MOD: THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000432

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BL
SUBJECT: MOD: THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS

REF: A. LA PAZ 428

B. LA PAZ 218

Classified By: Acting EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Walker San Miguel told the
Ambassador February 26 that the Bolivian government has a new
sense of urgency to conclude an anti-narcotics agreement with
the USG. San Miguel and the Ambassador agreed to a
high-level March 3 meeting to discuss a potential agreement
to reduce net production of coca, alternative development,
and potential changes in Bolivian laws. San Miguel said the
military's decision to boycott WHINSEC is lamentable, despite
public statements to the contrary. (Note: The Bolivian
Government Minister announced police would join the WHINSEC
boycott February 25. End Note.) San Miguel said he and/or
Vice Minister Wilfredo Vargas would approach President
Morales about reversing the WHINSEC decision and to expedite
an exchange of dipnotes that acts as a Status of Forces
Agreement for temporarily assigned U.S. military personal in
Bolivia. The dipnote is ostensibly stuck at the Foreign
Ministry because of the perceived implication that President
Morales was characterized as a narco-terrorist in a SouthCom
presentation. The Ambassador explained there is no substance
to this perception, which is based on the presentation of a
photo of Morales with the Iranian President, nor is there any
substance to the government's accusations of a U.S.
conspiracy based on other public photographs. The Ambassador
also criticized the Bolivian government's heavy use of the
media in place of diplomatic channels. Although San Miguel
and Vargas were enthusiastic about spurring bilateral
relations, only time will tell if their overtures are genuine
or convincing to Evo's inner circle. End Summary.

MOD Asserts New Urgency for Anti-Narcotics Cooperation
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The Ambassador met with Defense Minister Walker San
Miguel February 26 at the Defense Minister's request. Vice
Minister Gen. Wilfredo Vargas, Military Group Commander, and
Poloff also attended. San Miguel started the meeting by
explaining the difficulties the Bolivian government faces in
combating illegal narcotics, stressing eradication goals in
the Yungas region will be hard to achieve. San Miguel said a
there is a new government urgency to conclude a comprehensive
counter-narcotics assistance agreement with the United
States. "We want an alliance with the United States for zero
narcotics." Vice Minister Vargas said the Bolivian
government believes "eradication is the best form of
control," adding he hoped the USG could resume providing
satellite photos to aid eradication efforts, a practice he
claimed was suspended in 2007.


3. (C) The Ambassador said that an agreement to reduce net
production of coca, particularly in the Yungas, would be
welcome. The Ambassador said he last discussed the subject
at a summer 2007 meeting with Bolivian President Evo Morales,
but that the subject had not been raised with the Ambassador
since then, although working-level discussion had continued.
The Ambassador added the Embassy was keenly interested in
making progress on reducing coca in light of increasing
production over the last two years and that it would be
important to make progress on reduction and counter-narcotics
laws before summer to improve Bolivia's certification
prospects.


4. (C) The Defense Minister proposed a meeting of relevant
Embassy officials with ministers and vice-ministers in the
ministries of defense, rural development, and government
(responsible for police). San Miguel said the meeting should
include discussion of alternative development and changes to
drug and money laundering laws. The Ambassador agreed and a
tentative meeting was set for March 3.

WHINSEC Boycott: Special Case, Reversible
--------------

5. (C) Both San Miguel and Vargas expressed their
disagreement with the decision to suspend Bolivian military
participation in WHINSEC (Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation) and said they would talk to Army
Commander Luis Trigo and President Morales to advocate
lifting the ban. "Do not worry about WHINSEC ... we just need
a little space," said Vargas, indicating the ban would be
temporary. Although he did not share their opinions, San
Miguel said WHINSEC's negative reputation in the minds of
some NGOs and political groups, "including even from the
U.S.," made it a "special case." He explained the WHINSEC
decision was an exception which would not lead to additional
U.S. training boycotts.

Bilat Relations By Press; Public/Private Statements Clash
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The Ambassador used the WHINSEC discussion to make a
point about using the press in place of diplomatic channels,
citing Government Minister Alfredo Rada's February 25
announcement that police would also no longer attend WHINSEC.
(Note: Although the Ambassador did not call him out by name,
San Miguel stood by Rada at the same press conference and
explained "no officials will be sent to this academy
(WHINSEC) in 2008" because Bolivia wishes to have its own
security and defense doctrine "in accordance with the
countries of Latin America." "We have our own vision of
security and defense," said San Miguel, adding there "are
other military schools in the region." End Note.) The
Ambassador noted that he would never dispute the Bolivian
government's right to boycott WHINSEC or reject any other
U.S. assistance, but said it was poor diplomatic form to
announce such decision through the media. The Ambassador
noted he had to learn "from the papers" about all of the
Bolivian government's denouncements of the USG. The
Ambassador added that although he appreciated Vargas' attempt
to change minds concerning WHINSEC, "at the end of the day
you decide, and if that's your decision, that's your
decision. But this manner of communication through the media
is not appropriate."

Dipnote SOFA: Averting Death by PowerPoint
--------------


7. (C) San Miguel said the delay with the exchange of
dipnotes (acting as yearly renewal of a Status of Forces
Agreement) could not be blamed on the media, rather on
Admiral Stavridis' January 17 presentation to CSIS, which
included a slide with a photograph of Morales with Iranian
President Ahmadinejad. (Note: The Bolivian government has
alleged the photo implies Evo is a narco-terrorist a charge
we have refuted repeatedly. Reftel b. End Note.) The
Ambassador explained the PowerPoint slide in question used
the photo only to illustrate Iran's interest in the Latin
America, there was no intent or mention to suggest Morales
was a narco-terrorist nor was there any mention whatsoever of
Morales or Bolivia. The Ambassador invited San Miguel and
Vargas to view the presentation themselves, which is publicly
available on the Internet. The Ambassador regretted any
misunderstanding, but proposed that this misunderstanding was
now blocking military assistance, including urgently needed
military medical teams from participating in flood relief.
San Miguel and Vargas said they understand both our
explanation and the need to expedite the dipnote exchange.
San Miguel did add, however, that Admiral Stavridis could
have used a photo of Ahmadinejad with 10 other Latin American
leaders and avoided the controversy altogether. Vargas
stated that he knows Admiral Stavridis and understands the
admiral would not make this type of allegation.

Ambassador: Stop Photo Obsession
--------------


8. (C) Lastly, the Ambassador said the Bolivian government
needs some perspective in its use of photographic evidence,
citing the latest "scandal" involving a photo of a public
meeting between the Embassy and an indigenous group (reftel
a). The Ambassador asserted the right of any diplomatic
mission to meet with leaders of the opposition in host
countries and this latest example was not "proof" of
conspiracy, but rather proof that some government leaders
want to think the worst about the USG and are trying exploit
even the smallest opportunity to publicly impugn the Embassy.
The Ambassador said the constant barrage of Bolivian
government accusations of U.S. conspiracy were unprecedented
in our relations.

Vargas to the Rescue?
--------------


9. (C) Following the meeting, Vice Minister Vargas met
separately with MILGP Commander and Poloff. Vargas said he
would personally talk to President Morales "soon" about
rescinding the military ban on WHINSEC and expediting a
positive response to our stalled exchange of dipnotes. He
confided Presidency Minister (Chief of Staff) Juan Ramon
Quintana was behind resistance to WHINSEC participation and
the dipnote exchange. In light of the recent slew of
positive stories regarding WHINSEC, Vargas commented that he
attended WHINSEC when it was the School of the Americas, as
had many GOB officials (Note: Including Quintana. End Note.),
and there "was nothing wrong with it then, either."


10. (C) On the dipnote exchange, Vargas said he would try to
"put this in order," but did not provide an estimate on how
long that would take. Vargas said last year the MFA felt
rushed to approve the dipnote when they received a copy of
the dipnote "very late." Although he placed the blame for
this with the MFA, he said this year the MFA would examine
the dipnote thoroughly, as "we did not do this right last
year." Nevertheless, Vargas said he expected no changes to
the dipnote's text, once approved. Vargas advised us to
approach the MOD first with bootleg versions of agreements,
including the forthcoming 505 agreement, before officially
presenting them to the MFA so he could "prepare things" at
the MFA for a positive response. Vargas also said he would
approach the Foreign Ministry "today" concerning its refusal
last week to approve a dipnote for a Bolivian Senate staffer
to attend a MILGP-sponsored defense policy course in
Washington DC. He postulated the denial was a mistake by a
lower-ranking MFA official, not a sign of a change in policy,
which he assured emboffs he would have known about.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) San Miguel's supportive statements about WHINSEC and
affirmative head nodding during the Ambassador's criticism
about using the media to announce bilateral policy fell flat
considering his public statements about WHINSEC the day
before. Still, San Miguel and Vargas seemed relaxed and
accommodating, perhaps because they understand the value of
the assistance at stake, and we believe they will try to talk
Evo out of a long-term WHINSEC boycott and into a dipnote
SOFA. Vargas has an amiable relationship with Morales and
has followed through on similar promises to MILGP commander
in the past. Still, only time will tell if San Miguel and
Vargas follow through on promises to unstick military
assistance/training issues and push for a comprehensive
agreement on net reduction of coca.


12. (C) Perhaps they will also relay our thoughts on the
GOB's current round of public attacks, flagrant disregard for
the use of diplomatic channels, and perplexing infatuation
with photographic images. Although San Miguel and Vargas
seemed to follow our explanation of Admiral Stavridis' use of
Morales/Ahmadinejad photo, others in Morales' inner circle
seem to be unaware of our repeated explanations, media
accounts, and the presentation itself. The only pictures
that Evo's inner circle seem to favor are those that they can
manipulate for bashing the Embassy. End Comment.
GOLDBERG