Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LIMA304
2008-02-21 23:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

PERU AND CHILE: CONFRONTING OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON ETRD MARR PINR CI PE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000304 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ETRD MARR PINR CI PE
SUBJECT: PERU AND CHILE: CONFRONTING OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED
TIES

REF: LIMA 177 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POL/C ALEXIS LUDWIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000304

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ETRD MARR PINR CI PE
SUBJECT: PERU AND CHILE: CONFRONTING OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED
TIES

REF: LIMA 177 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POL/C ALEXIS LUDWIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)


1. (C) Summary: President Alan Garcia took office in 2006
planning to expand and deepen Peruvian relations with Chile
while quietly downplaying a series of potentially thorny
obstacles. The GOP continues to desire improved bilateral
relations, but the obstacles to progress have been anything
but quiet. The ongoing maritime border dispute is only the
most visible hurdle; Chile's vast direct investment in Peru's
economy as well as a wide military imbalance are additional
potential sore points in an otherwise broad and expanding
relationship. In seeking improved ties with Chile, the GOP
is pursuing a rational interest-based calculus that must
navigate a historically complicated emotional terrain
characterized by deep mutual suspicion. End Summary.

Peru Wants Stronger Relations With Chile...
--------------

2. (SBU) Improving relations with Chile continues to be a top
foreign policy priority for the GOP (refs). Our principle
government contacts view Chile as a country with a shared
pragmatic worldview in a region rife with populist leaders
and as an economic success for Peru to emulate. Peru's
free-trade and investment-friendly economic model, which the
Garcia government has actively maintained and vigorously
promoted, seeks in some ways to replicate Chile's
accomplishments. Government officials tout the variety of
free trade agreements in force or under negotiation as the
most visible aspects of this pragmatic approach. The
government has enthusiastically embraced its role as host for
upcoming summits between Latin American and European leaders
in May, and the APEC process culminating in the leaders'
meeting in November, as an opportunity to boost its profile
on the world stage and to underscore its insertion, following
in Chile's footsteps, into the global (read: Asia-Pacific)

economy. The GOP also recognizes the benefits Peru has
gained from tapping into Chile's economic success via trade
and investment and has vigorously promoted the expansion of
direct commercial ties.

But There are Obstacles, Such as Maritime Dispute
-------------- --------------

3. (C) Nevertheless, there are significant impediments to
expanded relations and broader integration. The most visible
obstacle remains the maritime border dispute. Peruvians,
from the most radical to the most reasonable (99% of the
population according to a recent poll),agree that the
current maritime border was unjustly defined and illegally
enforced by Chile, and that this amounted to a kind of de
facto "occupation" by Chile of Peruvian national waters.
(This view fuels local conspiracy theorists who claim that
Chile harbors expansionist designs on more Peruvian
territory.) Peruvian governments since Alan Garcia's first
in the 1980s have repeatedly requested maritime border talks
only to be rebuffed by Chile's argument that the border was
settled and there was therefore nothing to discuss.


4. (C) Partly in frustration, partly to boost his flagging
poll numbers, President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) signed a
law in 2005 to unilaterally adjust Peru's maritime border, a
move seen as the first step toward the Hague.
Then-presidential candidate Alan Garcia criticized Toledo's
maneuvering and promised to deemphasize the issue, which
reignited in August 2007 when the GOP published new border
maps in accord with the 2005 law. Now that it has submitted
its brief for adjucation by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, the Garcia government hopes the
dispute can be settled quietly and dispassionately (ref). At
the same time, most Peruvians, including those in government,
believe strongly in the correctness of the Peruvian argument.
Echoing the prevailing perspective, one senior-level foreign
ministry official told us that the difference between the
Chilean and Peruvian arguments is that "we are right".
(Comment: He meant this, without irony, as a statement of
fact. End Comment.) Given the overwhelming popular support
for Peru's case, local analysts believe the maritime border
issue needed to be addressed -- presumably as it has been by
the Garcia government -- in order to clear the path for a

deepening of bilateral ties.

Investment Imbalance
--------------

5. (C) A second obstacle to improved relations are
nationalist sensitivities surrounding the wide investment
imbalance, despite the great economic gains economic analysts
say Peru has made with Chilean capital. While Peru enjoyed a
more than USD 500 Million trade surplus with Chile in 2007,
Chile's high profile direct investment in Peru dwarfed
Peruvian investment in Chile by a factor of ten. (In 2006,
Chile invested over USD 4 Billion in Peru, while Peru had USD
50 Million in Chile.) Much of Chile's investment has gone
into airlines, insurance companies, and well known and
successful retail establishments such as the Ripley and Saga
Fallabella department stores. With the recent acquisition of
Peru's largest supermarket chain, Wong, Chileans now own many
of Peru's major retail and supermarket outlets. Although
economists emphasize that Chilean capital will allow Wong to
expand domestically and internationally, the takeover was
nonetheless perceived as a blow to Peruvian national pride
and interests. And despite the continued flow of Peruvians
to Chilean retail chains, average citizens often express
unease at alleged Chilean "control" over the economy.


6. (C) Both tabloids and respectable news sources reflect and
fuel this sentiment with banner headlines about the breadth
of Chilean investment, creating fertile ground for
nationalist politicians. Somewhat hyperbolically,
Congressman Gustavo Espinoza, spokesman for jailed
nationalist leader Antauro Humala, described Chile's
expanding investments here to poloffs as an effort to
exercise remote control over and even "to conquer" Peru.
Despite nationalist pressures, the GOP recognizes the great
benefits Peru has gained from Chilean investment and has made
every effort to continue deepening economic ties while
downplaying the Chilean economic "threat"; Chilean investors
in turn have signalled their desire to continue investing in
Peru's booming economy.

Military Disparity
--------------

7. (C) A third obstacle to deepened bilateral relations is
the hugely assymetrical modernity and strength of Chile's
military compared to Peru's. Peruvian investment in new
military hardware declined drastically during President
Toledo's term to less than $100 million in five years. At
the time, Toledo called on Chile to match Peru's cutback and
in 2001 the two governments agreed to set up a ministerial
commission to discuss harmonization of military purchases.
Instead of harmony, Peru's equipment fell into disrepair
while Chile's, fueled by billions spent on new planes, boats,
and tanks, continued to modernize and expand. The yawning
disparity and sense of alleged "betrayal" have stoked the
fears of some Peruvians that their government is not
adequately protecting the homeland from the supposed threat
of a Chilean invasion.


8. (C) Regular front page news reports about Chile's
military advantage and continued build-up (mostly but not
only in the tabloid press) help fuel the perception of danger
and threat. One analyst pointed to a series of
"...newspapers, blogs, and spokespeople that paint Chile as a
hopelessly embittered neighbor bent on subjugating Peru..."
Reflecting these fears, several of the Embassy's senior
military contacts say they view Chile as the nation's
greatest external threat. The GOP's current five-year
military modernization program includes $650 million for
repairs and new equipment. While much of this is focused on
internal threats such as narco-trafficking and remnant
terrorism networks, a significant portion is dedicated to
defense against external threats, principally Chile. Senior
civilian defense officials privately lament the need to
respond to the glaring military imbalance, but acknowledge
that failing to be seen as doing so would be tantamount to
political suicide.

Comment: Rational Interests Face Emotional Obstacles
-------------- --------------

9. (C) Comment: In seeking to intensify and expand its ties

with Chile, the Garcia government is pursuing a rational,
interest-based foreign policy calculus. And there is no
doubt that Chile's economic success and institutional
strengths have much to teach a Peru keen on following a
similar path. At the same time, the GOP's desired
rapprochement with Chile entails its navigating a highly
emotional historical terrain fraught with mutual suspicion
and (from an outsider's perspective) irrational attitudes
that color the views of players from across the political
spectrum. As an illustrative example, even Peru's
conservative Arch-Bishop from Lima, Cardinal Juan Luis
Cipriani, told us recently that Chile posed a greater
long-term threat to Peru's interests than did Venezuela. In
this complicated context, it should be no suprise that the
road to better bilateral relations includes an occasional
bump, large or small. We should just hope -- and do what we
can to help ensure -- that the shake and rumble that results
does not derail the effort.
MCKINLEY