BOLIVIA: EVO AND AUTONOMY, NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000694

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2018
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ASEC EAID BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: EVO AND AUTONOMY, NEXT STEPS

REF: A. LA PAZ 693

B. LA PAZ 677

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (C) Summary: Although isolated incidents of violence are
already occurring and will continue up to the scheduled May 4
Santa Cruz autonomy referendum, we do not expect the ruling
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party to take military or
police action against the opposition departments (states)
Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando. Ref A laid out what we
anticipate for the run-up to the May 4 referendum. During
the referendum, we expect that President Evo Morales' MAS
party will use its social-sector supporters to provoke
violence in an attempt to get international media coverage
that projects a "violent, extremist, illegitimate separatist"
Santa Cruz. The central government has already said it will
not provide police protection for what it considers an
illegal referendum, leaving the Santa Cruz government with
only its own social groups (including the radical Santa Cruz
Youth) to provide security for the referendum. In such a
situation, the MAS should have no difficulty provoking
confrontations. After the referendum, the government could
arrest opposition leaders for seditious acts; it is also
possible but less likely that the government might arrest
leaders before the referendum. In Santa Cruz and other
opposition departments, once autonomy is declared we expect a
period of regional exaltation before fiscal difficulties hit.
Although opposition leaders tell us that they will not
withhold taxes (so as not to provoke the central government)
at some point we expect that the newly autonomous departments
will have to take steps to begin solidifying their power, and
these steps could provoke a reaction from the central
government. End summary.

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Autonomy and Accusations Certain
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2. (C) All indications are that the Santa Cruz referendum
will take place on May 4th, regardless of other developments.
Since the central government has declared it will not
provide police protection for the event (and since there are
no departmental or local police forces in Bolivia,) the
opposition-led Santa Cruz government will provide crowd
control for the referendum polling using its civic groups.
One social group in particular, the Santa Cruz Youth Union,
has a reputation for racism and violence. Even without
having to import Altiplano MAS-aligned social groups, the MAS
will easily be able to provoke clashes using local MAS
supporters (often indigenous) from the countryside, and in
fact Santa Cruz MAS-aligned groups are already promising
protests and road blockages. We expect that the MAS will
extensively publicize any incidents of violence, and images
of white autonomy supporters fighting with indigenous MAS
supporters will resonate strongly through the MAS support
base in the indigenous highlands. The MAS will declare the
vote invalid because of (possibly MAS-manufactured) voter
interference. The MAS will use these accusations in an
attempt to prompt international criticism of the
autonomy-seeking departments and may use incidents of
violence as a further excuse to crack down on opposition
leaders. We do not expect the government to send in the
military, in part because the military is not likely to obey
an order to crack down on the opposition departments.


3. (C) Even if the government could somehow interfere and
actually stop the vote (which we do not expect) Santa Cruz
and the other autonomy-seeking departments will almost
certainly declare their autonomy. In many ways, the autonomy
referenda are merely formalities, since the departments voted
for autonomy in 2006. The central government will not
respect either the referenda or any declarations of autonomy,
but will be faced with a de facto division. To address this,
the government will either have to seek a negotiated
settlement or crack down to impose its authority.

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Direct GOB Interference in Referenda Unlikely
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4. (C) If the central government reacts rationally, it will
not take drastic measures against Santa Cruz to try to
prevent the referendum, thereby enabling the government to
look restrained and relatively reasonable, while its social
groups force the opposition into a bad position. Since the
Morales government often seems less than rational, however,
we suggest less-likely but still-possible scenarios of
government interference in the autonomy referenda. The
government could block the vote by ordering departmental
electoral courts not to proceed with the ballots, or the
government could arrest opposition leaders (including heads
of the electoral courts) to block the vote. This action
would require a coordinated effort on the part of the central
government which would be difficult to achieve without
information leaking. If the central government took such an
overt action, however, the inevitable result would be
violence. In fact, it is possible that the National Police
would be reluctant to enforce any orders to this effect,
since they have recently been striking against the government
for higher pay, and since recent lynchings resulted in a
number of national police officers brutally killed by mobs.
In the less likely event of direct government interference,
we predict that the Santa Cruz referendum would proceed in
some manner, and that Santa Cruz radicals would take over
central government buildings in the department (such as post
offices, tax offices, and possibly police installments, such
as happened in the violence in Sucre in 2007.)

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Viva Autonomy! Now What?
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5. (C) Although we expect the central government to reject
the "illegal" autonomy referenda and push for its own
referendum on the MAS draft constitution, the central
government has little choice but to accept the results of the
autonomy referenda. Despite the recent statements of
high-level military officials regarding their duty to defend
a united Bolivia, the central government is unlikely to send
in the military against the autonomous departments,
particularly as long as the departments emphasize that they
do not seek independence and do not wish to break the law.
Santa Cruz leaders have told us they plan to scrupulously
comply with the law, so as not to provide the central
government any excuse for a crackdown. Meanwhile, the
central government will likely be watching carefully for any
action that they can believably call anti-democratic or
illegal, giving them a reason to use the legal system against
the opposition.


6. (C) After the initial euphoria of having achieved autonomy
begins to fade, Santa Cruz and the other newly-autonomous
departments will need to take steps to assert their autonomy.
We anticipate that early in the process the departments will
propose elections of departmental officials. The departments
may also form departmental police forces, and departmental
taxation boards. To justify the push for autonomy, the
departmental governments may try to improve services for the
general populace or focus improvements on local indigenous
groups, so as to counter the idea of autonomy as a "white,
oligarch" issue.

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Confrontations Loom
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7. (C) Any increase in taxes on department residents is
likely to be hugely unpopular, although the departments might
explore ways of raising money from non-locals (road tolls for
out-of-department vehicles, for example.) Although
departmental leaders tell us that they will not withhold any
taxes from the central government (so as not to provoke a
reaction by breaking the law,) at some point the departments
will need money. Departments will likely try to negotiate
with local industry (particularly hydrocarbons) to divert
some of their taxes from the central government to
departments: companies will understandably balk at being
placed in the middle of this contentious issue. More radical
groups in the departments could attempt to take gas
installations or block pipelines in an attempt to force the
gas companies to change their position, which would lead to
inevitable confrontations with the central government.


8. (C) It is difficult to predict the central government's
long-term plans, partially because we have no indication that
the central government has long-term plans. Insiders
repeatedly tell us that the central government, including
President Evo Morales and his inner circle of advisors, are
"ad libbing." As the economy worsens and food prices
increase, the government's actions are likely to get
increasingly desperate (such as Vice President Garcia
Linera's warning in a meeting with the Ambassador that the
free market economy for foodstuffs in Bolivia is coming to an
end. Ref B.)

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Cochabamba Primed to Explode
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9. (C) Although sporadic violence in Santa Cruz is expected,
the dominance of the opposition will likely keep the violence
to a minimum. The situation is different in the department
of Cochabamba, which is a mix of highland and lowland, MAS
and opposition. Cochabamba has seen increasing violence in
the past months, including the mob murder of three policemen,
attacks on other police, and the current conflict at the
Santa Maria tin mine, where a number of miners have been
wounded and two killed by local community members who took
control of the mine. The presence of President Evo Morales'
strongest supporters, the cocaleros, also makes Cochabamba a
likely location for widespread violence, since Evo can easily
order these (often-armed) supporters to take the
opposition-controled capital of Cochabamba or to go east into
the neighboring opposition department of Santa Cruz. In the
geographic center of Bolivia and bordering on six other
departments including La Paz and Santa Cruz, Cochabamba could
be critical to the stability of the entire country.

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Autonomous Departments May Seek International Aid
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10. (C) Autonomous departments are also likely to turn to
international donors (USAID, the Europeans, and Japanese) for
assistance to make autonomy work. Any involvement of the USG
in supporting the autonomous departments will be portrayed by
the central government as interference in Bolivia's
sovereignty and conspiracy against the government. We expect
that current and past USG assistance in the autonomy-seeking
departments will be portrayed by the central government as a
conspiracy to break up the country.

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Unlikely Draconian Developments
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11. (C) Vice Minister of Defense Vargas mentioned to Emboffs
the possibility of the creation of a tenth department
(state),carving out the rich gas-producing southern half of
Santa Cruz to become the "Chaco" department. This concept
has been bandied before, and we do not view it as likely: the
central government would be met with fierce resistance from
Santa Cruz, which would view this as an outright attack.


12. (C) A possibility that we also feel is unlikely is a
military coup. President Morales has been fairly successful
in filling the upper levels of the military with officers
sympathetic to the MAS. In addition, there is little public
sympathy for a military coup, and any potential coup leader
must be aware of the near-impossibility of ruling the country
after an action against a generally popular president and a
legitimately elected government. Finally, with the economy
in trouble and society in increasing chaos, it is difficult
to imagine that anyone would want to take over the mess that
the MAS has made.

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Viva Evo, but "Evismo" is Dead
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13. (C) Former President Jaime Paz Zamora recently declared
"Evismo" dead, an analysis that is becoming generally
accepted. The question remains whether Evo will accept this
and moderate his approach. Evo thrives on confrontation but
has excellent survival instincts and has a history of making
compromises when necessary. Evo's vision of Bolivia as a
revolutionary, indigenous, statist country has been rejected
by the majority of Bolivians: in fact, it is not something
they ever wanted or voted for in the first place. Evo was
largely voted into power based on his claim of indigenous
empowerment and hatred for previous "corrupt" governments,
most particularly that of Goni Sanchez de Lozada. Evo's
recent moves toward a Venezuelan- and Cuban-inspired
socialism have not been as popular as his original call for
equality and his continuing importance as a symbol of
indigenism and change.


14. (C) Even if economic difficulties and public outcry over
the handling of autonomy cause changes in the central
government, we expect turnover to be limited to Evo's circle
of advisors and ministers: Evo will likely survive any
upheaval. He still enjoys significant personal popularity
(even government critics often blame Evo's advisors rather
than Evo personally) and there is no other viable option on
the national stage. To avoid further chaos, most of the
opposition would probably prefer that Evo--though not Evo's
policies--continue. No one is ready or able to step into the
vacuum that would be left by Evo's departure. Considering
Evo's much-repeated promises to leave the Palace only in a
coffin, there seems to be little risk of this vacuum at the
top in the near future. In the near future, however, we
predict further rhetorical attacks on the USG, in the
government's usual pattern of using the USG as a scapegoat
and a distraction from internal problems, notwithstanding
recent interest in our participation in a "Friends" group
(ref A.)

GOLDBERG