Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LAHORE221
2008-06-24 15:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lahore
Cable title:  

NAWAZ INELIGIBLE TO CONTEST ELECTIONS

Tags:  PGOV KJUS PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 241502Z JUN 08
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3715
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
CIA WASHDC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL LAHORE
C O N F I D E N T I A L LAHORE 000221 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PK
SUBJECT: NAWAZ INELIGIBLE TO CONTEST ELECTIONS

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, D

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAHORE 000221


E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PK
SUBJECT: NAWAZ INELIGIBLE TO CONTEST ELECTIONS

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, D


1. (C) Summary: In a surprise verdict, the Lahore High Court
ruled on June 23 that Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N)
leader and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ineligible to
contest the June 26 National Assembly by-elections. In the same
ruling, his brother Punjab Chief Minister and PML-N President
Shahbaz Sharif was allowed to retain his provincial seat while
deliberations on his eligibility continued within an election
tribunal. The PML-N has strongly condemned the verdict,
claiming that the court was pressured by both President
Musharraf and Pakistan Peoples Party Co-Chairman Zardari to
invalidate Nawaz's candidacy. In a late night session on June
23, PML-N leaders decided not/not to appeal the High Court's
ruling to the Federal Supreme Court, as doing so could be
interpreted as recognition of the judiciary installed by
President Musharraf on November 3, 2007. Instead, the party
intends to engage in street protests throughout the Punjab
scheduled to begin on the evening of June 24. Given the party's
and Nawaz Sharif's increasing popularity within the Punjab, such
protests could be sizeable in key urban areas. PML-N leaders
told post that the protest strategy would be designed to
pressure its coalition partner the PPP to use its influence with
the sitting Chief Justice of Pakistan to encourage a suo moto
judgement overturning the Lahore High Court's verdict. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) On June 23, a reconstituted bench of the Lahore High
Court issued a verdict declaring PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif
ineligible to contest a National Assembly seat in the June 26
by-elections. The court verdict concluded that Nawaz was
ineligible due to a 2000 conviction on terrorism charges,
stemming from his attempts to prevent the landing of then-Chief
of Army Staff Musharraf's commercial flight to Pakistan during
the 1999 overthrow of his government. The court found that
Nawaz's claim that the convictions had been pardoned by
then-President Rafique Tarar at the time of Nawaz's departure
for exile in Saudi Arabia lacked an evidentiary basis. The
refusal of Nawaz to present evidence at the Lahore High Court,
part of his refusal to recognize the judiciary installed by
President Musharraf on November 3, 2007, appeared to play a
significant role in the bench's verdict. The court found that
briefs arguing in favor of Nawaz's position filed by attornies

acting as "friends of the court" lacked sufficient evidence to
invalidate Nawaz's criminal conviction.


3. (SBU) The same Lahore High Court bench refused to take
similar action to invalidate PML-N President Shahbaz Sharif's
uncontested elections to two provincial assembly seats earlier
in June, which cleared the way for him to assume the office of
the Punjab Chief Minister. The court determined that the
challenge to Shahbaz's eligibility, stemming from his
participation in the storming of the Supreme Court in 1999,
required further evidentiary review by an Election Tribunal to
determine whether he had in fact insulted the nation's judiciary
-- a disqualifaction for elected office under the Pakistani
Constitution. Like his brother, Shahbaz had refused to present
evidence at the Lahore High Court, but the bench found that in
his case, there was no clearly disqualifying act presented by
the petitioners. The court's verdict specifically permitted
Shahbaz to continue as Chief Minister while the Election
Tribunal proceedings -- which can often take years to complete
-- go forward.


4. (SBU) PML-N leaders publicly condemned the Lahore High
Court's verdict. They claimed that the speed with which the
reconstituted bench deliberated on the case (less than 24 hours)
was evidence that President Musharraf and/or PPP Co-Chairman
Zardari had influenced the court. Public statements attempted
to portray this "injustice" as direct evidence that judicial
independence could only be ensured by removing all those judges
who took oath following the November 3, 2007 state of emergency
and the restoration of the pre-November 3 judiciary. The "weak"
reaction of its coalition partner, the PPP, to Nawaz's
disqualification was condemned and in some circles taken as
further evidence of Zardari's involvement in the verdict.


5. (C) Party sources who attended the late night June 23
leadership meeting in Raiwind confirmed press reports that Nawaz
Sharif would not/not appeal the verdict to the federal Supreme
Court and that Shahbaz would not take part in the proceedings of
the Election Tribunal. Despite strong protests from key
leaders, including Ahsan Iqbal and Ishaq Dar, Nawaz reportedly
took this firm stance as part of his refusal to compromise on
any recognition of the legitimacy of judges who took oath
following the November 3 state of emergency. Nawaz ostensibly
determined that his refusal to appeal would further strengthen
his populist, anti-establishment political credentials, even if
it denied him a seat in parliament. Sources reported that the
same logic was at play in Shahbaz's decision not/not to
participate in the Election Tribunal. However, they noted that
as a practical matter, Election Tribunals rarely heard cases in
a timely fashion and any decision would likely be years in the
making. They speculated that the establishment intended to use
the threat posed by the Election Tribunal case as a way to
influence Shahbaz's behavior during his tenure as Chief Minister.


6. (C) PML-N sources further reported that the party intends to
rely on "street power" to protest and hopefully invalidate the
High Court decision. The party intended to begin a series of
protests across the Punjab designed to shut down key
thoroughfares in urban and rural areas, beginning on the evening
of June 24. To date, only small, sporadic, largely non-violent
protests have occurred in a handful of urban locations. PML-N
leaders reportedly believe that such protests may (1) force the
PPP to issue a strong statement of condemnation against the
verdict, (2) increase pressure on the PPP to restrore the
pre-November 3 judiciary through an act of parliament, and (3)
encourage the PPP to intervene with the current Chief Justice to
obtain a suo moto invalidation of the Lahore High Court's
actions. Note: Post contacts surmise that the current Supreme
Court, including Chief Justice Dogar, is feeling under
increasing pressure to improve its public image in order to
retain their seats following judicial restoration. Suo moto
action that allowed Nawaz Sharif to seek election to parliament
would undoubtedly serve this goal. End Note.


7. (C) Comment: The irony is that Nawaz probably is ineligible
to contest a parliamentary seat under the Pakistani constitution
due to his criminal conviction. His exile in Saudi Arabia was a
result of a commutation of his sentence not a pardon, meaning
that the Lahore High Court's verdict is probably legally correct
and it is Nawaz, who is looking for a politicized decision from
the court. Such ironies, however, will have little sway in the
public perception, as Nawaz's politics of defiance on the
judicial restoration issue continue to play well in the public
imagination. His stance is generally viewed as principaled and
selfless in contrast to PPP leaders who are increasingly being
portrayed as playing politics as usual. Nawaz's refusal to seek
injunctive relief from the current Supreme Court, which could
well overturn the High Court's verdict, will likely reinforce
this political image. Street protests, particularly if active
PML-N support and financing occur, may well materialize in the
province. These are, however, likely to remain orderly. The
largest will probably occur in areas of strongest PML-N support,
particularly the Old City areas of Lahore and Faisalabad. In
our view, such protests are unlikely to force the current
courts' hands on the issue of Nawaz's eligibility, but they will
increase pressure on the PPP to follow the PML-N's roadmap for
restoration of the November 3 judiciary, particularly if the
PML-N continues its vocal criticism of the PPP's lukewarm
reaction to the verdict. End Comment.

HUNT