(S) SCENESETTER FOR THE KUWAIT PRIME MINISTER'S

S E C R E T KUWAIT 000936

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP LONNIE KELLY, NEA/I, NEA/IR
NSC FOR ELLIOTT ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS MASS ECON EINV IR IZ KU
SUBJECT: (S) SCENESETTER FOR THE KUWAIT PRIME MINISTER'S
SEPTEMBER 18-19 VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES: STRENGTHENING
AN INDISPENSABLE REGIONAL PARTNER

Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Ahmed
al-Jaber Al Sabah's September 18-19 visit to Washington
offers a timely opportunity to honor and reaffirm the unique
and indispensable security relationship between our two
countries; it is also an important opportunity to encourage
the PM and his government to be more resolute in confronting
a variety of social, political and security challenges which
-- if not addressed -- will erode the foundations of our
strong bilateral relationship.


2. (S) In contrast to the efficient autocracies to its west
and south, Kuwait enjoys a proud 50-year tradition of elected
parliaments and, since 2006, full political rights for women:
a fact we should applaud. That said, Kuwait's current
parliament reflects the country's political and demographic
shift over the past several decades, as primacy has passed
from a largely urban, relatively sophisticated merchant elite
to an increasingly restive and confrontational bedouin
population. After long years as second-class Kuwaitis, the
growing Bedouin group is eager to take its "fair share" of
the communal pie, with loyalties drawn according to tribal
lines and Islamist salafist sympathies.


3. (S) The combination of a fractious Parliament, politically
ill-disposed to take a hard line on shutting down support for
those engaged in global "jihad," and Kuwait's relatively
liberal legal system -- the State Security Court was
abolished with U.S. approval following the 1991 liberation --
makes it all the more difficult for the GOK to shut down and
effectively prosecute those suspected of funding or otherwise
supporting terrorist activities. Kuwaitis fault weak
leadership for the GOK's failure to deal effectively with
growing salafist influence, as well as their relative
economic stagnation -- despite record oil revenues -- in a
country that used to pride itself on being in the vanguard of
regional modernization, the so-called "Pearl of the Gulf."
The Amir has twice dissolved Parliament in as many years and
has threatened to do so again should the gridlock continue.
Unfortunately, this would lead only to further delays in
achieving necessary projects and reforms while the State
founders.


4. (S) Our relationship with Kuwait is co-dependent: the
Kuwaitis need us to remain a protective shield in a volatile
and dangerous neighborhood; we need them to remain a reliable
base and transit point for U.S. forces, maintain
uninterrupted energy flows and continue significant
investment in the U.S. We should use this visit to
strengthen the Prime Minister (PM) by:

-- underscoring the importance and durability of our security
relationship with this major non-NATO ally, ideally with a
full color guard ceremonial reception at the Pentagon when he
meets the Deputy SecDef;

-- applauding Kuwait's democracy, as difficult as it may be,
and encouraging continued economic reforms;

-- pushing hard for greater cooperation and transparency in
combating terrorism;

-- publicly welcoming Kuwait's naming of an Ambassador to
Iraq (despite Iraq's delay in similarly identifying a
counterpart) and its continuing cooperation with a former foe;

-- applauding Kuwaiti support for the Annapolis process and
regional peace initiatives, including its recent USD 80
million grant to the Palestinian Authority and its larger
commitments.


-------------- --------------
Regional Security Cooperation
-------------- --------------


5. (S) The Kuwaiti people remain deeply grateful to the
United States for leading Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Kuwait's approximately USD 1 billion annual contribution in
material and logistical support to Operation Iraqi Freedom
far exceeds that of all other nations combined. As during
the President's visit in January, we recommend reiterating
our appreciation for the critical role Kuwait plays in
supporting our regional security efforts, as well as our
intention to continue this close, mutually beneficial
partnership for the foreseeable future. The PM will be


listening for any indication the U.S. intends to increase its
military footprint in Kuwait in light of regional
developments. The PM may raise, with DOD interlocutors,
delays in acquisition of U.S. military equipment under the
Foreign Military Sales Program, a complaint regularly raised
by Kuwaiti Chief of Staff LTG Fahd Ahmad Al-Amir.


-------------- --------------
Positive Trends and Lingering Concern in Iraq
-------------- --------------


6. (S) The Prime Minister shares our assessment that "the
surge has worked" and that the Maliki government is
progressively consolidating security and stability across the
country, although he may ask about reports of PM Maliki's
failure to integrate the Sunni "Sons of Iraq" who were
critical to defeating the insurgency. Kuwait's
long-designated ambassador to Baghdad, General Ali al-Moumin,
expects to present his credentials formally in October.
However, there is lingering enmity over Saddam Hussein's 1990
invasion, and residual suspicion of Iraqi intentions,
exacerbated by Iraq's own failure to name an ambassador to
Kuwait and statements by Iraqi officials, including PM
Maliki, either challenging the UN-demarcated boundary lines
or making light of Kuwaiti concerns over the border
encroachments of Iraqi farmers. This, in turn, contributes
to Kuwaiti unwillingness to write off more than USD 17
billion in Iraqi debt, although the GOK has not actively
attempted to collect on it thus far. Kuwait has disbursed
only a small fraction of over 575 million dollars in pledged
aid, citing a lack of reliable aid implementers on the
ground; the Iraqis have acknowledged their bureaucratic
obstacles in this regard.


-------------- -
Keeping the Pressure on Iran
-------------- -


7. (S) Kuwait strongly supports international efforts to
pressure Iran to abide by IAEA safeguards in its nuclear
program. However, it is deeply concerned about being caught
in the middle of a conflict between the U.S. (and/or Israel)
and Iran. While few Kuwaitis view a ground attack on Kuwaiti
soil as likely, many are concerned about possible missile
attacks, Iranian terrorist sleeper cells, and dramatically
increased insurance rates for oil tankers due to Iranian
threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait's Foreign
Minister (FM) has been clear and direct in calling for
Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, reminding the Iranians
that cutting off the Strait of Hormuz would be a punishment
to Arab GCC states. The FM has also reiterated familiar
Kuwaiti assurances that Kuwaiti soil will not serve as a
platform for any attack on Iran. If push came to shove,
however, we believe Kuwait would support U.S. action if
Tehran sparked violence in the region. We recommend USG
interlocutors (a) thank the Prime Minister for Kuwait's firm
position on the need for Iran to meet its IAEA commitments,
and (b) urge him to continue to press Iran on this subject
both privately and in international fora. He should be urged
to discourage Kuwaiti commercial ventures with Iran. For his
part, we understand the PM will seek clarification of the
P5 1 formulation acknowledging "Iran's legitimate regional
security role," which the GCC countries believe comes at
their expense.


-------------- --------------
CT Cooperation Needs to Improve
-------------- --------------


8. (S) Stiffening Kuwaiti spine in CT performance -- e.g.,
timeliness/transparency in intelligence sharing; follow-up on
U.S. leads; consistent monitoring of extremists (including
the seven remaining previously transferred GTMO detainees);
and effective monitoring/auditing of charities -- should
figure prominently in top-level interaction with the PM. Our
best lever for achieving this aim is likely to be a frank and
unvarnished appeal in a small session at the highest level,
either by the President or the Vice President. The point
might be punctuated with a list of promising intel leads
passed to the GOK over the past year without visible result
(or in many cases even evidence of Kuwaiti follow-up).
Candor and clarity are the key, as the GOK, for its part,
accuses us of similar opacity. It is especially important to
have this conversation in light of the PM's likely raising of


the GOK's long-standing desire to take custody of their
remaining four GTMO detainees. Our assessment remains that
Kuwait has not demonstrated either the political will or the
capacity to mitigate or prevent future terrorist actions by
their detainees.


9. (S) Strong evidence suggests that a small number of
Kuwaiti nationals play an important role facilitating
al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq
through financing, recruitment and outreach. We are certain
the GOK's intelligence organizations are aware of this
activity, but choose to conform to the GOK leadership's
perceived policy of co-opting extremists with the principal
goal of deflecting domestic attacks and avoiding domestic
controversy. As a result, Kuwaiti security services are
unwilling to share information that could cause them
political, public or operational discomfort, particularly
when an investigation touches on a Kuwaiti citizen. We
believe this policy is ultimately detrimental to both U.S.
and Kuwaiti interests, as we assess that it is only a matter
of time before these extremist elements focus their
activities on Kuwait.


10. (S) U.S. interlocutors should encourage the PM to issue
forthright public statements denouncing terrorism and
specific attacks as they occur; the FM's strong denunciation
of the reported suicide bombing attacks by Kuwaitis in Iraq
earlier this year was exceptional rather than the norm. We
should also encourage a "rehabilitation" program for
radicalized Kuwaitis along the lines of the Saudi model. The
GOK's own "moderation Initiative" lacks teeth.


-------------- --
Terror Finance
-------------- --


11. (S) The USG's June decision to designate Kuwait's
prestigious and respected Revival of Islamic Heritage Society
(RIHS) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
Organization struck a nerve across society here, and elicited
harsh criticism from GOK interlocutors who believe Muslim
Charity is the antidote to Islamic extremism. Persistent GOK
doubts about the factual basis for the RIHS designation will
likely color its responses to future USG designations of
Kuwaiti nationals (which they believe only adds to their
notoriety),and could affect the GOK's willingness to commit
fully to other requests for counterterrorism cooperation. If
it is possible to provide a detailed briefing on the evidence
showing RIHS complicity, this might help influence the GOK.
Caveat: This should only be offered if we believe that we can
make information available at a sufficient level of detail to
overcome substantial GOK skepticism regarding the accusations
against RIHS.


12. (C) In any event, the PM should be encouraged to drive
through the parliament a long delayed anti-money laundering
law to strengthen the GOK's legal authority to confront the
problem. In early August, after 18 months of interagency
deliberation, the Central Bank Governor sent the "final"
draft of the law to the Ministry of Finance for review and
forwarding to the Council of Ministers for approval. The
Prime Minister should be encouraged to gain speedy executive
branch approval of the draft law and send it to the National
Assembly for expeditious enactment.


--------------
Visas and Students
--------------


13. (SBU) Kuwaitis value their close relationship with the
United States, a preferred destination for vacation, study,
medical care and business. Visa applications by Kuwaitis in
2008 are projected to surpass pre-9/11 totals for the first
time. Recognition of this strong Kuwaiti interest in close
ties with the U.S. is helpful in countering a prevalent
regional perception that the U.S. is not a welcoming place.
A stand-alone meeting at DHS would usefully follow up
Secretary Chertoff's highly successful visit last March, and
offer an opportunity to draw positive attention to the pilot
program on pre-screening of foreign students at ports of
entry. Port-of-entry problems and delays in SAO clearances
have a serious ripple effect in this small society, with
complaints often rising to the FM's office (who recently
asked the Ambassador whether Kuwaiti students were being
"targeted"). USG attention to the issue in recent years has


won favorable attention.


-------------- -
Trade and Investment
-------------- -


14. (SBU) The PM may raise Kuwait's long-standing interest in
a Free Trade Agreement. Kuwait still needs to make
significant reforms in such areas as IPR legislation, full
compliance with WTO obligations and removal of technical
barriers to trade for a FTA to be worth considering once we
regain Trade Promotion Authority. Kuwait continues to invest
in the United States to the tune of more than USD 200
billion. In July, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation concluded an
USD 11 billion petrochemical joint venture with Dow Chemical
Company which will be based in Michigan.


-------------- -
Oil Production
-------------- -


15. (U) The USG could welcome the recent GOK award of
contracts, one to American company Fluor, to build what will
be one of the largest refineries in the world in southern
Kuwait. However, this issue has stimulated significant
opposition in the National Assembly and may be delayed. More
broadly, the GOK has not favored OPEC production cuts and
recently announced the intention to increase its crude oil
production from 2.5 to 4 million barrels per day over the
next 20 years. The goal will be hard to reach, however,
unless Kuwait welcomes upstream partnerships with responsible
international companies.


-------------- --
TIP Report
-------------- --


16. (C) The PM is unlikely to raise Kuwait's Trafficking in
Persons status. GOK reluctance to address poor working
conditions has spurred protests among low-income foreign
workers over recent months. While the GOK has taken initial
steps to address their concerns, it is premature to consider
any move from Tier 3 to the Tier 2 Watchlist.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
JONES