Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LAPAZ751
2008-04-07 17:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

BOLIVIA: PRE-MAY 4 DIALOGUE HOPES ON THE ROPES

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS OFDP OVIP BL AR CO BR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000751 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS OFDP OVIP BL AR CO BR
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: PRE-MAY 4 DIALOGUE HOPES ON THE ROPES

REF: A. LA PAZ 747

B. LA PAZ 735

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000751

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS OFDP OVIP BL AR CO BR
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: PRE-MAY 4 DIALOGUE HOPES ON THE ROPES

REF: A. LA PAZ 747

B. LA PAZ 735

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Despite much-publicized government urgency to
head off Santa Cruz Department's (state) May 4 autonomy
referendum through dialogue with the opposition, Bolivian
government contacts are privately accepting they cannot head
off the referendum and are looking at a post-May 4 strategy.
In the meantime, the government continues its flirtations
with various potential third-party mediators (OAS, Catholic
Church, and Brazilian/Argentine/Colombian governments),
efforts that Morales used April 5 to warn opposition
departments that the international community has declared
their autonomy movements "illegal." Despite his newfound
vigor for dialogue, Morales also laced his April 5 speech
with legal threats against autonomy leaders and calls for his
base to mobilize against the referendum. Rather than
actually proposing a concrete role for a "Group of Friends,"
Morales used his meeting with Colombian and Argentine
delegations April 3 to lambaste Santa Cruz oligarchs, the
USG, and Ambassador Goldberg, according to the Colombian DCM.



2. (SBU) Although the opposition is politely meeting with
proposed facilitators, it has been steadfast that it will not
postpone the May referendum for another open-ended dialogue
(earlier attempts at compromise in the Constitutional
Assembly, in Congress, and with prefects ended
acrimoniously). Opposition leaders view the government's
dialogue push as either an empty PR gesture to curry
international and domestic support and/or as a strategy to
strip the opposition of what they perceive as a winning hand
on May 4. End Summary.


3. (C) During an April 4 lunch of mission DCMs, Colombian
Charge Adriana Patricia Arbelaez provided DCM with a readout
of the April 3 meetings the Colombian Vice Foreign Minister
Camilo Reyes and Argentine Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana had

with government and opposition leaders. The two were invited
by the Bolivian government ostensibly to lay the groundwork
for a "friends group" of Latin American governments to
facilitate/mediate negotiations between the deadlocked
government and opposition leadership. Brazilian Foreign
Minister Celso Amorim was also invited, but was not able to
arrive in La Paz the evening of April 4. Argentine DCM Jorge
Gomez, also present at the lunch, confirmed Arbelaez's
version of events.

Evo Strong on Blame, Weak on Direction
--------------


4. (C) Arbelaez said Bolivian President Evo Morales blasted
the U.S. and opposition "oligarchs" for a straight hour with
Reyes and Taiana. Among Morales' "unbelievable" accusations:
the United States is funneling funds to Santa Cruz
Department's (state) opposition leadership and Ambassador
Goldberg is masterminding the autonomy movement behind the
scenes. Morales added boilerplate criticisms that opposition
oligarchs are concerned only with protecting their wealth and
privileges at the expense of the common people. Morales
allegedly challenged the popular support for the May 4 Santa
Cruz autonomy referendums, asserting that if it wasn't for an
alliance between Goldberg and a small group of business
oligarchs, "there would be no referendum." (Note: Government
Minister Alfredo Rada April 6 publicly accused the Ambassador
of trying to "dismember" Bolivia. Reftel a. End Note.)


5. (C) Arbelaez said Reyes asked Morales, Vice President
Alvaro Garcia Linera, and Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca
repeatedly "what do you want us to do?" Although none of the
government leaders laid out any options for a charge or
mandate for the nascent "friends group," Garcia Linera
allegedly asserted the government would be willing to make
changes to the draft constitution and redirect petroleum
revenues to departments if the opposition dropped autonomy
referendums (which are also scheduled for three other
departments). (Comment: This is the same line Garcia Linera
used during negotiations with the opposition in Congress,
which ended in blocking the opposition from a Kangaroo
session to pass legislation making department autonomy
referendums explicitly illegal. End Comment.) Choquehuanca,
however, indicated he did not share this view and would not
support any compromise that included changing the draft
constitution.

Evo Not so "Friendly" with Colombia
--------------


6. (C) According to Arbelaez, Morales did not shake hands
with Reyes and ignored him throughout the meeting. Arbelaez
explained that Reyes defended the United States' intentions,
although she did not go into specifics.

Mexico Standing in for "Unacceptable" Peru
--------------


7. (C) The Mexican DCM added that Mexico is being considered
for a friends group to appease the opposition, and only
because the opposition's first choice, Peru, was unacceptable
to the Bolivian government. She explained the Mexican
Foreign Minister is waiting for a readout on the
Argentine/Colombian meetings before committing to an official
visit to La Paz. According to press accounts over the
weekend a Mexican delegation is forthcoming, though no dates
were provided.

Brazilian FM Notes Will/Lack of Will on Dialogue
-------------- ---


8. (SBU) Among others, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso
Amorim met with President Morales, Public Ombudsman Waldo
Albarracin, and opposition leaders Samuel Doria Medina
(National Unity),Jorge Quiroga (PODEMOS),Oscar Ortiz
(PODEMOS Senate President),and Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben
Costas April 5 and 6. Following his meeting with Morales,
Amorim said he was "concerned with the disposition of both
sides to open a dialogue." Perhaps recognizing how
pessimistic the comment appeared in the press, Amorim seemed
to reverse course the next day, saying "despite the
difficulties " there is a desire on both sides for dialogue."
In a public roundtable sponsored by the Brazilian Embassy
later in the day, Amorim compared Morales favorably with
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Da Silva, who also was not
initially liked by "the establishment." Quiroga said he told
Amorim that any international efforts to mediate the conflict
should be subordinated and coordinated with existing
mediation efforts of the Catholic Church in Santa Cruz.

Church Tries to Revive Moribund Facilitation Role
-------------- --------------


9. (U) Meanwhile the Catholic Church plans to meet with
opposition prefects (governors) April 7 to explore mediation
options. The Church has blamed the lackluster progress of
its efforts to move a dialogue forward, underway since March
14, on the lack of will from both sides to negotiate.
Bolivian Cardinal Julio Terrazas said on April 3 that he
believes it is now "impossible" to facilitate dialogue
between the government and the opposition due to an
environment of mutual suspicion, pressure and violence.
Terrazas lamented that the two sides seem to appreciate force
and pressure over rational arguments. These comments came
only one day after Bolivian President Evo Morales appealed
for mediation by the Catholic Church in the conflict.
President Morales has also appealed for mediation assistance
from the OAS (reftel b).

Evo's Schizophrenic Dialogue/Confrontation Message
-------------- --------------

10. (U) Despite talking dialogue with FM Amorim in the
morning, Morales talked later April 5 about mobilizing his
base against the referendum (although he did not specify
advocate violence). Morales also threatened legal
prosecution against opposition autonomy leaders. "If these
prefect officials are investigated, I am certain they will be
thrown in jail," said Morales, specially citing prefect
misuse of government funds. Vice President Alvaro Garcia
Linera followed Morales' statement with a call for government
supporters to mobilize against the referendums. "If they
(opposition) want to try something, it will be illegitimate,
unconstitutional, and will provide the basis to take them to
court for their misdeeds."

Evo: Internationals Love Me, Love Prefects Not
-------------- -


11. (U) Morales attacked the legality of "seditious" Santa
Cruz autonomy statutes, specifically its supposed creep into
federal prerogatives. Morales warned prefects not to
"deceive themselves" concerning the legality of autonomy
referenda and assured the prefects they would not be able to
count on the support of the international community.

MFA Director Advises Deemphasizing May 4
--------------


12. (C) MFA Director of Bilateral Affairs Jean Paul Guevara
told Poloffs April 4 that both sides needed to
"de-dramaticize" the May 4 referendum so that "it doesn't
become an artificial impediment to dialogue." Guevara said
it had been a strategic mistake of the GOB to initially give
so much importance to the May 4 vote, and the GOB was now
looking beyond May 4 ) "not everything has to be worked out
before then." Guevara said dialogue was unlikely before May
4, but that both parties should renew efforts post May 4,
which is why the government is engaging the OAS, Catholic
Church, and the international community. Guevara said the
Bolivian government would still consider a U.S. mediation
role "as we discussed with (Assistant Secretary) Tom
Shannon," but that for the moment no such role was "under
discussion."


13. (C) Ultimately, Guevara conceded the referendum would
pass, though not in the landslide estimated by the
opposition. He argued, however, that it would not matter
whether they win by "70, 80, or even 90 percent" because "it
will still be illegal." He said the government would ignore
any vote not recognized by the National Electoral Court or
international observers. "Not even the police will
participate other than to carry out their normal functions."
Guevara also pointed out that although the government did not
desire or plan a police/military "state of siege" in Santa
Cruz May 4, it had every legal right to do so. Guevara said
the government would not be instigating its supporters to
violence May 4 and that if the opposition did the same "there
will be no violence."


14. (U) Separately, the press reported over the weekend that
a letter sent by FM Choquehuanca to Bolivia's foreign
missions ordered Ambassadors to campaign publicly against the
autonomic referendums.

MAS Deputies "Not Worried"
--------------


15. (C) Ruling MAS party deputies Tony Condori and Ramiro
Venegas told PolOff April 4 there would be no large-scale
violence May 4. They believe the autonomy referendum will be
not be conclusive enough to put it beyond dispute and
"hopefully" would become just another bargaining chip in
government/opposition negotiations. They foresaw a post-May
4 grand compromise that would meld opposition autonomy and
budget concerns into the draft-constitution.


16. (C) Condori postulated the government could actually beat
the opposition at their own referendum, as pollsters and
politicians routinely underestimate the
government-sympathetic rural vote, "as they did in 2005."
(Note: A March 16 Equipos Mori poll estimated a nearly 80
percent vote in favor of autonomy in Santa Cruz. End Note.)
Condori estimated a 70 percent support for the referendum in
urban communities, with at least 70 percent opposed in rural
areas. With about a million voters each, the urban/rural
split makes the outcome "too close to call." Anything less
than a landslide would be considered a defeat, according to
the MAS deputies.


17. (C) Although they discounted the probability the
government would encourage supporters to confront the
referendum process violently, they conceded it remained an
option both for May 4 and beyond. They added that skirmishes
with opposition supporters were inevitable May 4, but would
generally be confined to posturing and "people yelling at
each other." Condori contended, "Bolivians are not violent
people, we always work something out before it comes to
that." Condori said citizens from his city of El Alto would
mobilize if they could be convinced Santa Cruz was blocking
the government's agenda or threatening recent Aymara
immigrants, but that such a mobilization would "not be
automatic," as Altenos were more inclined to support a
peaceful dialogue than fight. He added that "no one is
talking about it" and that "there is no need" to use the
military or outside government supporters, since there are
already enough government supporters in Santa Cruz.
Separately, MAS Lower House leader Cesar Navarro said
publicly April 4 that "the only way to prevent the referendum
is to intervene military and we will not do that in any way."


MAS Moving Red Lines Post-May 4
--------------


18. (C) Venegas opined that if Santa Cruz does pull off a
clear victory "it will be the end to dialogue" and maybe the
beginning of a government crackdown. Condori echoed
sentiments from Director Guevara that he was not worried
about May 4, but rather actions Santa Cruz might take
afterwards to exercise authorities reserved for the national
government, such as setting up its own police force,
negotiating with foreign governments, or disputing federal
land distributions. "If they start acting like a country,
the government will have no choice," asserted Condori. "No
national government on earth would put up with the Santa Cruz
statutes."
Opposition: May 4 or Bust
--------------


19. (C) However genuine (or not) the government's dialogue
overtures are, it does not appear that the opposition is
inclined to participate in a dialogue prior to May 4, at
least one without conditions. Bolivian Senate President
Oscar Ortiz told the Argentine/Colombian "friends" delegation
that nothing would stop the May 4 Santa Cruz autonomy
referendum from going forward. According to Arbelaez, Ortiz
explained the opposition has been burned too many times in
negotiations with the government to sacrifice the one card
they have left: departmental autonomy referendums (Note:
Since November, negotiations in the Constitutional Assembly,
Congress, and between Morales and the departments all ended
acrimoniously for the opposition, with the government forces
moving forward with their agenda under legally dubious and
exclusionary processes. End Note.) Ortiz indicated the
opposition would be willing to negotiate, but only after the
May 4 referendum, when it would be a position of greater
strength. Arbelaez and Gomez agreed the opposition gave a
more cogent and relevant presentation than the government.


20. (C) Santa Cruz Department Prefect (state governor) Ruben
Costas made similar points in his meeting with Reyes/Taiana,
according to prefect sources, but dramatically added that the
timeline for the May 4 referendum was out of his control. "I
can't stop the May 4 referendum; the people would tear me
apart." Following his April 6 meeting with Amorim, Costas
stressed hopes for a peaceful, democratic May 4: "We are not
in agreement with violence.


21. (U) After his meeting with FM Amorim, Quiroga
unequivocally placed the burden of creating conditions for
dialogue with the government, for example by annulling acts
arrived at undemocratically, such as the draft constitution
and laws passed during a government blockade of opposition
congressmen. The same day, Santa Cruz autonomy authority
Carlos Dabdoub assured there was no "legal capacity or
dialogue that could stop the course of this (autonomy
referendum) process

Comment
--------------


22. (C) The group of friends make-up for now has
pro-government leaning Argentina and Brazil balanced with
Colombia and Mexico, at the opposition's request. But this
may only be much ado about dialogue, as neither side appears
serious about negotiating before May 4. The government
appears to realize it cannot forcibly stop a May 4 referendum
from occurring and is working a post-May 4 strategy. Part of
that strategy in the near term appears to be
"de-dramaticizing" May 4, as the MFA's Guevara put it,
emphasizing the government's legal arguments, and projecting
a facade of reasonability, to include insinuating support
from the international community.


23. (C) Morales' tone shifted from benevolence to
confrontation April 5, as it often does when addressing his
coca-growing radical base in the Chapare. His statements
implying the international community backs him against the
Media Luna's autonomy referenda are a misrepresentation of
international statements and postures to date and reveal the
true intentions of inviting foreign ministry delegations from
Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia to La Paz, ostensibly here to
explore mediation options. They were instead paraded out as
a supposed sign of international sympathy for the Morales
administration. Instead of providing guidance on how the
delegations might utilize their good offices to initiate a
dialogue, the government lectured these diplomats and used
them as public props. Although the government has
misrepresented international concern about the political
situation in Bolivia for Morales administration support in
the past, this is the most flagrant example. What remains to
be seen is if these countries will attempt to clarify their
positions publicly or go willingly along with the role Evo
has cast them in. End Comment.
GOLDBERG