AMBASSADOR BRIEFS NAWAZ SHARIF ON USG ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 000209

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS NAWAZ SHARIF ON USG ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

CLASSIFIED BY: Antone C. Greubel, A/PO, US Consulate Lahore,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Ambassador and members of the country team
briefed former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his closest
advisors on USG assistance programs and the terrorist threat on
May 15. This was similar to the briefing provided to Ambassador
Durrani and ANP leader Wali Khan at CIA headquarters. The
Ambassador and others were clear about US criteria for
unilateral action in the FATA and the rules of engagement of
ISAF troops on the Afghan-Pak border, and ODRP chief explained
clearly the recent incidents along the border and the fact that
ISAF troops would defend themselves against cross-border
attacks. Nawaz and his ministers seemed surprised by the
diversity of terrorist threats that have originated from the
FATA and the presence of the entire Al-Qaeda (AQ) leadership
inside Pakistan.


2. (C) Summary Continued: Nawaz expressed appreciation for the
briefing, stressed that a strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship is
critical to the continued development of Pakistan and criticized
the previous government for not doing more to sway public
opinion more favorably toward the United States. Nawaz asked
why the USG was having so many high level meetings with the
leadership of the Karachi-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
and cautioned that his own past efforts to woo MQM into the
political mainstream had failed. Ambassador stressed that MQM
was important to the stability of the fourth largest city of the
world and one that was key to Pakistan's economy. End Summary.


3. (C) On May 15, Ambassador led a Mission delegation to Lahore
to brief former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on U.S. Mission
Pakistan's goal to strengthen the long-term, multi-dimensional
bilateral relationship. Accompanying the Ambassador were DCM
Peter Bodde, Chief of Office of the Defense Representative to
Pakistan (ODRP) Major General James Helmly, U.S. Agency for
International Development Program Officer Robert Wuertz,
Regional Affairs Officer Greg Lane and Lahore A/PO Antone
Greubel (note taker). The group spent over three and half hours
with Nawaz. (Embassy has also briefed Pakistan People's Party
(PPP) leadership, Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) leadership
and this week will be briefing the Senate Defense Committee.)
Present with Nawaz were his closest Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
(PML-N) advisors -- his brother and former Punjab Chief Minister
Shahbaz Sharif, former Senior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan,
Senator and former Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, former Punjab
Governor Sardar Zulfikar Khosa and Punjab Chief Minister Dost
Muhammad Khan Khosa.


4. (C) The DCM gave an overview of multiple programs that
included:
-- USD 26 million provided to support free and fair elections;
-- the USD 2.3 billion in USAID development assistance provided
from 2002-2007;
-- an overview of various economic, commercial and agricultural
programs;
-- USG initiatives and assistance to mitigate the energy crisis;
-- educational exchanges and cultural programs;
-- initiatives to improve human rights, tolerance and Afghan
refugee assistance;
-- law enforcement training and assistance;
-- counternarcotics programs and financial assistance to improve
border security and frontier law enforcement.


5. (C) ODRP Chief then briefed the PML-N delegation on foreign
military sales, foreign military financing, military education
and training, coalition support funds and military assistance
for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). He
described clearly the rules of engagement for ISAF troops along
the border, walking Nawaz and his team through recent incidents.
The DCM then led the section on the FATA Development Strategy
and Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. The briefing concluded
with RAO discussing intelligence issues and Pakistan's critical
role in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).


6. (C) The Nawaz team focused in on the security issues. The
briefing by RAO described the terrorist threat emanating from
the tribal areas, including plotting against the UK, other
allies, and plans by terrorists to disrupt the Beijing Olympics.
RAO briefer stressed that the entire AQ leadership was in
Pakistan. He also described the linkages among and between
terrorist groups which threaten Pakistan and which have been
responsible for attacks inside Pakistan.


7. (C) After the briefings, Nawaz hosted participants for lunch
at his Raiwind residence on the outskirts of Lahore. Nawaz and

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his advisors expressed gratitude to the Ambassador and the
traveling party for making the time to come to Lahore to brief
them and discussions continued on a number of topics.


8. (C) Nawaz pointed out that when he was Prime Minister he was
fully cognizant of the importance of the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship and was willing to take political hits by defending
unpopular U.S. foreign policy actions. As an example, he
mentioned that in 1990 he had publicly criticized Saddam Hussein
for invading Kuwait and supported the U.S.-led Operation Desert
Storm. He added that other mainstream party leaders (read the
Pakistan People's Party) in contrast were publicly condemning
the United States at that time.


9. (C) Nawaz emphasized that he is cognizant of the threat
extremism poses to Pakistan and it deeply concerns him. He also
stressed that no part of Pakistan should be allowed to harbor
terrorists or become a base of operations to plot and organize
international terrorist operations. Nisar even commented that
the latest peace agreement with tribal leaders is "half-baked"
and no one really owns it. Nawaz and his advisors raised no
objections or concerns over Pakistan's role in the GWOT and
clearly stated cross border attacks from Pakistan into
Afghanistan should be stopped.


10. (C) Nawaz criticized President Musharraf and the previous
government for not doing more to sway public opinion toward the
U.S. He said that if the Pakistani people were more informed on
USG assistance programs and aware of the threat that
Pakistan-based terrorists posed, not only to the world, but to
Pakistan itself, the public would have a more favorable view of
the U.S. Nawaz even floated an idea that Pakistan's role in the
GWOT should be debated and approved in Parliament so that it
would have the full support and backing of the Pakistani
government.


11. (C) Turning to politics, Nawaz told Ambassador that recent
high level meetings between the Ambassador and other high level
USG officials with MQM officials sent strange signals. He said
MQM is not a mainstream party and should be publicly condemned
for its regular use of "thuggery." Dar went on to relay a story
about how in 1993 and in 1997 PML-N tried to bring MQM into the
political mainstream by forming a coalition with them. The MQM
leadership, however, demanded exorbitant bribes and set other
unrealistic conditions.


12. (C) The Ambassador replied that MQM is in charge of the
fourth largest city in the world and the key to Pakistan's
economy. While she was very mindful of the history of the party
and of its leaders, MQM had some promising new leaders, was
anxious for international respectability, is a secular party,
and most importantly has the ability to keep the lid on Karachi
during these tumultuous times. We should, therefore, continue
efforts to bring it into the mainstream.
GREUBEL