Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LAPAZ483
2008-03-04 21:13:00
SECRET
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

WOULD BOLIVIAN MILITARY GO ALONG WITH A CRACKDOWN?

Tags:  BL ECON MARR PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0483/01 0642113
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 042113Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6694
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7669
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5032
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8943
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6158
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3372
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3599
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5300
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6001
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0624
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0969
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
S E C R E T LA PAZ 000483 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2028
TAGS: BL ECON MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WOULD BOLIVIAN MILITARY GO ALONG WITH A CRACKDOWN?

REF: A. LA PAZ 432

B. 2007 LA PAZ 3220

C. 2007 LA PAZ 3153

D. 2007 LA PAZ 3119

E. DAO REPORT: IIR 6 808 0106 08

Classified By: A/DCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T LA PAZ 000483

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2028
TAGS: BL ECON MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WOULD BOLIVIAN MILITARY GO ALONG WITH A CRACKDOWN?

REF: A. LA PAZ 432

B. 2007 LA PAZ 3220

C. 2007 LA PAZ 3153

D. 2007 LA PAZ 3119

E. DAO REPORT: IIR 6 808 0106 08

Classified By: A/DCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Although Post believes the Bolivian military
would still balk at participating in a crackdown on the
opposition in the Media Luna departments as we assessed in
November 2007 (reftel d),some changes since then make the
probability greater. First, the current senior military
leadership is more beholden to Evo and therefore is more
inclined to accept the government's justification of action
against the opposition's "illegal acts," i.e. if the
opposition proceeds with its autonomy referenda. Second, the
military is better armed and equipped given Venezuelan arms
and ammunition that have been supplied via Bolivian Air Force
cargo planes. Post believes most or all of this ammunition
is destined to Media Luna units to alleviate ammunition
shortages, which were acute in 2007. Third, there have been
changes in field commands in the Media Luna that have placed
officers who are more prone to support Morales. Lastly, the
December "trial run" mobilization means the military would be
better prepared to act if called upon. Despite these
factors, many of the impediments to using the military for
overt political repression, or to quell civil unrest, remain.
The most likely scenarios for military engagement are in a
pre-emptive strike against opposition organizers of "illegal
acts," in response to an opposition takeover of national
resources or offices, or in support of the police if they are
overwhelmed. End Summary.

Pro-Evo Signals from Senior Leadership
--------------


2. (C) The 2008 changes in the high command appeared
generally unpoliticized. However, the regular rotation of
senior officers resulted in a slightly more pro-government
outlook. Armed Forces Commander Luis Trigo, who already
passed the government litmus test in leading the
controversial deployment to Viru Viru airport last fall, is

clearly more inclined to support Morales than his
predecessors. The Joint Command Chief of Staff Gen. Jose
Luis Prudencio and Vice Minister of Defense Gen. Wilfredo
Vargas have told us separately that anti-opposition and
anti-U.S. Minister of Government Juan Ramon Quintana is
increasing his involvement in military decision-making. In
fact, in a recent meeting with a visiting U.S. Congressional
delegation, President Morales made clear that he had relied
on Quintana to advise him on how to respond to comments by
SouthCom Commander Stravridis, hence the freeze on an
exchange on notes regarding status of forces.


3. (C) Even among officials and officers with whom we have
had open and productive relations, there appears to be
reevaluation of some of the red lines for military
engagement. For example, last year then-Army Commander
Vargas told us the military would only be used against Media
Luna autonomy efforts under strict conditions, such as taking
over government buildings or energy infrastructure,
establishing relations or trade agreement with foreign
entities or governments, and outright declaring independence.
Vargas did not otherwise seem interested in the Media Luna's
autonomy machinations. Vargas told MILGP Commander recently,
however, that the military would not allow any "illegal acts"
to move forward, implying planned autonomy referenda in Media
Luna departments.

Congress Provides "Legal" Cover for Crackdown
--------------


4. (C) Such incremental shifting of the military's
constitutional duty has been further blurred by the February
28 passage of a law establishing a May 4 date for the
pro-government draft constitution and requiring any
departmental autonomy resolutions to originate in the
Congress, de facto making the Santa Cruz referendum illegal.
No doubt the legality of both these votes will be challenged
(the opposition was physically blocked from participating and
the session may not have had the required quorum),but they
provide legal cover for a military crackdown. Prudencio and
Vargas had already hinted prior to the vote that they
considered the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum illegal. With
the opposition blocked from Congress and without a functional
Constitutional Court to rule on these issues (the Morales
administration has forced out a quorum of justices from the
court),what is legal has become what President Morales says
is legal. Any officer that refuses orders under the premise
that they are illegal is on increasingly shifting and
nebulous ground.

Chavez Sending Ammunition
--------------


5. (S) Post has confirmed through multiple sources that two
to five Bolivian Air Force C-130 transport planes were used
in February to shuttle Venezuelan arms and ammunition to
Bolivia. The Venezuelans are using Bolivian planes because
Media Luna opposition leaders have refused to allow
Venezuelan planes to land there since November and forced a
Venezuelan flight crew to hastily depart shortly after
landing at the Riberalta airport December 6 (reftel b). Two
C-130s brought in 70 crates of weapons and about 150,000
pounds of ammunition during the week of February 18,
according to the pilots. Last year post identified lack of
ammunition as key practical impediment to military use in a
crackdown of the Media Luna opposition movement. We do not
know whether these shipments represent the full extent of
Venezuelan efforts to ship arms to Bolivia, but these latest
reports, confirmed by the pilots, add credence to opposition
charges that the Venezuelans have been moving in weapons and
ammunition into the Media Luna since at least 2007.

MAS-friendly Media Luna Command Changes
--------------


6. (C) We suspect 2008 changes in Media Luna field commands
are more political than the high command rotation. Out of 19
Media Luna commands, typically about half would have rotated
out under normal conditions under two-year tours. However,
16 commanders were swapped out in 2008, ostensibly for more
government-loyal alternatives. DAO is familiar with four
command changes in the Media Luna, three rotating in
(including the 7th Division in Cochabamba) and one rotating
out, that all fit this pattern. However, MILGP Commander
knows the incoming Santa Cruz Division Commander and does not
find him more pro-government than his predecessor.
Additionally, Army Commander Mackay is known for his
institutional approach to decision-making and it would be out
of character for him to select commanders based on their
political affiliation rather than their competence. If the
MAS is trying to pack the Media Luna with like-minded
commanders, we suspect it is being done against the wishes of
Mackay, who is not a favorite of Morales' inner circle.
Although some senior military officers have hinted at the
political nature of the Media Luna command changes, we will
not be able to confirm it until we have the opportunity to
visit with more of the new field commanders.

Practice Run Allows Military to ID Problems
--------------


7. (C) The December military mobilization in the
opposition-led Media Luna states provided the government a
practice run and an opportunity to identify problems and
problem commanders. We suspect the government realized an
acute lack of supplies and support from field commanders in
the Media Luna during the December mobilization and are
taking corrective measures to improve the prospects the
military will and can carry out the Morales administration's
political will in the future. Although government-opposition
tensions were diffused via a Holiday truce, as the deadline
approaches on Media Luna autonomy resolutions and
negotiations in Congress and between President Evo Morales
and opposition prefects (governors) are moribund, the
prospects for a violent standoff have resurfaced.

Evo Flirts with Irregular Groups
-------------- --------------


8. (C) During the last two weeks, Morales has twice
insinuated the use of irregular groups to support his
political agenda in the Media Luna. We continue to believe
these arms are military bound as the shipments are
coordinated by the military and it would be difficult
logistically and operationally to transport the arms from
military hands to irregular groups. However, we cannot rule
out arms being transferred to radical pro-government groups.
Morales hinted at this February 14, when he said a leader of
a pro-government Santa Cruz group called him in the middle of
the night asking for arms to force the opposition to
"respect" Morales' administration. Many prominent civic and
labor groups declared they would not take part in any
violent, pro-government irregular force and, despite constant
circulation that such forces exist from opposition rumor
mills, we have yet to confirm any widespread irregular force.
Although he shies away from outright endorsing and
encouraging GOB-aligned groups from taking arms, he is
certainly not condemning such action. If Evo is serious
about using irregulars, it will surely call into question the
trust Morales has in regular troops' ability and loyalty and
may turn the military against him in a self-fulfilling
prophesy. We find the veiled threat of paramilitary use a
sign of weakness and likely exaggerated in order to cull fear
in the hearts of autonomy leaders.

Continuing Impediments to Intervention
--------------


9. (C) Despite these troubling changes, many things have not
changed since our last assessment of the military's
proclivity to intervene in the Media Luna in November, 2007
(reftel d):
--The military view that quelling civil unrest is principally
a police function that the military is not trained for nor
responsible for. Conscripts are only two-months in service,
have never fired a weapon, and have no crowd control training.
--An institutional reluctance to involve the military in
actions that could be perceived as political in nature. The
military is still resentful of blame cast on it for deaths
and injuries resulting from a 2003 crackdown on road blockers
ordered by then-President Gonzalo Sanchez. With the November
violence in Sucre still fresh in their minds, both military
and police leaders are pressing for a political solution that
will keep them in their barracks.
--Regulated mixing of conscripts: Conscripts are more or less
evenly split between those from the pro-opposition Media Luna
and pro-government highlands. Mixed Media Luna/highlands
conscripts would be ill prepared and unlikely to support an
overt offensive against Media Luna leaders.
--Although he has not insulted his troops lately, Evo
continues to have a strained relationship with the military
due to past institutional slights (especially regarding the
military's efforts in capturing Che Guevara and defeating the
communist insurgency in the 1960s) and his use of troops in
government social projects. Evo's perceived disregard of the
military has also deepened the divide between the high
command and field commanders.

New Wild Cards: Pay Dispute and Opposition Calls
-------------- ---


10. (C) Existing military resentments toward the government
are exacerbated by recent demands for a pay raise from
enlisted troops, who charge generals and colonels have
received bonus' equal to a 30 percent pay raise to ensure
their loyalty, while enlisted have gained only eight percent.
After rejecting an offer for a seven percent raise March 3
from Gen. Trigo, enlisted troops gave the government 10 days
to provide pay increases of 30 to 70 percent.


11. (C) Santa Cruz Mayor Percy Fernandez openly called on the
police and military March 3 to "convince them (the Morales
Administration) to leave peacefully." Although other
opposition leaders are more veiled with their statements, the
legislation outlawing department-originated autonomy
referendums passed during the government's kidnapping of
Congress February 28 has only accelerated and deepened the
opposition's autonomy movement. The opposition has offered
military commanders an alternative "legal" path by
pronouncing the government's illegalization of autonomy
referenda itself illegal. Many active and retired senior
military officers are either from the Media Luna or have
married into the Media Luna while stationed at the many
military bases there. Those officers may well be inclined to
read their constitutional duties differently than the current
high command in La Paz and sit out a proposed Media Luna
crackdown or, perhaps, even side with the opposition.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Despite changes in military capability and posture
since 2007, we continue to find overtly repressive use of the
military against opposition demonstrators or even use in
general civil unrest unlikely, consistent with our 2007
analysis. That said, these changes are worth noting. With
the lines apparently shifting on the will to intervene, we
cannot rule out military participation in a pre-emptive
strike against opposition organizers of "illegal acts," or to
support the police if they are overwhelmed. As in 2007, the
Bolivian military can also be expected to stand their ground
defending government buildings, infrastructure, and energy
hubs, consistent with their constitutional role.


13. (C) Given that he is surrounded with yes men, the biggest
unknown of all is whether Morales is looking at the same
indicators we are and coming to a similar conclusion. If he
thinks the ability and inclination of the military has
changed dramatically since 2007, i.e., that they are more
likely to follow his orders, he may come to a different
conclusion on use of force in 2008. If that happens, instead
of extinguishing a civil war, Morales may instead ignite an
internal war within his military that could end up burning
Evo.
GOLDBERG