Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LISBON678
2008-03-19 16:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Lisbon
Cable title:  

FM AMADO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS LAJES AIR BASE,

Tags:  PREL PO IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9468
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHLI #0678/01 0791654
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191654Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6710
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 000678 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

S/WCI FOR WILLIAMSON AND LAVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PO IR
SUBJECT: FM AMADO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS LAJES AIR BASE,
KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, AND GTMO

REF: A. LISBON 510

B. LISBON 467

C. LISBON 410

D. LISBON 251

E. LISBON 183

F. 07 LISBON 2720

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

Summary
--------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 000678

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

S/WCI FOR WILLIAMSON AND LAVINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PO IR
SUBJECT: FM AMADO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS LAJES AIR BASE,
KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, AND GTMO

REF: A. LISBON 510

B. LISBON 467

C. LISBON 410

D. LISBON 251

E. LISBON 183

F. 07 LISBON 2720

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

Summary
--------------


1. (S) The Ambassador told FM Amado on March 19 that Lajes
Air Base is important but not crucial to the United States,
so it made sense to think about possible new missions that
would make the base more attractive. They agreed to move
forward with military-to-military exploration of a new
training airspace north of the Azores. Amado insisted there
is broad agreement among the mainstream political parties
that NATO's effort in Afghanistan is important to Portugal's
own security, but he lamented that the government's resource
constraints do not enable it to engage as actively as it
would like. Amado shed no light on when his government would
recognize Kosovo, saying only that the decision would come
"soon." The Foreign Minister said he wants to revisit the
standing U.S. request to accept detainees from Guantanamo but
plans to do so by pushing for a common EU approach to the
issue. The portion of the conversation addressing talks
between Portugal's largest energy company, Galp, and Iran's
national oil company will be reported septel. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador called on FM Luis Amado on March 19,
accompanied by Pol/Econ counselor. Amado was joined by
diplomatic advisor Paulo Lourenco.


Lajes Air Base -- New Missions?
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador recalled his earlier discussion with
Amado (ref C) in which the two had discussed the possible
establishment of a training airspace north of Lajes Air Base
in the Azores. As Amado suggested, the Ambassador later
raised the issue formally in the Bilateral Commission on
February 21 (ref A),when he expressed his hope that our
respective Air Forces would be able to begin discussions this
spring. Minister of Defense Severiano Teixeira, however,
subsequently told the Ambassador that he would be unable to
authorize his military officers to do so without written
authorization from Amado, while Air Force Chief General

Araujo had indicated he would be unable to proceed without a
formal go-ahead from Severiano Teixeira. The Ambassador
solicited Amado's guidance on how to move forward in
addressing an issue that seemed to hold real benefits for
both sides. He added that there is increasing pressure on
our side for additional personnel reductions at Lajes. The
air base is important to the U.S. but not critical, he
emphasized, so it would be useful to think together about
possible new missions for Lajes.


4. (C) Amado replied that he planned to see his defense
counterpart later in the day and would convey his verbal
approval of military-to-military discussions on a potential
training area. In addition, Amado would send to the MOD the
same day a written note containing the same message. That
ought to give Severiano Teixeira what he needs to instruct
General Araujo to proceed, Amado commented. The Foreign
Minister added that the GOP must consult closely with the
autonomous Regional Government of the Azores (RGA) as
discussions proceed, and he reported that RGA President Cesar
told him the U.S. Consul in the Azores had briefed him on the
possible training area. Regarding the broader issue of
finding new missions for Lajes, if the RGA accepts the need
to do so, we can proceed along those lines, Amado stated.


Afghanistan
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador thanked Amado for Portugal's decision
to deploy a second Operational and Mentoring Liaison Team
(OMLT) to ISAF and expressed his hope that the decision would
be made public before the Bucharest Summit. It is essential
that NATO succeed in Afghanistan, he said, and that all
Allies engage actively there. The Ambassador urged Portugal
to reconsider its decision to withdraw its commando company
in August of this year.


6. (C) Amado asserted that there is broad consensus among

LISBON 00000678 002 OF 002


the mainstream political parties in Portugal that the fight
in Afghanistan is critical to Portugal's own national
security interests, even if there are differences internally
and with us about how to achieve our common objectives there.
He lamented, however, that the government's limited
resources prevent it from being as engaged as it would like
to be. Amado recalled the most recent gathering of EU
foreign ministers, at which there had been some pessimistic
assessments of recent developments in Afghanistan but no
voices of dissension regarding the importance of the mission
there.

Kosovo
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador asked when Portugal planned to
recognize Kosovo, emphasizing that the longer the uncertainty
lingers, the greater the risk of destabilizing activities.
On the other hand, the sooner Serbia and Russia recognize
Kosovo's inevitability as an independent state, the sooner
Belgrade and Pristina can move toward integration with the
Euro-Atlantic community.


8. (C) He alone does not make the decision on Kosovo, Amado
replied, adding that the GOP is "consulting with our
President and our allies." He lamented that the UN Security
Council appears blocked and would say only that Portugal
would take a decision "soon."

Guantanamo
--------------


9. (S) Amado raised Guantanamo, saying he wanted to follow
up on the visit to Lisbon in October 2007 by Ambassador
Williamson (Ref F -- in which the latter asked Portugal to
accept a number of GTMO detainees). Toward that end, he
expressed his intention to raise formally with his EU
counterparts the need to develop a new framework for
transatlantic collaboration, one that moves beyond the
"exceptional" period that followed the 9/11 attacks. Europe
and the United States need to pass from "a stage of
exceptionality to one of maturity," Amado said. As part of
that effort, it is important to adjust our legal systems on
both sides of the Atlantic to take into account the new
threats that we all face. A discussion of what to do about
Guantanamo, and how Europe can help, would be raised in the
context of this broader discussion within the EU, according
to Amado.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) As usual, Amado was very generous with his time --
today's conversation lasted an hour and ten minutes. We were
disappointed that he did not provide more clarity on the
GOP's position on Kosovo recognition, despite our pressing.
We were struck by his reference to ongoing consultations with
the President, which makes us wonder whether Cavaco Silva
might be the stumbling block. It is the first time we have
heard such a reference -- our contacts at all levels have
been unusally close-mouthed on the issue -- but we will
follow up with the President's office. Prime Minister
Socrates and his government make the final decision on
recognition, but the President wields significant influence
in his role as commander in chief, and Socrates has been very
solicitous of his foreign policy expertise and interests. On
the positive side, Amado clearly wanted to send a message of
his desire to be helpful on Guantanamo. His diplomatic
advisor clarified after the meeting that Portugal is prepared
to accept some detainees but only subsequent to an EU
consensus requiring member states to play their part in
helping us close the facility. Amado plans to lead the
effort to achieve such a consensus but will do so indirectly
by pressing for strengthened transatlantic collaboration.
Stephenson