(C) WHY PORTUGAL IS SOFT ON RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LISBON 002689


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON RS PO
SUBJECT: (C) WHY PORTUGAL IS SOFT ON RUSSIA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS STEPHENSON, REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Portugal has shown itself to be notably
reluctant to criticize Russian misbehavior in recent months.
There is no single reason for this, but rather a combination
of Portugal's new economic diplomacy, a desire to find a
"balance" on tough issues, and some preconceptions on the
part of a few highly-placed individuals in Portugal's
personality-driven foreign policy apparatus. We believe that
Portugal's occasional softness on Russia and cautious nature
should not obscure the fact that it remains a committed ally
of the US, the EU, and NATO. While its impulses are not
likely to change in the short to medium term, we may be able
to overcome them in the longer term with an approach focused
on how Portuguese, European, and transatlantic interests are
at stake when Russia misbehaves. END SUMMARY.


2. (C/NF) When Russia acts up -- in cases ranging from the
Estonia cyber attacks to Kosovo to the invasion of Georgia --
we are often disappointed by the lack of vigorous support we
receive from Portugal, a founding NATO member and
self-described stalwart ally. It can appear that Portugal is
pro-U.S. ideologically but supports Russia tactically. While
there is no single explanation for these tepid responses,
there are a number of factors at play, illustrated by the
examples below. Indeed, as Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov
will visit Lisbon in November, we expect Portugal to miss
another opportunity to press the Russians on issues of
importance to us.

CASE STUDIES: GEORGIA, HUMAN RIGHTS, OSCE, AND UKRAINE
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3. (C/NF) Georgia: While the GOP joined EU consensus to
condemn Russia's disproportionate actions in Georgia, it
followed rather than led, waiting until consensus was reached
in Brussels. Even then, the MFA communique said only that
the GOP aligned itself with the EU statement without
mentioning what that EU statement contained. Moreover, the
MFA statement was in Portuguese only; no translation was
released, as is the norm for MFA statements. And there were
no follow-up statements, even as the situation on the ground
unfolded.


4. (C/NF) Human Rights in Russia: At the 2007 EU-Russia
Summit (during the Portuguese EU presidency),a journalist
asked Prime Minister Socrates if his decision to minimize
human rights as a summit topic in order to have a friendlier
atmosphere had "paid off." Socrates was visibly frustrated
with the perception that he had minimized human rights
issues, and then Putin masterfully exploited the moment by
pointing out that he and Socrates had indeed discussed human
rights, and that Russia was ready to help with the EU's human
rights problems.


5. (C/NF) OSCE Election Observation: Also at the 2007
summit, many western nations were concerned about Russia's
reluctance to allow OSCE observers at its elections. The
MFA's then-Political Director Bramao Ramos told us the
Russians had told him privately on his recent trip to Moscow
that an extended OSCE mission of 90 days would be insulting
to a developed member state of the OSCE. Bramao Ramos
continued that, "They are not an emerging country, you know.
I can understand the point of view." He said the Russians
openly told him that their slowness in responding to the OSCE
was a delaying tactic to avoid the kind of mission the OSCE
wished to conduct, and Bramao Ramos saw no need to object.


6. (C/NF) Cold Shoulder to Kiev: Ukrainian embassy officials
in Lisbon tell us that their many overtures to the GOP are
rebuffed with little explanation, and given the large
Ukrainian population in Portugal (roughly 10% of the
immigrant population here),there are presumably areas for
cooperation. MFA officials tell us it would be difficult to
engage in high-profile programs with Ukraine without
"balancing" them with programs for Russia, for fear of
upsetting Portugal's Ambassador to Moscow, who is also
accredited to Kyiv and Tblisi. The Ukrainian Ambassador to
Lisbon has stressed that, even during his President's visit
to Lisbon, the Russians received deliverables. "They have to
give them something every time they give us something," he
sighed.

THREE PILLARS OF PORTUGUESE FOREIGN POLICY
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7. (C/NF) Prime Minister Socrates and President Cavaco Silva
-- who represent rival political parties -- both stress that
Portugal has three pillars to its foreign policy: the
Lusophone world, the European Union, and the trans-Atlantic
relationship. Issues not fitting neatly into one of these
boxes get little love in Lisbon. This system creates an
internal consistency whose logic is not always readily
visible to outsiders. Thus, East Timor is of importance to
the GOP but the Horn of Africa is not. Rule of law in
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde is a top priority, but the same
issue in Nicaragua is not.


8. (C/NF) Afghanistan demonstrates how Portugal develops
foreign policy. Portugal eagerly joined ISAF operations when
the mission was framed as an Article 5 response to an attack
on a NATO ally; this was clearly supported by one of the
foreign policy pillars. As the mission continued, it was
framed as an example of the future of the trans-Atlantic
alliance; an argument Portugal also supported. Portugal's
enthusiasm has waned recently, however, as Afghanistan is
viewed now primarily as a regional stability activity in a
region in which Portugal has no strategic interests.

NEW ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY
--------------

9. (C/NF) While these pillars guide Portuguese diplomacy at
the strategic level, there is still room to act elsewhere if
Portugal's interests are demonstrably at stake. PM Socrates
has focused his attention on activist economic diplomacy to
improve Portugal's 22 billion euro trade deficit and
particularly to diversify energy supplies. To that end, he
and his foreign policy circle have developed trade programs
with Russia, Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Venezuela, for which
the GOP in general and PM Socrates in particular have been
widely praised. The only significant exception to the media
praise for the GOP's economic diplomacy has been in regard to
Angola, which is, of course, part of the Lusophone world so
the strategic equities are still in play.


10. (C/NF) Portuguese interlocutors openly discuss the need
to maintain access to Russian energy at a time when much of
Europe is wishing to diversify away from Russia. Portugal is
not looking for direct petroleum exports from Russia, but is
interested in Russian-controlled sources elsewhere, including
in North and West Africa. The GOP and the Portuguese
business community are equally energized in engaging Russian
extractive firms for contracts in technology and services.
They feel that these efforts would be hindered by Portugal
taking a public stance on the Nabucco/South Stream
competition, so the GOP remains silent. With the press
generally supportive of this approach, look for PM Socrates
to stay the course heading towards Autumn 2009 elections here.

THE SEARCH FOR "BALANCE"
--------------

11. (C/NF) As a small power, Portugal has decided to carve
out a niche as an "honest broker" in international relations.
This manifests itself in varied ways, not only in
Europe-Russia issues, but also in Europe's relations with
Iran and North Africa. Portuguese officials believe that a
good ally helps alleviate a crisis through mediation, which
is somewhat at odds with our view that in a crisis, allies
stand publicly with allies.


12. (C/NF) Kosovo may be the issue where Portugal has most
disappointed us. During its EU Presidency, Portugal took the
lead in making Kosovo an EU question (which brought it
briefly within Portugal's own diplomatic pillar of the
European Union). But when the EU failed to reach consensus
and Portugal rotated out of the presidency, Kosovo defaulted
to a bilateral issue outside the three Portuguese pillars,
and the GOP delayed eight months before recognizing Kosovar
independence. GOP officials offered a buffet of
justifications for their tardy recognition, including the
timing of Russian, Spanish, Serbian, and Kosovar elections,
the timing of UNGA, and even (privately) a protocol slight
that reportedly had irritated President Cavaco Silva.


13. (C/NF) When the GOP finally recognized Kosovo on October
7, FM Amado simultaneously announced the GOP would support
Serbia's call to have the ICJ review the legality of Kosovo
independence. That is, the GOP both acted and called its own
action into question, all in the quest for "balance". After
a furious round of US and UK calls to the MFA, Portugal

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stepped back and abstained on the ICJ resolution. And while
we believe the Portuguese were legitimately striving for
balance, rather than playing some more nefarious game, the
result was to annoy everyone equally. This search for
balance is deeply rooted and we expect it to be a continuing
irritant regarding policies on Russia, as well as on
Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.

800 POUND MFA GORILLAS
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14. (C/NF) Another factor is the influence of Portuguese
Ambassador in Moscow, Manuel Marcelo Monteiro Curto, one of
Portugal's most senior diplomats. According to MFA contacts,
he is extremely pro-Russian and is the embassy's only fluent
Russian speaker, having served in Moscow previously and being
married to a Russian. When Russia recognized Abkhazia and
South Ossetia on August 26, Russian officials informed
Monteiro Curto before making a public announcement.


15. (C/NF) It is worth noting that the Portuguese MFA takes
discrete approaches to its regional policy making. For
example, foreign policy towards the US is managed almost
entirely by the offices of FM Amado and PolDir Nuno Brito,
bypassing the Americas Division, whereas Russia policy is
generated by Monteiro Curto and his embassy in Moscow.
Russia desk officers at the Portuguese MFA must route their
papers through Monteiro Curto before sending them to the FM
and PolDir. Further, Monteiro Curto is also accredited to
seven other states that Russia and Monteiro Curto himself
believe to be within Russia's sphere of influence, including
Georgia and Ukraine.


16. (C/NF) Still worse, Monteiro Curto had, until recently, a
kindred spirit in the MFA's Political Director, Vasco Bramao
Ramos. Bramao Ramos was recently replaced by Nuno Brito as
PolDir, but he carried a particular torch for Venezuela
(e.g., urging U.S. interlocutors to view Hugo Chavez as an
ideal intermediary for reaching out to Fidel Castro) and was
equally unhelpful on Russia. We periodically had to check
with FM Amado to ascertain if Bramao Ramos was fairly
representing GOP views, and were often told he was not. We
are hopeful that with Nuno Brito in place, this pocket of
free-lance policy making will wither away.

RECOMMENDATIONS
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17. (C/NF) Portugal is softer on Russia than we would like.
While this is for tactical rather than strategic reasons,
this impulse is not going away soon. Portuguese officials
will continue to eschew public controversies with Russia and
other troublemakers unless they believe a key national
interest is being challenged. For policy makers in
Washington and allied capitals, the proposition of winning
Portuguese support on the range of tough issues boils down to
our ability to frame them not as disputes between, e.g., the
West vs. Russia or the US vs. Venezuela, but as threats to
Portugal's own interests where Portuguese "balance" would be
counterproductive.


18. (C/NF) Thus, the primary focus of our efforts should be
on encouraging Portugal to take a leading role in defining EU
policy discussions. Should the Lisbon Treaty be implemented,
the lowest common denominator approach to policy would not be
so prevalent and those states wanting to be heard will have
greater influence. GOP officials have a willingness to
overlook Russian misdeeds and to be annoyed with what they
term anti-Russia obsessions of EU allies to the east --
Poland in particular -- because they view each of these
misdeeds in isolation rather than as part of a pattern.


19. (C/NF) Indeed, FM Amado stated publicly that Russian
actions in Georgia spurred the GOP to recognize Kosovo,
demonstrating that the GOP had finally begun to see Russian
actions more broadly. It is far too soon to imagine that
this is a preview of continued holistic thinking about
Russia, but this is the direction we should encourage. The
basic line is that Russian actions, taken in their entirety,
are extremely worrying and affect Portugal's national
interests. The unified and effective European Union that we
want to see -- and which benefits Portugal -- is hampered
when our mutual allies to the east are under continuing
systematic threat from Russia. We believe that over time
Portugal will recognize and accept this idea that Portugal's
interests within the European Union and the transatlantic

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relationship are at stake when Russia misbehaves.
STEPHENSON