rupel had his own ideas, which he would not share with others
in the MFA before the GAERC. Arih noted that the MFA's
prepared national position is that Serbia's further progress
on the path to European integration could positively affect
stability in the region. He also agreed that EULEX must
operate throughout Kosovo. He stated, however, that Slovenia
still had not decided its position on Serbia seeking an
advisory opinion from the ICJ. He speculated that Slovenia
most likely would abstain, and he was pretty sure that
Slovenia would not vote against it. He added that
discussions within the EU were ongoing and that there was not
a common position to abstain. He opined that some member
states would support Serbia's move.

Belarus
--------------


7. (C) Arih noted that the FMs would, without discussion,
adopt Council Conclusions on Belarus: welcoming the release
of all political prisoners; stating that compliance with
democratic principles and the rule of law were the conditions
for the start of more EU engagement; and welcoming the
deployment of OSCE observers for the September 28 elections.
Arih commented that there were some member states, including
Poland, that favored lifting sanctions. Those member states
compared the EU's relationship with Belarus to Cuba, where
the EU had lifted sanctions even though there were still
political prisoners. Arih added that Solana's call to
Lukashenko the week of September 1 had been a "clear signal"
that the EU was ready to engage Belarus, but it would be
almost impossible to do so if Belarus were to recognize
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
FREDEN