Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LIBREVILLE420
2008-08-20 15:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Libreville
Cable title:  

CEEAC, AN EVOLVING REGIONAL ORGANIZATION, ASSUMES

Tags:  PREL MASS KPKO GB 
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FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
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INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0995
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0329
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0091
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1479
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0384
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 1051
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0460
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0954
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 000420 

SIPDIS

AF/C PLEASE PASS EMBASSIES BANGUI, BRAZZAVILLE AND MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018
TAGS: PREL MASS KPKO GB
SUBJECT: CEEAC, AN EVOLVING REGIONAL ORGANIZATION, ASSUMES
CONTROL OF PEACEKEEPING IN CAR

REF: A. IIR 6-833-0063-08

B. LIBREVILLE 0327

Classified By: CDA Nathan Holt for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 000420

SIPDIS

AF/C PLEASE PASS EMBASSIES BANGUI, BRAZZAVILLE AND MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018
TAGS: PREL MASS KPKO GB
SUBJECT: CEEAC, AN EVOLVING REGIONAL ORGANIZATION, ASSUMES
CONTROL OF PEACEKEEPING IN CAR

REF: A. IIR 6-833-0063-08

B. LIBREVILLE 0327

Classified By: CDA Nathan Holt for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS/CEEAC) took over responsibility for a small EU-funded
peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR)
on July 12. The handover was a milestone in CEEAC's gradual
emergence as a focus for security initiatives in central
Africa. Though security structures are still evolving, and
observers inside and outside the organization voice
frustration at the pace of progress, CEEAC has so far avoided
major missteps and racked up some modest accomplishments.
CEEAC's relations with regional heads of state and its two
major donors--France and the EU--are generally on sound
footing, and its status as the key regional partner for AU
security initiatives seems secure. These are early days for
the still-evolving organization, however, and there are tough
challenges ahead. End Summary.

--------------
CEEAC Activities
--------------


2. (U) Formally in existence since 1983, CEEAC was dormant
for much of the 1990s because of endemic insecurity in many
of its member states. Since then, regional leaders have
effectively re-launched the organization and directed its
focus toward security issues. Following is a quick overview
of CEEAC's current role and future plans.

--------------
MICOPAX--Peacekeeping in
the Central African Republic
--------------


3. (U) CEEAC's takeover of the EU-funded peacekeeping force
in CAR represents a major expansion in the organization's
responsibilities (Ref. A). The takeover also coincides with
actual and planned changes in the force's name, commander,
mandate and composition.


4. (U) "FOMUC" (for the "Central African Multinational
Force") was established in 2002 to help stabilize the wobbly
regime of then-President Ange-Felix Patasse. After Patasse's
overthrow by current president Francois Bozize in 2003, the
peacekeeping operation continued in largely the same form

until today: about 500 troops, a majority of them Gabonese,
under a Gabonese commander, with salaries and others costs
covered by the EU and logistical and material support
(including weapons) provided by France.


5. (C) Concurrent with the handover to CEEAC, FOMUC has been
re-named MICOPAX and placed under the overall command of
Congolese Vice-Admiral Hilaire Mokoko. Command of the force
is expected to rotate among CEEAC member states at six-month
intervals. At least five countries--Cameroon, Gabon,
Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and Chad--are slated to contribute
military or police personnel. CEEAC Secretary General
Sylvain Goma told CDA August 9 that the force will remain at
500 total personnel through the end of 2008, but after that
will grow by about 100 personnel per year until it reaches an
overall strength of 800. Such expansion is necessary, Goma
emphasized, in order to support an expanded mandate
(including greater focus on police functions and support for
CAR's efforts at internal reconciliation). More personnel
will be particularly critical if CAR holds elections in 2010,
Goma added.


6. (C) While the MICOPAX commander has overall authority for
operations, finance, logistics and communications, MICOPAX
must coordinate closely with French military forces for
logistical and other basic needs. Under an agreement
brokered by Gabonese President Omar Bongo in June (Ref. B),
parties to CAR's long-running civil conflict have agreed to a
ceasefire, cantonment, amnesty and negotiations over
power-sharing and the reintegration of rebel forces. Under

this agreement, which is already under significant strain,
the MICOPAX commander is also required to work closely with
Bongo's personal representative, an ambassadorial-level
official based in Bangui.


7. (C) The transition of MICOPAX to CEEAC control has not
been without hiccups. Only days before the handover, the EU
secured a written commitment from CEEAC Secretary Goma that
the force's mandate, activities and troop levels would not
change before the end of 2008. EU officials had urgently
sought this commitment to prevent disruption of current
financing mechanisms. Senior CEEAC officials also complain
that French logistical support has been unreliable, and that
such problems have worsened in recent months. General Claude
Reglat, commander of French forces in Gabon and a key player
in French support to MICOPAX, scoffed at those charges in a
brief conversation August 17--though he admitted that
conflicting regional demands, such as the February 2008
evacuation of French and other citizens from Chad, have
sometimes impacted French support for FOMUC/MICOPAX.

--------------
Standby Brigade
--------------


8. (C) Separate from the CAR peacekeeping operation, CEEAC
is leading efforts to create an AU-sanctioned regional
standby brigade for Central Africa--one of five standby
brigades the AU hopes to establish across the continent.
Starting in 2003, CEEAC has slowly worked out a command
structure and identified units for a brigade totaling 4800
personnel from all nine CEEAC member states (Angola, Burundi,
CAR, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, DRC, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon). CEEAC's initial focus, however, will be
assembling a mixed force of 1200-1600 persons according to
Secretary General Goma.


9. (C) Under an ambitious plan adopted in Libreville in
February, each member state is to provide 10 military
observers to the standby brigade. Angola is to provide two
IL-76 aircraft and Congo-Brazzaville one. Cameroon, Chad and
Gabon have each pledged a C-130. DRC also pledged to
contribute an as-yet-unidentified transport airplane. Angola
pledged three helicopters. Peacekeeping infantry battalions
(whose precise troop levels are not specified) are pledged by
Angola, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, CAR, DRC and Chad. Other
pledges include police units from Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, CAR
and DRC. Chad pledged a company of camel-borne troops and
Gabon pledged a field hospital unit.


10. (C) CEEAC officials admit privately that member states
are far from meeting these commitments. However, they point
to "Operation Bahr-el Ghazal" in eastern Chad in November
2007 as a significant step forward in the development of
multi-national interoperability within CEEAC and CEEAC's
organization of a regional standby force. In that exercise,
member states managed to project 1600 military personnel into
a harsh and remote environment for a three-day program that
included airborne (parachute) operations, field medical
assistance, and civil-military activities. The Gabonese
general who co-directed the exercise said that despite
difficulties, particularly with communications equipment, the
overall effort was a success and "reinforced the spirit of
comradeship." The next such large-scale training exercise is
planned for 2010 in Angola.


11. (C) Overall, CEEAC officials acknowledge that a standby
"brigade" or even a smaller multi-national force, dispersed
in country-specific units across several member states, needs
significantly more joint training to be fully operational.
Officials also cite weak transportation infrastructure across
the region and limited airlift and other transport capability
as major obstacles to the deployment and effectiveness of the
brigade.

--------------
The General Staff and CEEAC
Headquarters Activities
--------------


12. (U) CEEAC has a small military general staff--currently
about 15 total persons--based in Libreville under the command

of General Guy-Pierre Garcia of Congo-Brazzaville. The
general staff has primary responsibility for oversight of
MICOPAX, the standby brigade and other CEEAC security
initiatives. Operating from a refurbished building donated
by Gabon, the general staff has received vehicles, computers,
communications equipment and furniture through various EU and
French assistance programs.


13. (C) Gen. Garcia told CDA August 13 that the Government
of Cameroon has donated a warehouse to CEEAC for the
stockpiling of defense and humanitarian material. The
warehouse, at a military airstrip near Douala's commercial
airport (NFI),needs refurbishment and is currently empty,
Garcia reported. He admitted that CEEAC lacks both personnel
and expertise to operate the depot, and made a pitch for
training and other assistance. Garcia also pointed out that
the general staff has no reliable communications with MICOPAX
in CAR, and currently relies either on French assistance or a
faulty internet connection.


14. (C) CEEAC is working to overcome these limitations, with
particular focus on improved communications, Garcia claimed.
He added that CEEAC is also attempting to attract resources
for "centers of excellence" for the training of military
personnel. In each case, Garcia said, CEEAC is attempting to
make better use of existing facilities in member states.
Strategic, senior-level training can be carried out at an
institution ("CSID") in Yaounde, Garcia reported, and
"tactical" training--he cited demining--could take place in
Angola. Engineering instruction should take place in
Brazzaville, he said, and medical training is planned for
Gabon.

--------------
Civilian Control
--------------


15. (C) Secretary General Goma and other senior officials
also delineated CEEAC's complex structure for civilian
control of military activities. Peacekeeping and other
forces in the field report to their commanders, who report to
the CEEAC chief of general staff (though field commanders
also communicate regularly with other officials). The chief
of staff reports to CEEAC's deputy secretary general for
peace and security, who reports to the secretary general.


16. (C) Although CEEAC has absorbed the "Council for Peace
and Security in Central Africa" (COPAX),CEEAC is still bound
by a 2000 protocol defining COPAX's authority and
establishing a hierarchy of additional structures providing
political guidance and overall policy direction to CEEAC's
military components. These structures include a Defense and
Security Commission of senior military and police officials
from member states, which meets periodically at the request
of CEEAC's Council of Ministers (generally representing the
foreign affairs, defense and interior ministries of member
states). The Defense and Security Commission provides advice
to the Council of Ministers, which either reaches a consensus
decision on key policy questions or passes issues forward for
further review and ratification at periodic meetings of CEEAC
heads of state.

--------------
Analytic Capability
--------------


17. (C) Also at the headquarters level, CEEAC operates a
small conflict early warning mechanism ("MARAC", or the
Mecanism d'Alerte Rapide d'Afrique Centrale) with the broad
mission of identifying any situation likely to constitute a
threat to peace in the region. MARAC, which receives
financial backing and technical assistance from the EU, has
an "accent on strategic planning" according to Secretary
General Goma. MARAC also has responsibility for synthesizing
information collected from both open and "paid" sources,
according to CEEAC public documents. MARAC works closely
with a newly-created pol/mil department ("DAPD", or the
Direction des Actions Politique et Diplomatique),which is
responsible for non-military aspects of regional crises,
including conflict prevention, mediation efforts, and
post-conflict and reconstruction support.

--------------
Donor Relations and Accountability
--------------


18. (C) CEEAC officials acknowledge that their modest
achievements to date would not have been possible without
support from France and the EU. Both have a history of
engagement with CEEAC that predates the CEEAC's assumption of
peacekeeping duties in CAR. In addition to the French/EU
finance and administration cell attached to MICOPAX in
Bangui, the EU has a three-person team attached to the CEEAC
secretariat which oversee financial and material assistance
at the headquarters level. This cell is backed up by staff
at the European Commission office in Libreville. More
recently, the EU has channeled some support for CEEAC and the
regional standby brigade through the African Union in Addis
Ababa. A joint EU/AU team of accountants and other
professionals travels to Libreville quarterly to monitor that
assistance. EU assistance is set out in at least one formal
MOU with CEEAC, while agreement(s) governing French support
to MICOPAX appear to be less formalized--and confidential.


19. (C) CEEAC Secretary General Goma claims that French and
EU partners are satisfied with the relationship, a view
generally confirmed by representatives on the ground in
Libreville. The stringent accountability arrangements,
however, reflect well-founded concern over corruption and
other malfeasance in CEEAC member states, if not in the
organization itself. According to French General Reglat,
control of lethal and non-lethal defense articles provided to
MICOPAX is under particularly tight control. Such articles
remain technically the property of France, he emphasized, and
the finance and administration cell closely tracks their use
and their ultimate return to French/EU stores.

--------------
Political Will
--------------


20. (C) CEEAC's peace and security mechanisms have emerged
slowly, after seemingly endless rounds of meetings among
military and security officials; ministers of defense,
interior and foreign affairs; and heads of state. Key heads
of state, like Chad's Idriss Deby, have expressed public
skepticism about CEEAC's role in crises. Rwanda,
disenchanted with France and its francophone allies, withdrew
from CEEAC in 2001 and Burundi, though still a participant,
is pursuing closer ties to the East African Community. In a
comment to the Ambassador shortly before assuming his duties
as Chair of the AU last year, former Gabonese Foreign
Minister Jean Ping said that a major shortcoming of CEEAC was
that two of its key members--Angola and DRC--were "looking
south" toward membership in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). Nevertheless, member states have provided
personnel, equipment and some financial resources to key
initiatives like MICOPAX and the standby brigade. CEEAC has
also provided a platform for regional diplomatic efforts to
bring peace and political reconciliation to CAR and
resuscitate the latest peace agreement between Sudan and Chad.

--------------
Comment
--------------


21. (C) CEEAC's ambitions in the realm of peace and security
significantly exceed currently available resources, and some
of its plans should probably be scaled back. The weakest of
Africa's major regional organizations, CEEAC has nevertheless
made a real start towards creating structures to prevent and
respond to conflict. CEEAC's assumption of responsibility
for the MICOPAX peacekeeping operation in CAR will be a major
test of its capacity. So too will efforts to create a
standby brigade. French and EU assistance has been
essential, and more help from other quarters--including the
United States--could be put to good use with proper
safeguards. CEEAC's ability to develop into an effective
regional organization, however, is most dependent on the
political will of regional heads of state. It is their
recognition of the costs of conflict, more than statesmanship
or high-minded commitment to regional cooperation, that has
created the modest momentum that CEEAC now enjoys. End
Comment.

HOLT