BOLIVIAN MILITARY PULLS OUT OF WHINSEC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000099

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN MILITARY PULLS OUT OF WHINSEC

REF: 07 LA PAZ 2856

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Incoming 2008 Bolivian Army Commander General Freddy
Mackay Peralta told Military Group officers January 11 that
the army would no longer send officers to the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at
Fort Benning, Georgia. Mackay said the decision was
"political," but offered no further details or commentary on
the subject. Other branches have confirmed this is a
military-wide action to boycott WHINSEC.


2. (C) No Bolivian security forces had been sent to WHINSEC
in 2008, although 40 were slated for WHINSEC training in
Fiscal Year 2008 and a Bolivian was slated to take over the
vice-commandant position, a prestigious post. Those
currently in training or serving as instructors at WHINSEC
will finish their terms and other U.S.-supported military
training will continue unaffected. In fact, Mackay signaled
that the Bolivian military is still interested in receiving
U.S. training even if WHINSEC has been ruled out. Until
January 11, we were uncertain if candidate changes and slow
submissions were politically motivated or simply new 2008
commanders reshuffling to send their own people. Venezuela
stopped sending armed forces personnel to WHINSEC in 2005 and
cycled out its last student in 2007.


3. (U) Bolivian President Evo Morales has made pulling the
Bolivian military out of WHINSEC a standard stump-speech
topic since he took office in January, 2006. His recent
criticism of WHINSEC during an October 9 Press Conference
(reftel) is typical, when he announced Bolivia would
"gradually" stop sending troops to WHINSEC, which he referred
to as its former name, the School for the Americas (SOA).
Morales asserted the institute teaches "high ranking officers
to confront their own people, to identify social movements as
their enemies."

Comment
--------------


4. (C) After almost two straight years of railing against
WHINSEC and threatening to cut off Bolivian participation,
Morales finally dropped the other boot. The timing coincides
with WHINSEC 2008 training cycles, but also with the 2008
turnover in the military's high command, perhaps making the
change easier to impose on new commanders. This decision
will not endear Evo to the armed forces, who covet WHINSEC
training opportunities.


5. (C) Comment Continued: Although Morales' administration
constantly criticizes the U.S. military cooperation and
anti-narcotics efforts publicly, privately cooperation has
proceeded unimpeded at the working level. Morales is
increasingly following up years-old rhetorical threats
against U.S. cooperation with concrete action. He also
passed vague restrictions on foreign aid clearly aimed at the
U.S. in 2007 (reftel b). It is unclear if following through
on the WHINSEC threat is a stand-alone action or if it will
lead to action on other rhetorical threats against U.S.
military cooperation in Bolivia, which Evo has typically
packaged in the same anti-"imperialist" speeches. Evo has
repeatedly asserted it is a question of "national dignity"
that "uniformed armed foreigners" would have to leave the
country and that he would not allow foreign military bases.
Both comments are confusing as we have no bases in Bolivia
and he consistently fails to identify exactly what forces
(DEA agents, MILGP, Embassy Marines...) he wants to kick out
of the country. Like many of Morales' acerbic comments,
these "general" comments about "uniformed armed foreigners"
are clearly directed at us, not other foreign national
military representatives in Bolivia (i.e. Venezuelan, Cuban).
End Comment.
GOLDBERG