EVO CONNECTS THE DOTS: PANDO, PNG, AND PROTEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001973

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PBTS ODIP OFDP VE BL
SUBJECT: EVO CONNECTS THE DOTS: PANDO, PNG, AND PROTEST

REF: A. LA PAZ 1964

B. LA PAZ 1359

Classified By: ADCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of his September 10
announcement declaring Ambassador Goldberg persona non grata,
Bolivian President Evo Morales is linking the USG to violence
in the opposition departments (states) and specifically to
the death of thirty-some people in opposition-controlled
Pando Department. Pando appears calm for the moment after
the Bolivian military took over the airport September 12, but
tensions remain high, with the government promising to impose
martial law and the Prefect (Governor) refusing to recognize
the state of siege. Over the weekend, Morales all but
accused the USG of financing bloodshed in Pando and conflict
in the Media Luna and called on social groups to fight and
"die" for the government's 'change' agenda. Contradictorily,
Morales also called for debating differences with the
opposition and assured he would never sever ties with the
USG. Meanwhile, pro-Morales forces in El Alto (and possibly
beyond) organized a protest September 15. Our contacts claim
protesters were prepared to blame the USG for the Pando
deaths, demand the removal of the Ambassador (who left
September 14),and rehash complaints about the supposed
harboring of ex-President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada.
End Summary.

Pando Standoff Continues
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2. (U) Although Bolivian military forces succeeded in
securing the airport in Cobija in the opposition-controlled
northern department of Pando (along the Brazilian/Peruvian
border) on September 12, the city still belongs to Prefect
Leopoldo Fernandez, who claims he will not capitulate or
recognize the government's imposing of martial law in Pando.
There has been no serious violence since the airport
takeover, in which airborne troops secured the runway for
troop transports. An opposition-aligned civilian and a
solider were killed in the operation.


3. (U) President Evo Morales ordered martial law for Pando
the same day, justifying it as a response to a "massacre" and
"genocide" he alleged was organized and executed by
Fernandez's forces. Eight people were initially reported
killed in the September 11 clash between forces loyal to
Fernandez and pro-government campesinos (small farmers)
outside Cobija; reports as of September 15 suggest the number
of dead may surpass thirty. The majority of the dead seem to
have been government-aligned campesinos. Both sides have
called for a formal investigation. Opposition contacts
inform us that Prefect Fernandez has told his followers not
to oppose the military, but that he will not allow the
military to take the prefecture or himself.

Conflict Reportedly Started by Pro-Evo Forces
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4. (C) Ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) Congresswoman
Ana Lucia Reis told PolOff that campesinos initiated the
September 11 Pando conflict and warned us "do not let anyone
tell you differently." Pro-government campesinos from Beni
were attempting to join forces with Pando MAS organizer and
ex-Cobija mayor Miguel "Chiquitin" Becerra at his farm about
30 kilometers from Porvenir. Prefect representatives tried
to intercept the Beni group somewhere between Porvenir and
Cobija. The prefecture representatives were unarmed and
suffered the first deaths. Later prefecture forces were
reinforced by armed opposition supporters and the campesino
side was backed up by supporters from the MAS stronghold of
Filadelfia.

Government To Pando: You Are the Weakest Link
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5. (C) Reis said that Chiquitin is distributing weapons to
campesinos with the intention of taking over Cobija and
jailing Prefect Fernandez (Note: A government spokesman
announced that Fernandez would be sentenced to thirty years
in jail; Fernandez has not been arrested nor tried and has
declared that the government will not take either the
prefecture or Fernandez himself. End note.) Reis claimed
that the MAS strategy is to foment violence with social
groups and that MAS regional leaders decided to consolidate
forces in Pando, as it was considered an easier target than
Beni, where Opposition Prefect Ernesto Suarez is considered
stronger than Fernandez (Note: "Chiquitin" Becerra lost by
only 400 votes to Fernandez in the 2005 election for prefect.
End Note.) Reis said without the military, Chiquitin "will
not succeed, but when you are getting that much money you
go." She claims Chiquitin receives infusions of Venezuelan
cash every time he is called upon by the central government
to mobilize MAS supporters. She added that distribution of
large sums of Venezuelan cash during referendums this year
has boosted Chiquitin's local standing. Reis, who normally
discounts the possibility of violence in "laid-back Pando,"
said she is afraid "for the first time" to return to her
Cobija hotel, which she fears will be targeted by opposition
radicals, despite her warm relations with opposition leaders.

Forcing the Armed Forces to Evo's Side?
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6. (C) Opposition strategist Javier Flores asserted the Pando
violence is the result of a government plan designed by
Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana and Minister
of the Government Alfredo Rada to lure the military into a
more proactive role by fomenting confrontations between
civilians. (Note: Some sources claim that Quintana is
present in Pando organizing the violence on the MAS side. End
note.) Flores claimed Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca
strongly disagreed with this strategy during a September 7
cabinet meeting, but was overruled and the rest of cabinet
was mute. Flores confirmed Reis' version of events and added
that Chiquitin planned to initially form a road block between
the Cobija and Porvenir to isolate the area from prefecture
meddling while Chiquitin prepared pro-government forces for a
siege on Cobija.

Opposition: Bolivian Soldier Among "Campesino" Dead
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7. (C) Flores said Fernandez's forces captured more captives
than the fifteen hostages reported by the media (note:
reportedly the prefecture holds about sixteen hostages while
the campesinos hold fourteen.) Flores says that Chiquitin is
threatening to kill the opposition hostages to keep
information that implicates the government out of the news.
Most notably, he claimed September 13 that the opposition had
confirmed that one of the "campesino" dead was in fact an
active duty military officer. He said he suspected some of
the captives who lack identification and will not talk are
also Bolivian military or police. Flores claimed the
government has infiltrated campesino and social groups with
plainclothes officials (mostly loyalists from the
military/police) to orchestrate attacks on the opposition
largely in order to draw the military into the conflict on
the side of the government. He discounted Fernandez's public
allegations that Venezuelans are among the organizers, but
said it was possible.

Morales Explains PNG; Provides Opening for U.S. Ouster
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7. (U) President Morales publicly explained September 13 that
he declared Ambassador Goldberg persona non grata for
"conspiring against democracy and promoting the division of
Bolivia." Morales called Goldberg the "external authority
that heads the division of Bolivia." Morales claimed that
Ambassador Goldberg's history as a diplomat in the Balkans
was proof of USG plans to "balkanize Bolivia", a common
government refrain over the past year (official news agency
ABI provided a lengthy readout of Ambassador Goldberg's
resume to complement Morales' comments). Evo said the
decision was made "for the dignity and sovereignty of our
people" and that the action did not signal "any intention to
sever relations." He did, however, hold out the possibility
that the United States would "opt for this route, which is
their right."

The Evo Whisperer: Chavez as PNG Puppet Master
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8. (C) Flores claimed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is the
driver of the dual PNG strategy (Venezuela declared its U.S.
Ambassador persona non grata in "solidaritQ with Bolivia.)
Flores asserted that Chavez essentially "tricked" Evo into
making the first PNG move, using Venezuelan "intelligence"
linking Ambassador Goldberg to conspiracy. Although he would
not reveal his source for the information, Flores asserted
that Minister of Defense Walker San Miguel allegedly
presented this Venezuelan intelligence during a September 7
evening cabinet meeting. (Minister of Government Alfredo
Rada presented a similar list based on government sources.)
Most of the "intelligence" is public information, but it also
included a list of opposition officials that have gone to the
United States with U.S. financing/orchestration (including
international visitor programs). Flores said San Miguel
characterized opposition Santa Cruz Civic Committee leader
Branko Marinkovic's last U.S. trip during the first week of
September as "meetings with USG officials." In fact,
according to Flores, Marinkovic was with Flores, Senate
President Oscar Ortiz, and prefect representatives,
participating in strategy meetings with Greenberg Quilan
Rosner and other polling/consulting firms. Flores contends
that President Morales relies heavily on Venezuelan and Cuban
intelligence for any information from within the United
States, giving the Venezuelans wide latitude to make things
up; Evo believes it all.

ABI: Balkanization By Association
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9. (U) The September 13 state news agency (ABI) story about
the Ambassador's PNG also addressed Marinkovic trip. ABI
implied nefarious USG involvement by stating that Marinkovic
decided to take government institutions only after returning
from the United States. The story later implied that
Marinkovic's Croat ethnicity predisposed him to, like
Ambassador Goldberg, divide Bolivia in a similar way "to what
occurred in the Balkans."

Morales: "Change" By Any Means Necessary
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10. (U) In other comments September 13, Morales called on
social groups to mobilize to defend "the process of change"
led by his government "or die for the country." Addressing
his cocalero base in Cochabamba Department, Morales said
"this democratic and cultural revolution has to be completed,
it must be culminated." Morales shouted "country or death,
we will triumph!" In odd incongruity with these statements,
Evo added that he was "disposed to debate our differences
with the opposition."

El Alto March to Embassy: Here Comes the Neighborhood II
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11. (C) El Alto was mobilizing for a march to the Embassy
that was planned to continue into the Zona Sur residential
area of La Paz. Groups confirmed by EcoPol contacts to
participate are basically the same players that organized the
June 9 Embassy march: the large and influential Central
Regional Workers Union of El Alto (COR) and El Alto
neighborhood federation (FEJUVE),in addition to smaller
social groups, labor organizations, the El Alto "Popular"
Civic Committee (a MAS front organization),minor political
party M17 led by radical Roberto De La Cruz, and a pro-MAS
student organization (it was unclear whether the students
have decided to also continue with their planned September 16
march against the Embassy). These groups have made
participation mandatory for their members, enforced through a
combination of payments and fines.


12. (C) El Alto construction contractor and political
operative Felix Montalvo told PolOff September 13 that COR
President Edgar Patana also invited and offered payment for
participation for groups beyond El Alto: the national small
farmer union (CSUTCB),the Ponchos Rojos (indigenous
militia),miners from the Department of Oruro, and the La Paz
"Popular" Civic Committee (MAS front group). In the wake of
the Ambassador's departure, some of the anti-USG impetus for
the march has faded and FEJUVE 1st Vice President Luis Huanca
told us September 12 that the march would be revamped to
target the prefects and mourn the Pando dead. COR legal
advisor Martin Quino told PolOff the march is being financed
by the Bolivian Government (with Venezuelan funds) in order
to link the USG with the Pando deaths. "Evo is looking for
someone to blame and you are his target." He added this
should not be surprising, since "you have not fought back
before; this is nothing new." Montalvo commented that
"wanted" posters of Ambassador "Goldbert" printed by the COR
for an aborted march in August will be distributed for the
march.

Comment
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13. (C) Evo often cites unassociated pieces of information
and links them together by association. This latest
three-parter is easily dissected: opposition kills people in
Pando, USG supports opposition, USG is responsible for the
deaths. Some contacts have also noted that the Embassy "is
the only place we can march to," as La Paz provides few
opposition or business targets. In fact, in Charge's meeting
with Foreign Minister Choquehuanca September 14 (ref A) the
FM said that El Alto groups were angered by opposition
looting and destruction of MAS properties in the opposition
departments and were seeking ways to retaliate, hence the
possible targeting of opposition leaders' homes in the Zona
Sur residential area of La Paz. End Comment.
URS