Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LAHORE234
2008-07-17 12:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lahore
Cable title:  

NAWAZ REMAINS FIXATED ON MUSHARRAF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ECON PK 
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O P 171257Z JUL 08
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3734
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4465
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0260
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0078
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0635
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1872
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1555
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 4866
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 000234 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON PK
SUBJECT: NAWAZ REMAINS FIXATED ON MUSHARRAF

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, US Consulate
Lahore, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 000234

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON PK
SUBJECT: NAWAZ REMAINS FIXATED ON MUSHARRAF

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, US Consulate
Lahore, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Boucher met with Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz Chief Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on July 1.
Nawaz said the judges' restoration issue was a matter of
principle not subject to political compromise. Nawaz expressed
lukewarm support for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Khyber Agency military operation but was displeased that the
government did not consult him or other senior party leaders
about it beforehand. He equally criticized what he perceived as
the lack of a government strategy to develop public support for
the operation. Boucher pressed the point that polarizing
political issues such as the judges' restoration and threats to
impeach Musharraf are distracting the Government of Pakistan
from effectively tackling more serious threats to Pakistan's
stability, i.e. the economy and the law and order situation. He
expressed U.S. willingness to support the Government in
addressing these issues. End Summary.


2. (C) Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Richard Boucher met with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Leader
Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on July 1. The Assistant Secretary was
accompanied by National Security Council Senior Director for
South and Central Asian Affairs Mark Webber, Deputy Chief of
Mission Peter Bodde, Principal Officer Bryan Hunt, Senior
Advisor Caitlin Hayden and Political Officer Antone Greubel
(notetaker). Joining Nawaz were his brother Punjab Chief
Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Pakistan Muslim League Parliamentary
Leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, former Petroleum Minister Khwaja
Asif and Ambassador Tariq Fatemi.


3. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher began the meeting by asking
about the status of Nawaz's eligibility to run for parliament
and how long it would take to resolve. Nawaz explained that
papers were shuttling back and forth, having not been accepted
in a "political move." He filed candidacy papers at the urging
of his party, he explained, despite that fact that he "didn't
want to," and preferred to "run at a later, appropriate time."

But, he said, "they want me among them." Nawaz claimed no
desire to be Speaker of the Assembly, or Opposition Leader;
rather, he will support the Government and seek to address the
"serious constitutional issues" Pakistan faces, including
restoring the constitution to its 1999 form ("when I was Prime
Minister") and reinstating the judiciary. He noted that there
were no major disagreements with the Pakistan Peoples Party on
the current proposed package of constitutional amendments.


4. (C) There remain disagreements on reinstating the judiciary,
however. Assistant Secretary Boucher said that the judges' issue
was one for Pakistanis but pressed Nawaz to consider compromise
so that it might be swiftly resolved. Nawaz said that he could
not compromise on the judges' restoration since it was "morally
wrong," and a matter of principle. There must not be any
Provisional Constitutional Order judges on the courts since they
abandoned their principles by taking an oath against the
constitution under the Order. He acknowledged judicial reforms
were in order but the time to tackle them was only after the
judges were restored. Nawaz criticized Asif Ali Zardari for
going back on his commitments in the Murree Declaration to
restore the judges within 30 days through a parliamentary
resolution. Boucher stated that many felt Nawaz had also pulled
out of an earlier commitment to support restoration minus former
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry -- the so-called "minus one"
formula. Nawaz responded emphatically that he had never
committed to the "minus one" formula and even if he was amenable
to it "the people would never accept it."


5. (C) After listening to Nawaz's explanations of judicial and
constitutional issues, Boucher said that we agreed these were
important issues and the United States wants to see them
resolved quickly so the Government can get down to the business
of dealing with the most pressing issues facing the Pakistani
people. He expressed serious U.S. concern over the state of the
economy, the rise of militancy and the increase in cross-border
attacks in the Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province.
Nawaz agreed that it was time to get to business, but said that
the country could only do that once the judiciary was restored
and Musharraf was out of power. When asked about the prospect
for returning his ministers to Cabinet, Nawaz said that the
party will also not reinstate its ministers until the judges are
restored. He conceded, however, that the Pakistan Muslim League
was getting a free ride in the current scenario because it can
claim to be a ruling coalition partner but does not have
ministers to face the media to announce unpopular policy
decisions.


LAHORE 00000234 002 OF 002



6. (C) Asked if he supported the Prime Minister's multi-pronged
strategy to combat terrorism, Nawaz said that he supports the
policy and that it was important that Pakistan coordinate with
the United States in the War on Terror. He expressed concern
that terrorists and militants are threatening the social fabric
of Pakistan, as well. Nawaz's principal complaint about the
statement on fighting terrorism and the undertaking of the
Khyber Agency military operation was that the government and
military did not consult him or his other senior party leaders
in advance. The Pakistan Muslim League is a major coalition
partner, after all, and the policy on fighting terrorism should
be developed through public debate (in the National Assembly and
in the press),not by one party. Nawaz admitted that neither
Pakistan nor Afghanistan have effective writs of control in the
tribal areas straddling their borders. The Assistant Secretary
agreed on the need for everyone to come together on a
comprehensive terrorism strategy, including public outreach, but
pressed for quick, demonstrable progress in curtailing the
operations of militant groups in the meantime.


7. (C) Nisar expressed skepticism on how deeply committed the
current government is to combating terrorism. He accused the
government of launching the Khyber operation immediately before
Boucher's arrival simply as a facade to demonstrate to the
United States that Pakistan is still a reliable ally. He
asserted that limited combat encounters to date buttress this
accusation. Nisar repeatedly claimed that President Musharraf
was never as committed to effectively combating terrorism as the
U.S. believed. The Assistant Secretary noted that Musharraf had
made genuine and important contributions to the War on Terror
and reiterated that the current governing coalition needed to
demonstrate its own credibility on this issue rather than
rehashing the past.


8. (C) After railing against Musharraf as the cause of all of
the problems in Pakistan, Nawaz and Nisar emphasized to Boucher
that during Nawaz's two terms as Prime Minister in the 1990s he
was a reliable ally of the United States. They cited their
support for Operation Desert Storm in 1990, reigning in militant
groups and embarking on policies to improve relations with
India. Aside from the judges' restoration issue and the future
of Musharraf, they claimed the Pakistan Muslim League platform
and United States foreign policy goals in Pakistan are on the
same page. Boucher agreed that there was certainly a
commonality of interests between the two.


9. (C) Nawaz asserted that he also had commonality of cause with
Zardari when it came to President Musharraf, reporting that
Zardari told him he was prepared to move forward with impeaching
President Musharraf. Boucher stressed that this would be
another counterproductive diversion and a negative backward
movement to begin impeachment proceedings against Musharraf.
Nawaz countered that the "people have expressed that they want
to get rid of Musharraf." Boucher quickly responded: "They also
asked you to govern." Ignoring this comment, Nawaz continued,
saying "Musharraf is conspiring against us every day...Not me.
If I am conspiring, I'm conspiring to get the judiciary
reinstated."


10. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this cable.
HUNT