Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LAPAZ810
2008-04-09 22:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

BOLIVIAN MILITARY: LATEST THINKING

Tags:  PGOV PREL PARM PINR KPKO MARR MOPS BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0810/01 1002242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 092242Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7104
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7811
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5154
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9079
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6298
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3490
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3724
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5392
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6114
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0771
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1055
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000810 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM PINR KPKO MARR MOPS BO
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN MILITARY: LATEST THINKING

REF: A. LA PAZ 706


B. LA PAZ 432

C. LA PAZ 428

D. LA PAZ 373

E. LA PAZ 218

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000810

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM PINR KPKO MARR MOPS BO
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN MILITARY: LATEST THINKING

REF: A. LA PAZ 706


B. LA PAZ 432

C. LA PAZ 428

D. LA PAZ 373

E. LA PAZ 218

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: President Evo Morales continues to demand an
apology from SouthCom Commander Admiral James Stavridis for
allegedly implying Morales has links to terrorism, according
to Armed Forces Commander Luis Trigo Antelo. Trigo told our
MILGP Commander that without a formal written apology there
would be no progress on an exchange of dipnotes required to
send temporary-duty military to Bolivia, effectively freezing
many of MILGP's humanitarian assistance projects. Our
contacts assure us the suspension of the dipnote exchange is
coming from the Presidential Palace, most likely directly
from Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana. As
discussed by the Ambassador and Admiral Stavridis, we advise
not responding to this request, as the complaint has already
been addressed by dipnote and in high-level meetings, and
would only empower Quintana. Separately Trigo said
high-level visits and training for uniformed military would
be put on hiatus, but that all other exchanges, technical
training, and military cooperation would continue. Trigo
also conveyed fears for his life, following a bizarre April 3
"assassination attempt," and implied he suspected the
opposition or opposition-sympathetic actors might have
something to do with it. Morales and administration officers
have distanced themselves from use of the military to quash
the May 4 autonomy referendum in Santa Cruz Department
(state),but have instead enlisted social groups to play
interference. End Summary.

Evo to Stavridis: Say You're Sorry
--------------


2. (C) Armed Forces Commander Luis Trigo Antelo told MILGP
Commander April 8 that President Evo Morales wants a written

apology from SouthCom Commander Admiral James Stavridis for
allegedly implying Morales was a "narco-terrorist" during a
January 17 presentation. Trigo said an of exchange
diplomatic notes with the United States allowing U.S.
military personnel rights and privileges in Bolivia roughly
equivalent to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would be
forthcoming following such an apology. Trigo explained the
apology should be submitted to Trigo, who would deliver it to
Morales.

Trigo/Vargas Outline Near Term Military Relations
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Trigo further laid out his interpretations of the
government's new agenda regarding U.S. Military assistance:
--The ban on Bolivian military attended WHINSEC (Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) will stand for
the near-term, although he added it could be reconsidered
pending an apology from Admiral Stavridis.
--Senior military leaders would pass on training and
conference opportunities, including Distinguished Visitor
programs. Although he did not define what he meant by
senior, and we suspect he may be speaking only for himself,
he implied this would include all high-command officers,
effectively canceling planned U.S. trips for Army Commander
Freddy Mackay (June) and Air Force Commander Daniel Salazar
and Trigo (July). This travel ban would not/not impact the
MOD and a planned mid-May visit by Vice Minister of Defense
Wilfredo Vargas would continue, as will trips by other
high-ranking MOD officials, such as MOD's senior civilian
advisor.
--Participation in all other U.S. technical training,
conferences, and exchanges would continue.


4. (C) VMOD Vargas told MILGP April 4 that his efforts led to
the military finally nominating officers for several U.S.
training and conference slots. He said he was also
successful in advocating for an increased role for Bolivian
peacekeeping troops participating in UN missions and approval
of a separate dipnote exchange to facilitate U.S. funding of
Bolivian peacekeeping efforts. Vargas lamented he did not
succeed in pushing for the dipnote SOFA or securing access
passes to the Joint Command facilities. Although the passes
were routinely distributed to U.S. officers in prior years by
unofficially asking for them, we asked to receive them
through official channels this year and have been denied.
Nevertheless, access to BolMil installations remains
excellent.

All Signs Point to Quintana
--------------


5. (C) Trigo said he did not agree with the request for an
apology, nor did the MOD or uniformed command, who would
rather see the dipnote move forward expeditiously, but that
the "political" decision to require an apology had come from
the Presidential Palace. Trigo said he would discuss the
matter directly with Stavridis during a May 15-17 Sothern
Cone Chiefs of Defense Conference in Brasilia (SCONDEC). A
variety of military and civilian contacts confirm there is no
resistance to the dipnote SOFA agreement on substantive
grounds from either the MOD or MFA, but that the agreement
has been held up for political reasons by Morales' inner
circle (refs a and b). Vice Minster of Defense Wilfredo
Vargas told MILGP Commander and PolOff February 26 that
Presidential Minister (Chief of Staff) Juan Ramon Quintana
was behind the holdup. During a meeting with Codel Engel
February 19, Morales complained about SouthCom Commander's
presentations and said, with Quintana at his side, that
Quintana would take care of it (ref d).


6. (C) Toni Condori, Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies'
(lower house) Defense Committee, told PolOff April 4 that he
had convoked the MFA to report on the delay weeks ago, but
that the MFA had not yet responded due to a busy schedule of
incoming diplomatic missions. He did not think the delay was
an intentional slight, but plans to push for an expedited
exchange because "we are concerned about losing
opportunities." Condori (ruling MAS party) said he
understood that the holdup could send a negative signal to
Washington that could affect the budgets for military
training and assistance for 2009. Still, Condori conceded
that if the holdup is from the Presidential Palace, as he
suspects, "there is not much I can do to move it along."
Fernando Romero, Chairman of the Senate Defense Committee,
likewise told PolOff in late March that he too had asked for
an MFA report on the dipnote, but that if he does not receive
assurances the dipnote was moving forward he was inclined to
complain publicly about the "absurd rejection of help we
need." MFA Director for Bilateral Affairs Jean Paul Guevara
told PolOff April 4 that he had confirmed that the
Presidential Palace had no issue with the agreement's merit
or text and he would "try again to find a way forward we can
all agree on."

Dipnote SOFA Background
--------------


7. (C) Without an exchange of diplomatic notes before April
15, SouthCom has indicated U.S. MILGP medical missions to
Bolivia will be canceled for 2008. The dipnote exchange
covers U.S. military personal on temporary duty in Bolivia.
Without it, all U.S. MILGP humanitarian assistance projects
requiring TDY personnel are in danger. In light of the
current political atmosphere in Bolivia, the Ambassador is
not inclined to provide country clearances for such personal
without the protections guaranteed in the dipnote due to the
absence of a SOFA. The dipnote SOFA exchange has been in
practice since the mid-90s and must be renewed annually.


8. (C) We presented dipnote 011-08 initiating the process
January 16. The government's reply was dipnote
VREC-015/2008-1225 (text in ref e),dated January 29, which
suspended the exchange of dipnotes pending the bridging of "a
significant gap in our understanding." The gap referred to
Admiral Stavridis' January 17 presentation to CSIS, which
included a slide with a photograph of Morales with Iranian
President Ahmadinejad. The Bolivian government has alleged
the photo implies Evo is a narco-terrorist, a charge we have
refuted repeatedly, including via dipnote 034/08 and in
conversations with Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera and
Minister of Defense Walker San Miguel (refs b and e). The
Ambassador explained to both Garcia Linera and San Miguel
that the PowerPoint slide in question used the photo only to
illustrate Iran's interest in Latin America, and there was no
intent to suggest Morales was a narco-terrorist nor was there
any mention whatsoever of Morales or Bolivia.

Trigo's Strange Behavior Belies Fears of the U.S.
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Trigo also told MILGP Commander he feared a follow-on
to the April 3 attempt on his life by a lone, crazed youth.
He gave no details on the investigation, but was noticeably
uncomfortable with MILGP Commander and said he had not
determined whether the gunman acted alone or as part of a
larger conspiracy backed by the opposition or
opposition-sympathetic actors. MILGP Commander reiterated to
Trigo that MILGP is solely concerned with maintaining
positive military relations and cooperative programs. After
two months of trying to obtain a meeting with Gen. Trigo, his
deputy (Gen. Prudencio) pulled MILGP Commander into Trigo's
office to cover agenda topics that he felt only Trigo could
address. Trigo has since told MILGP Commander he has a an
open-door and MILGP Commander can visit him anytime he likes.
(Comment: Trigo's strange combination of unease and friendly
engagement with MILGP Commander comes after Trigo called
Defense Attache to his residence about a half-an-hour after
the aborted attack occurred. Trigo spent two hours with
Defense Attache recounting the episode. We suspect Trigo is
trying to ingratiate himself with the Embassy. End Comment.)


10. (U) According to local media, Yovanni Joel Guillen
entered Trigo's residence at 5:30 PM April 3. Guillen
slipped in with a group visiting Trigo's wife and was
subsequently apprehended with a 22 caliber rifle in his pant
leg. The mentally unstable 21-year-old reportedly planned
the attack against Trigo because he suspected he was planning
a coup against President Morales, but at the last minute
changed his mind.

Evo: Social Groups, not Military, mobilized for May 4
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Trigo also told Defense Attache he is lobbying
Morales to back off from a hard-line response to Santa Cruz
Department's (state) May 4 autonomy referendum and that any
use of security forces should be confined to the Bolivian
National Police. MOD San Miguel publicly said opposition
warnings of a May 4 crackdown are "irresponsible and
ridiculous" and President Morales issued a statement April 7
denying any plans to for a state of siege on Santa Cruz to
prevent the referendum. Morales and Vice President Garcia
Linera said April 5 that the referendum would be met with
social groups, not the military. Morales assured April 9
that the military is in "complete unity" with the government,
despite efforts by "some people" to divide the institution.
As proof, Morales cited his weekly meetings with the
military's high command and his talks with regional
commanders when he visits departments. The comments were in
response to an April 7 article in leading daily La Razon in
which anonymous military officers allegedly said they would
not use force against Bolivians to resolve the internal
political conflict, urged Morales to seek a peaceful
resolution of the government/opposition standoff, and
complained that some senior commanders are disposed to obey
Morales' orders blindly.

Comment:
--------------

12. (C) We already fully explained our version of events in
dipnote 034/08. We will continue coordinating our MILGP
programs through working-level contacts, but believe any
response to this absurd request for an apology is both
inappropriate and ill-advised, as it will undoubtedly be used
against us as "proof" of our nefarious intent to undermine
and discredit the Morales administration. Quintana is
deliberately using the Stavridis comments as an excuse to
block U.S.-Bolivian military cooperation. Providing an
apology, or any response, would only empower Quintana. Any
attempt to convince Morales to accept our help should come
from his own MOD and MFA, not the United States. MILGP
commander's active-duty contacts tell him they would lose
significant confidence in the high command should they
proceed with any further restrictions on U.S. cooperation,
especially exercises, training, and seminars. Our message to
Trigo should be that no apology is forthcoming and to
reference him to our dipnote. End Comment.
GOLDBERG