IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI'S VISIT TO LISBON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 000238

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PO IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI'S VISIT TO LISBON

REF: LISBON 183

LISBON 00000238 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: pol/econ counselor Matt Harrington for reasons 1.4 (B) a
nd (D).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) According to an MFA diplomatic advisor, during a
one-day visit to Lisbon by Iranian FM Mottaki on January 23,
FM Amado urged his counterpart to take steps to restore the
international community's trust and to act responsibly as a
key player in the Middle East, and he publicly welcomed the
agreement in Berlin earlier in the week on the text of a new
UN Security Council Resolution. Mottaki insisted privately
that Iran was fully cooperating with the IAEA, and he said
publicly there would be no need for another UNSCR given
Iran's full cooperation. Mottaki was upbeat about security
progress in Iraq but expressed deep pessimism about the
"Talibanization" of Pakistan, and he claimed President Bush's
recent trip to the Middle East had strengthened Iran's
standing in the region. An Amado advisor said there was
little the Portuguese government could do to control
collaboration between Portugal's largest oil and gas company
with Iranian counterparts, given the lack of a UN prohibition
on such commerce and the fact that many EU member states have
substantial business interests in Iran. End Summary


2. (C) As promised by FM Amado (reftel),his diplomatic
advisor, Paulo Lourenco, on January 25 provided pol/econ
counselor a readout of Iranian FM Mottaki's discussions in
Lisbon two days earlier. According to Lourenco, Mottaki and
Amado met one-on-one for 30 minutes, followed by a joint
press conference and a subsequent lunch with five-person
delegations on each side.

One-on-One
--------------


3. (C) The two foreign ministers discussed only two topics
in their tete-a-tete, according to Lourenco: Iran's nuclear
enrichment program and Lebanon. On the first issue, Mottaki
insisted the world had nothing to fear from Iran's enrichment
program, claiming that Tehran has cooperated fully with the
IAEA and would share remaining details requested by the
nuclear agency by the March deadline. Amado in turn
emphasized that trust was the key issue for the international
community, and Tehran had work to do to establish it.


4. (C) Commenting to us that "we are well aware of Iran's
efforts to poison regional stability," Lourenco said Amado
expressed concern about developments in Lebanon. He noted
to Mottaki that Portugal maintained an army engineering
company there as part of the UN PKO, and that Lebanon was a
test case for the Middle East, particularly on the need for
political coexistence. In what Lourenco said was a veiled
reference to Iran, Amado underscored that "every party" must
make an effort to find a solution to the political stalemate.
"Everyone thinks you're part of the problem," Amado told
Mottaki, "but you can be part of the solution." He told
Mottaki pointedly that Iran had the most to lose from its
continued isolation.

Press conference
--------------


5. (C) Lourenco said Amado's main goal at the press
conference was to express strong support for the P5 plus one
efforts, and he had been taken aback at how vehemently Amado
had done so. The Portuguese foreign minister strongly
endorsed the international community's efforts on Iran,
mentioning specifically the agreement on a new Security
Council resolution text by the P5 plus one gathering in
Berlin earlier in the week. He twice emphasized that Iran,
as a key player in the Middle East, bears a particular
responsibility to fulfill the international community's
expectations. Amado lamented that Portugal had been unable
to commemorate 500 years of relations with Iran in 2007
because of the political environment. He added that Lisbon
would like very much to strengthen bilateral ties, but that
would be impossible unless political and strategic conditions
changed (comment: according to Lourenco, this was
Amado-speak for "we wish we could have a better relationship
but Iran is not making that easy.") Asked by a journalist
about the meeting in Berlin, Mottaki replied that a new
resolution is unnecessary because Tehran is cooperating
fully. Amado welcomed the agreement on a new UNSCR text.


6. (C) Pol/econ counselor expressed concern about Mottaki's
and Amado's remarks about ongoing discussions between Iran's
national oil company and Portugal's principal oil and gas

LISBON 00000238 002.2 OF 002


company, and said they appeared to be inconsistent with
Amado's vow to Amb. Stephenson two days earlier to turn up
the heat on Tehran. Lourenco initially lamented that the
media reports had focused primarily on those remarks, which
he said had consumed only a small part of the press
conference. He added that he knew little about the topic,
that it was the Ministry of Economy that dealt with such
matters. When pressed, Lourenco said Galp, the Portuguese
company, was now a private enterprise and that there was
little that government could do to control its activities.
The MFA's role is to explain to companies the political
environment and the potential for additional UN sanctions
that might affect them. In short, "our responsibility,"
Lourenco insisted, is not to prevent companies from
involvement in Iran, but rather "not to encourage them."
When told that the United States prohibits commercial
activities in Iran by American companies, Lourenco replied
that there is no UNSC prohibition on general commerce with
Iran, and he pointed out that EU partners such as Italy,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom all have "big time
business with Iran." Business interests underpin every EU
discussion about Iran, and "we are bound by the internal EU
debate," Lourenco remarked.

Lunch
--------------


7. (C) MEPP: At the subsequent lunch, at which both foreign
ministers were joined by five delegation members -- including
Lourenco -- Mottaki spoke extensively, with Amado mostly in
listening mode. Mottaki was very critical of President
Bush's recent trip to the Middle East, insisting that whoever
tries to turn the region against Iran will fail. He claimed
that the foreign ministers of the countries visited by the
President all subsequently travelled to Tehran, and he
reveled in taking a call during lunch he claimed was from
Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah. Amado replied that the
Annapolis conference had provided a very important
opportunity to make progress in the region, and he urged Iran
to play a responsible part.


8. (C) Iraq: Mottaki was "very upbeat" about Iraq, noting
the improved security environment. Asked whether Mottaki had
addressed Iran's own involvement in Iraq, Lourenco said he
had not. Mottaki did express concern about developments in
northern Iraq, saying Iran and Syria would never accept an
independent Kurdistan. Asked whether U.S.-Iran talks on Iraq
were continuing, Mottaki said they were, and Amado was
pleased, describing that channel as "essential."


9. (C) Pakistan: Mottaki was "extremely pessismistic"
about Pakistan, which he described as moving inexorably
toward Talibanization.

Levinson
--------------


10. (C) Asked whether Amado had raised the case of
disappeared Amcit Robert Levinson with Mottaki, Lourenco said
he was unsure but would check. He noted that our earlier
requests to press the Iranians to share information on their
investigation had been passed to the Portuguese embassy in
Tehran, at our request, and Lourenco promised to check with
Amado to see if the issue was raised during the Mottaki visit.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) On the nuclear issue, Amado was determined to
underscore publicly that Portugal stood with the P5 plus one,
and he did so at the press conference in more direct language
than he normally uses. His private comments to Mottaki,
however, were apparently more typical of Amado's usual
cloaking of criticisms in non-confrontational language.
Mottaki's remarks on talks between Galp and the Iranian oil
company (NOIC) received wide media play here, but Amado's
only public comment was that he was aware such discussions
had been ongoing for several months. Based on our subsequent
conversation with Lourenco, the Portuguese government is
unlikely to try to limit possible collaboration unless the UN
moves to restrict such commerce, or unless the EU decides to
impose autonomous measures, both options which Lourenco saw
as unlikely. Nonetheless, we'll continue to press the
Portuguese -- including in the Ambassador's call on the MFA
political director on January 29 -- to advocate within the EU
for stronger steps.
Stephenson