BOLIVIA: DEMARCHE DEAD LETTER OFFICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002307

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR ODIP OPDC KDEM IAEA BO
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: DEMARCHE DEAD LETTER OFFICE

REF: A. LA PAZ 1023

B. 07 LA PAZ 2974

C. 07 LA PAZ 2587

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: Responding to a negative shift in the Foreign
Ministry's working-level relationship with the Embassy, we
are reevaluating how to deal with the MFA. Well before the
expulsion of Ambassador Goldberg and expulsions of USAID and
DEA from the Chapare, the MFA had been increasingly
unresponsive and dismissive of Embassy requests and USG
positions. One MFA contact told us delivering demarches ipso
facto ensures that they will be referred to hard-line
Presidential Palace advisors. He said we would be better
served to leave some contentious issues, for example Iran's
nuclear program, with careerists in the field. Another MFA
contract conceded most USG demarches are ignored or rejected
in knee-jerk fashion and suggested raising shared
international concerns through other missions. MFA careerist
contacts lament the Spring replacement of Ministry careerists
with political appointees in key positions. During recent
negotiating experiences, MFA contacts have urged us to make
minor changes to existing proposals so the MFA can claim it
is not just rubber-stamping agreements with prior
governments. We are inclined to accept recent MFA demands
that the Embassy provide diplomatic notes for even routine
demarches, not to appease Bolivian notions that we do not
show them appropriate respect, but rather because we do not
trust MFA officials to provide an accurate account of our
meetings. End Summary.

Exhibit A: UNGA and General Unresponsiveness
--------------


2. (C) When PolOff asked about the composition of the
Bolivian delegation to UNGA August 25, the MFA's Director of
Bilateral Relations Jean Paul Guevara, Chief of the Americas
Section Maria Estella Mendoza, and U.S. Desk Officer Arce
collectively shrugged their shoulders. Arce had given PolOff
a broad idea of the composition about a month earlier and
PolOff had obtained a more refined list from another MFA
contact prior to the meeting, but Post wanted to get an
official listing of the delegation, their agenda, and
determine their interest in meeting USG officials on the
margins. "We do not know," said Guevara. However, later the
same day Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca publicly
announced the delegation's composition and travel schedule.
Through other MFA contacts, PolOff learned Guevara was
intimately involved in the planning and attended part of the
UNGA.


3. (C) Later, when PolOff was attempting to deliver a
demarche requesting Bolivian positions on UNGA human rights
votes, the MFA's Director of International Organizations
(Office of Multilateral Affairs) directed PolOff to send the
demarche to his e-mail account because "this is easier than
meeting. If we need a meeting, I'll let you know." PolOff
is still waiting for a response to the September 26 e-mail.
Last year, then Director of IOs Ruben Vidaurre (strictly
protect) met with PolOff multiple times on UNGA-related
issues and was diligent about getting back to us with
information on Bolivian views/votes. Similarly, PolOff was
directed to write a letter to Director of Multilateral
Affairs Edgar Pinto Tapia on a number of demarche issues.
PolOff addressed the concerns in a May 27 letter, but also
requested a follow up meeting to discuss them. Eventually a
June 10 meeting was arranged with subordinates, which,
although very cordial, did not result in any follow-up
action, as promised, on the part of the MFA.

Exhibit B: Shooting Ourselves in Iranian Foot
--------------


4. (C) Post has been selective about delivering demarches on
Iran, not so much because of the government's inherent
sensitivity to criticism of its new ally and the increasingly
diminishing likelihood of Bolivian action against Iran, but
rather because of the probability we would get a better
result by not delivering certain demarches. Ex-Director
Vidaurre told us a demarche we delivered in September 2007
(reftel c) concerning an IAEA vote on Iran worked to
undermine careerists in Vienna pursuing goals consistent with
the USG position. He explained that starting sometime in
2007 our demarches were being routinely sent to the
Presidential Palace, where hard-liners were inclined to
oppose whatever position we advocated regardless of the
merits. Vidaurre said by red-flagging the issue with the
palace we had inadvertently prompted a "gag order" from the
Palace for Bolivia's IAEA delegation to abstain on all
Iranian-related votes.

Careerist Appointees: Let Sleeping Dogs Lie
--------------


5. (C) Left to their own devices, Vidaurre said the IAEA
delegation would have better chances to convince La Paz
counterparts to endorse a policy more in line with the U.S.
position. He explained that in the "new" MFA, political
appointees, often with little or no background in
international affairs or subject matter expertise, are
disposed to leave complicated issues or technical decisions
to careerists, who are more inclined to support U.S.-friendly
policies.

Exhibit C: 505 Agreement and "Dignity Changes"
--------------


6. (C) The long, strange trip Post had to take to reach a
505/end-use agreement for military equipment with the
Bolivian government speaks volumes about the MFA's new
approach to dealing with the United States. PolOff delivered
a diplomatic note offering our proposed text for the
agreement in March, explaining the reasons for the new
agreement and that it was needed to obtain GPOI (Global Peace
Operations Initiative) and other new program funds. In at
least four follow-on meetings each with the MFA and Ministry
of Defense, EmbOffs asked for a status of a government reply,
offered our help with any questions about the proposed text,
and reiterated that the agreement was needed for GPOI funds
before the end of the fiscal year. Expect for a request to
provide all referenced agreements, which we complied with May
16, EmbOffs received no questions on text and assurances that
it "looks fine" and "we will rely heavily on the Defense
Ministry for this." The issue was also brought up at several
higher-level meetings between Ambassador and/or DCM and both
Minister of Defense Walker San Miguel and Vice Minister of
Foreign Relations Hugo Fernandez.


7. (C) By June 4, we were sufficiently concerned by lack of a
formal reply that EmbOffs visited Vice Minister of Defense
Wilfredo Vargas as a courtesy to remind him about the August
15 agreement deadline. We provided the same reminder to the
MFA August 19, when PolOff told Director Guevara it was
probably already too late for FY 08 funds and that failure to
show progress on an agreement put future funds at risk as
well. Given the choice of accepting the proposed language or
putting funds in jeopardy, Guevara replied that "if we miss
the deadline, this is fine, then we will work for 2009." On
August 25, Guevara, Mendoza, and Arce questioned the need for
the agreement, although they did not bring forth any specific
questions on the proposed text. Guevara's secretary told
PolOff after the meeting that the MFA group looked over the
text for the first time that morning. In an August 27 joint
MFA-MOD meeting with EmbOffs, Guevara stated he would not
accept the text and, although he had no specific changes in
mind at the time, Arce would provide them later. Guevara
also maintains that the agreement was never explained to him,
which is false, as PolOff explained it in detail to Guevara
personally March 28. On September 12, the Embassy delivered
dipnote 350/08 with new agreement text incorporating MFA
concerns and dipnote 351/08 formally explaining the need for
the agreement and answering questions brought up during the
August 25 meeting. The MFA responded affirmatively September
17 via reply dipnote.


8. (C) By contrast, the Canadians tell us they concluded a
similar agreement via MOU in three days in August. Although
the Canadian version did not require an exchange of
diplomatic notes, the same players in the MFA were looped
into the process. Canadian Consul David Smart told us not to
take it "personally," since "we do not have the same problems
you have."

Demanding R-E-S-P-E-C-T, but Short on S-P-E-C-I-F-I-C-S
-------------- --------------


9. (C) During a September 23 meeting, Mendoza objected
generally to the "lack of respect" for Bolivian concerns
during USG bilateral negotiations. "You do not negotiate
with us, you just hand us a proposal and we are imposed upon
to accept it. That's not how countries operate; there has to
be a give a take." PolOff replied that in any international
negotiation some side has to make the initial proposal and
that we have always been forthcoming about answering
questions or entertaining Bolivian suggestions. Although
Mendoza conceded the MFA objections came "very late" during
the 505 negotiation, she maintained that the Bolivians should
have been consulted before we proposed the agreement text.
PolOff told Mendoza we respected the sovereign right of
Bolivia to accept the proposal, propose changes, or reject
it, but that we cannot start a process until a text is
proposed. PolOff further explained that in order for the
Embassy to "respect" Bolivian concerns, a Bolivian has to let
us know what those concerns are. Flustered, Mendoza insisted
she did not mean to imply Bolivia intended to reject any
proposal and did not further explain her complaints beyond
"that we work together in mutual respect."

"Improved" Agreements to Make Bolivia Feel Brand New
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Escorting PolOff from the September 23 meeting, Arce
added that "I am willing to work (with USG),but we have to
have something to show for it. We cannot continue as things
were with prior governments." PolOff understood this vague
statement (and others like it from Guevara, Mendoza, and Vice
Minister Hugo Fernandez) to mean in the case of the 505 they
insisted on some insignificant changes in order sell it to
advisors in the Presidential Palace as a victory against the
empire, which capitulated to Bolivian dignity changes. After
the government froze negotiation on a 2008 renewal of a
interim Status of Forces Agreement, VM Fernandez advised us
to similarly make minor changes and move the text around for
a "new and improved" 2009 revision, allowing the government
to claim it "was not just rubber stamping agreements with
prior governments."

Stop Talking and Give Us Our Dipnote Dignity
--------------


11. (C) During an August 25 meeting with Guevara, Mendoza,
and Arce, PolOff began the conversation with a softball offer
to nominate an instructor in the MFA's diplomatic school for
a USG-funded 2009 postgraduate course on U.S. security
policy. This icebreaker was met with crossed arms and a
rejection of some background information on the course. "We
should have the proposal for this course in a diplomatic
note," said Guevara, adding there should be a Spanish version
attached to all dipnotes because "this is our mother tongue
and we require respect for this." When asked if they were
interested in the course, Guevara replied in the affirmative,
but added "we must have this in an official proposal, we
cannot just discuss it. It is a matter of our national
dignity." Guevara similarly concluded that Post's demarche
on treasury designations on Iranian citizens and firms would
have to be in a dipnote and that our request for information
concerning Bolivian views on the 5th Summit of the Americas
in 2009 would also require a dipnote.

Careerist Advice and "Trojan Horse" Demarches
--------------


12. (C) Trusted MFA contact and Director of Policy Planning
Jorge Caballero (strictly protect) acknowledged demarching
the MFA is "often going to be a waste of time" and advised
against any high-level demarching "until relations
stabilize." Caballero told PolOff a more productive approach
would be to share demarche concerns with other missions,
particularly on common interests like counter-terrorism and
relations with rogue regimes, and encourage them to engage
the Bolivian government. Such a Trojan horse demarche, he
claimed, would have more resonance from a friendly
neighboring or European country than the knee-jerk negative
reaction U.S. diplomats are likely to receive. He said the
United States is not alone in frustration with the MFA, and
cited a shouting match between Guevara and Brazilian
diplomats. "Other missions are complaining about the same
things," he explained, noting slights caused by lack of
understanding of diplomatic norms by new political appointees
are often misunderstood as deliberate offenses.


13. (C) EU Desk Officer Claudia Betancourt (strictly protect)
told PolOff not to take offense to the "revolutionary
discourse and Yankee bashing. ... This is all part of their
show, they have to say these things." Betancourt added that
"no matter what you say or how you say it, they will only
hear the empire talking." Betancourt provided the example of
a recent trip to European capitals, when Guevara told a group
of Dutch parliamentarians he appreciated the European
approach dealing with Bolivian on Iranian issues, which he
described as "treating Bolivians as sovereign equals,"
explaining differences of opinion, and providing information
to justify a harder line on Iran's nuclear weapons programs.
Guevara allegedly contrasted this with the U.S. approach to
"tell us what to do."

Spring Cleaning of MFA Careerists
--------------


14. (C) Caballero and Betancourt explained that a general
downturn in working-level diplomatic emphasis was hastened by
a Spring MFA reorganization that brought many political
appointees to prominent Ministry positions, pushing
careerists, like Vidaurre, to foreign postings. Ostensibly
the government acknowledged the need for careerists in the
field after a failed policy of pushing political appointees
abroad early in the Morales Administration. Sending
careerists abroad also serves the purpose of allowing the
government to cull less enthusiastic Morales supporters after
returning by failing to provide an oncoming assignment, a
legal method of replacing careerists with political
appointees already well underway (reftel b). Many
careerists, such as Julio Salas (strictly protect),former
America Section Deputy, started looking for the exits after
"seeing where this is going." Salas told PolOff he resigned
in May largely because of Guevara's increasing
marginalization of careerists and reliance on ideological
instruction from the palace.

Comment:
--------------


15. (C) Post continues to conduct regular diplomatic business
through diplomatic channels (i.e. demarches and meetings),
but realizes the reality that respecting such norms has put
us at a continual disadvantage with a country that does not
respond in kind and prefers to conduct bilateral affairs via
press conference. We are inclined to respect the MFA's new
preference for dipnotes in lieu of demarches, but more
because we do not trust the memories or intentions of MFA
officials than out of any bizarre notion that we owe them
dipnotes out of respect for Bolivian "dignity." The MFA's
insistence on dipnotes with unofficial translations is
already requiring a significant increase in the workload of
our PAS translator, but we believe the extra effort to
document each MFA encounter is necessary given the current
political environment. Post is, however, approaching the MFA
sparingly on a case-by-case basis with demarche requests. As
Vidaurre alluded, we would be wise to apply demarches to the
"first do no harm" threshold. End Comment.
URS