GOK APPEALS TO STOP DESIGNATION OF KUWAITI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000079

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, EEB/ESC/TFS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2013
TAGS: ECON PGOV PTER PREL KU KTFN
SUBJECT: GOK APPEALS TO STOP DESIGNATION OF KUWAITI
TERRORIST FINANCIERS

Classified By: Acting DCM Tim A. Lenderking for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Director of the MFA Americas Desk Ambassador Ali
Hussain Al-Sammak sought an urgent meeting with CDA on
January 17 to request, on instruction from the Kuwait FM,
that the U.S. use "its good offices" to end the initiative to
designate three Kuwaiti terrorist financiers (Hamid Al-Ali,
Jaber Al-Jalamah, and Mubarak Al-Bathali) at the UN 1267
Committee. Al-Sammak stressed that Kuwait was making the
request in light of the strong friendship between Kuwait and
the United States, and specifically in the afterglow of the
very successful January 11-12 visit to Kuwait by President
Bush. Al-Sammak added that "our information" is that "these
are good Kuwaitis" whose funds perhaps got "misdirected" or
"diverted" through no intention of their own. Al-Sammak
noted that Kuwait had formally appealed to the Libyan PermRep
to remove the three Kuwaitis from designation, in a letter
submitted to Libya on January 7. Al-Sammak said he had known
Al-Ali and Al-Jalamah "twenty years ago," and at least at
that time "they were decent people."


2. (C) CDA noted that the move to designate the three
Kuwaitis was not a new issue, and the U.S. had presented its
case on numerous occasions to the GOK since the December 2006
designation of the three individuals by the U.S. Department
of Treasury. All that had changed in the last few weeks was
the membership of the Security Council. CDA explained that
the U.S. believed there was a strong case against these three
individuals, who were not, in the USG view, "good people."
CDA asked Al-Sammak to "keep an open mind" on the charges
against the individuals, since the USG believed there was
genuine, reliable information linking these men to
fund-raising activities associated with Al Qaeda. CDA also
noted the possibility of an upcoming visit to Kuwait by
Treasury U/S Levey, at which time the U.S. and Kuwait could
discuss the issue further. CDA said he would relay the GOK's
views to Washington.


3. (C) Al-Sammak said he was dismayed at CDA's report noting
financial ties between the three Kuwaitis and Al Qaeda. He
said the FM would be "upset" to hear this. He did not wish
to dispute USG information on the three and agreed that "bad
people should be behind bars." He said the GOK looked
forward to receiving U/S Levey if he were able to visit, but
he appealed once again for U.S. understanding. In discussing
the issue within the Security Council, Kuwait understood that
the designation "depended on the Americans."

Comment
--------------


4. (C) As is well known, Kuwait has consistently opposed the
designation of Al-Ali, Al-Jalamah, and Al-Bathali by the UN
Sanctions Committee. Throughout 2007 Kuwait lobbied
then-Security Council member Qatar to maintain a hold on the
designation. MFA contacts have generally dismissed the USG
case against the three financiers as lacking evidence,
suggesting that the U.S. is making "martyrs" out of three
individuals who have no following and no influence in Kuwait.


5. (S/NF) We believe there are other motives at play in
Kuwait's resistance to designation. First, Kuwait dislikes
public shaming of its citizens. While Kuwait has no control
over a U.S. domestic designation, it will, as we have seen,
use its diplomatic muscle to prevent a broader international
designation, in part because such a designation is
embarrassing. Similarly, as with the Guantanamo detainees,
the senior leadership in Kuwait is no doubt mindful of, and
concerned about, the domestic public backlash that could
arise from a designation. In their January 11 meeting in
Kuwait, the Amir described the Guantanamo issue to President
Bush as a "headache," a reference to the vigorous and public
lobbying the families of the remaining detainees have engaged
in, with some members of Kuwait's parliament adopting their
cause. While we have no reason to believe that the families
of these three individuals have any particular clout or reach
within the senior leadership, we do anticipate that the
Kuwaiti leadership, and perhaps the Amir himself, will have
another public relations challenge to confront following
their designation. Finally, Kuwait's resistance to
designation reflects its approach to countering terrorism
within Kuwait: co-opt rather than destroy. The Kuwaitis
have long argued that the three men are under surveillance
and cannot therefore perpetrate or support terrorist
activity. Yet we are only too well aware of the limits of
Kuwait's ability or willingness to monitor its own terrorist

KUWAIT 00000079 002 OF 002


sympathizers, as we have seen in their handling of Guantanamo
returnees.


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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
MISENHEIMER