Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KUWAIT694
2008-06-18 11:21:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:
KSS TO WAINSTEIN: KUWAIT CT LEGISLATION INADEQUATE
how-toVZCZCXRO2227 PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR DE RUEHKU #0694/01 1701121 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 181121Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1686 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1956 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1247 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1108 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 3144 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000694
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: KSS TO WAINSTEIN: KUWAIT CT LEGISLATION INADEQUATE
REF: A. KUWAIT 557
B. KUWAIT 512
C. KUWAIT 565
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000694
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: KSS TO WAINSTEIN: KUWAIT CT LEGISLATION INADEQUATE
REF: A. KUWAIT 557
B. KUWAIT 512
C. KUWAIT 565
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
--------------
1. (S) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, in a June 11
meeting with Kuwait State Security (KSS) Director Muhaylan,
conveyed the President's appeal for increased
counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and information sharing
among partners. Muhaylan complained of inadequate
legislation to effectively pursue and prosecute suspected
terrorists, and cited the Kuwaiti constitution as a limiting
factor in CT cooperation. Muhaylan claimed that current
intelligence sharing is not on an equal footing, as KSS, has
received "not one word" of information or evidence against
Kuwaiti's eight former GTMO detainees. He noted that
continuing tensions between the Kuwaiti legislative and
executive branches ensure that there will be no near-term
improvement in Kuwait's inadequate CT legal framework. The
best course forward, according to Muhaylan, is for the Amir
to dissolve Parliament and impose CT measures by decree. As
he states in every conversation with USG officials, Muhaylan
lamented the dissolution of the Security Courts. End summary.
Urging Cooperation and Information Sharing
--------------
2. (S) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, accompanied by
Ambassador, spoke on June 11 to Kuwait State Security (KSS)
Director, Major General Suleiman Al-Muhaylan about the
President's call for increased counterterrorism (CT)
cooperation and information sharing among partners. He also
relayed that, in a previous meeting with Kuwait's Prime
Minister (septel),he had delivered a letter from the
President to the Kuwaiti Amir that called for increased CT
cooperation.
3. (S) Muhaylan welcomed the visit as a continuation of
ongoing substantive CT dialogue, including recent visits by
S/CT Dailey (ref A) and S/I Satterfield (ref B),and noted
the utility of learning from the experience of others:
"Working together is a must, not an option." He noted that
Kuwait is especially vulnerable because of its location, and
lamented that terrorists continually change their priorities
and their tactics to keep one step ahead of security
services.
No Adequate CT Legislation in Kuwait
--------------
4. (S) APHSCT Wainstein stressed to Muhaylan that, despite
recent CT gains in the region, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations remain a threat. He pointed to the growing
menace of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, and added that
free societies like the United States and Kuwait are the
intended targets of terrorists. The key CT focus must in
Kuwait remain on terror facilitators, he stated. CT
legislation in Kuwait is inadequate, and reflects permissive,
pre-9/11 norms. APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan not to
underestimate the threat, and stressed the need to continue
enhancing U.S.-Kuwaiti joint CT efforts.
Limits on Sharing
--------------
5. (S) According to Muhaylan, KSS is ready to arrest or
detain suspected extremists; but, unfortunately, "the law is
not on our side." He lamented that KSS has "no influence"
with the government. When asked by APHSCT Wainstein about
sharing specific information on activities of Kuwaitis,
Muhaylan replied that KSS provides everything to the USG that
it can, within the confines of the constitution. KSS has no
immunity from the law, which prohibits the release of some
types of information to foreign governments. Nevertheless,
KSS passes "a mere fraction" of information to Saudi Arabia
than it shares with the United States.
KUWAIT 00000694 002 OF 004
6. (S) APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan to be creative in
relaying information without breaking any laws, and advised
him to use the Kuwaiti intelligence apparatus to push the
drive for new CT legislation.
Former GTMO Detainees
--------------
7. (S) Muhaylan contended that the USG presented a double
standard in its requests for more intelligence on Kuwaiti
nationals and its demands for prosecution of suspected
terrorists because "not one word" of evidence on eight
Kuwaiti former GTMO detainees has been shared with KSS. He
asked for information that the GOK can use to prosecute other
detainees or suspected terrorists. APHSCT Wainstein agreed
to review GTMO-related information sharing with CT partners
upon his return to Washington.
Kuwaiti Democracy 101
--------------
8. (S) Muhaylan contended that democracy in Kuwait began
its descent into chaos after the liberation of Kuwait in
1991. From that time, legislative anti-terror efforts were
scaled back to protect freedom of speech, the Kuwait State
Security Court was dismantled, and suspected terrorists were
set free for lack of criminal evidence. He expressed little
hope for new CT legislation in the near future, because the
dysfunctional relationship between MPs and the Cabinet
ensures that any such initiative would be stillborn. Though
he had hoped for a new, more collaborative Parliament, he was
profoundly disappointed that the May 17 election produced an
even more recalcitrant body than before. (Ref C)
GOK CT Actions
--------------
9. (S) Muhaylan cited some CT efforts undertaken recently by
the GOK:
--A Kuwaiti team visited terrorism rehabilitation centers in
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and submitted a report to the GOK
assessing the viability of developing such a center in
Kuwait.
--All mosques in Kuwait must now have KSS approval for Imams.
--All foreign teachers must now have KSS approval.
Saudi Radicals Influence Kuwaiti Extremists
-------------- --------------
10. (S) Muhaylan opined that radicalization in Saudi Arabia
has directly affected the Kuwaiti outlook on extremism;
religious hard-liners in Kuwait are inspired and motivated by
fatwas issued by Saudi clerics. Due to passport control
system flaws and family connections on either side of the
border, many Kuwaiti extremists--as described by
Muhaylan--have dual Saudi/Kuwaiti nationality, enabling easy
passage between the two countries, and creating difficulty
for Kuwaiti authorities in reconciling watchlist names with
documents.
Profiles of Kuwaiti Extremists
--------------
11. (S) Muhaylan profiled Kuwaiti extremists as young, high
school dropouts with no standing in the community or
potential for the future. Compared to jihadists from the
earlier stages of OIF, he described the new generation of
extremists as less impassioned and less able to seduce
vulnerable recruits. He added that, since most Gulf recruits
for Al-Qaeda are tasked with suicide operations in Iraq, they
are taking another look at Afghanistan as a battlefield to
prove their valor in combat.
Downplaying Mohammed Al-Dossary's Role
--------------
12. (S) Muhaylan downplayed the role of Kuwaiti suspected
terrorist facilitator Mohammed Al-Dossary, whom he described
as psychologically ill, stating that earlier reports
exaggerated his connections to Syrian terrorist, Abu Ghadiya.
He added that Al-Dossary's current activities in Syria were
limited to the shoe trade with Syrian merchants.
Border Concerns
KUWAIT 00000694 003 OF 004
--------------
13. (S) Muhaylan claimed that, because of improvements in
border monitoring, Kuwaiti jihadists have found it
increasingly difficult to cross into Iraq via Saudi Arabia
and Syria. This, he added, has opened up concerns that
Kuwaiti jihadists now travel through Bahrain and the UAE en
route to Iraq or Afghanistan. He added that the MOI was
modifying controls on sea borders, with new abilities for
close, far and land monitoring, with hopes to be fully
operational by 2009.
Charities
--------------
14. (S) APHSCT Wainstein emphasized the importance of
cooperation efforts in identifying charities used in whole or
in part to fund terrorism. He noted the disparity of views
on this matter, but urged more operational officer level
cooperation, promising continued efforts to encourage more
transparency and cooperation.
Future Scenarios
--------------
15. (S) Muhaylan stated that Kuwaitis do not understand the
terror threat that faces the country and speculated on likely
scenarios:
A. Kuwait suffers a major catastrophe.
B. (Sarcastically) Kuwait adopts the Jordanian model of
repeatedly dissolving parliament to intentionally exhaust and
bankrupt candidates.
C. The Amir dissolves the Parliament unconstitutionally
(i.e. without the required new elections within 60 days) and
begins issuing, by decree, CT laws that allow the GOK to
bring to justice suspected terrorists.
"Subverting Democracy" the Best Course for Kuwait?
-------------- --------------
16. (S) Muhaylan remarked that the best solution is an
unconstitutional dissolution of Parliament by the Amir.
However, he contended should this action take place, the GOK
would have to endure USG condemnation for subverting
democracy.
Comment
--------------
17. (S) Ironically, Muhaylan blasted the Ambassador halfway
through the meeting for the recently published TIP report
placing Kuwait on Tier III. Claiming that Kuwait's human
rights protections were the best in the GCC, Muhaylan faulted
the USG for relying on unsubstantiated press reports and said
the GOK had discovered that the various human rights groups
operating in Europe had proven ties to Islamic extremists.
End comment.
18. (S/NF) The participants of the meeting, which took place
at Kuwait State Security (KSS) Headquarters, included:
U.S.
Ambassador Deborah K. Jones
Kenneth APHSCT Wainstein, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Nicholas Rasmussen, Senior Director for Combating Terrorism,
NSC
John Duncan, Director for Combating Terrorism, NSC
Kate Gladney, Aide to APHSCT Wainstein
GRPO Head
Tom Rosenberger (notetaker)
KSS
MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security
Affairs and de facto KSS Director
KSS Officers, names not provided
19. (U) This cable has been cleared by APHSCT Wainstein.
********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s
KUWAIT 00000694 004 OF 004
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
MISENHEIMER
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: KSS TO WAINSTEIN: KUWAIT CT LEGISLATION INADEQUATE
REF: A. KUWAIT 557
B. KUWAIT 512
C. KUWAIT 565
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
--------------
1. (S) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, in a June 11
meeting with Kuwait State Security (KSS) Director Muhaylan,
conveyed the President's appeal for increased
counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and information sharing
among partners. Muhaylan complained of inadequate
legislation to effectively pursue and prosecute suspected
terrorists, and cited the Kuwaiti constitution as a limiting
factor in CT cooperation. Muhaylan claimed that current
intelligence sharing is not on an equal footing, as KSS, has
received "not one word" of information or evidence against
Kuwaiti's eight former GTMO detainees. He noted that
continuing tensions between the Kuwaiti legislative and
executive branches ensure that there will be no near-term
improvement in Kuwait's inadequate CT legal framework. The
best course forward, according to Muhaylan, is for the Amir
to dissolve Parliament and impose CT measures by decree. As
he states in every conversation with USG officials, Muhaylan
lamented the dissolution of the Security Courts. End summary.
Urging Cooperation and Information Sharing
--------------
2. (S) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, accompanied by
Ambassador, spoke on June 11 to Kuwait State Security (KSS)
Director, Major General Suleiman Al-Muhaylan about the
President's call for increased counterterrorism (CT)
cooperation and information sharing among partners. He also
relayed that, in a previous meeting with Kuwait's Prime
Minister (septel),he had delivered a letter from the
President to the Kuwaiti Amir that called for increased CT
cooperation.
3. (S) Muhaylan welcomed the visit as a continuation of
ongoing substantive CT dialogue, including recent visits by
S/CT Dailey (ref A) and S/I Satterfield (ref B),and noted
the utility of learning from the experience of others:
"Working together is a must, not an option." He noted that
Kuwait is especially vulnerable because of its location, and
lamented that terrorists continually change their priorities
and their tactics to keep one step ahead of security
services.
No Adequate CT Legislation in Kuwait
--------------
4. (S) APHSCT Wainstein stressed to Muhaylan that, despite
recent CT gains in the region, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations remain a threat. He pointed to the growing
menace of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, and added that
free societies like the United States and Kuwait are the
intended targets of terrorists. The key CT focus must in
Kuwait remain on terror facilitators, he stated. CT
legislation in Kuwait is inadequate, and reflects permissive,
pre-9/11 norms. APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan not to
underestimate the threat, and stressed the need to continue
enhancing U.S.-Kuwaiti joint CT efforts.
Limits on Sharing
--------------
5. (S) According to Muhaylan, KSS is ready to arrest or
detain suspected extremists; but, unfortunately, "the law is
not on our side." He lamented that KSS has "no influence"
with the government. When asked by APHSCT Wainstein about
sharing specific information on activities of Kuwaitis,
Muhaylan replied that KSS provides everything to the USG that
it can, within the confines of the constitution. KSS has no
immunity from the law, which prohibits the release of some
types of information to foreign governments. Nevertheless,
KSS passes "a mere fraction" of information to Saudi Arabia
than it shares with the United States.
KUWAIT 00000694 002 OF 004
6. (S) APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan to be creative in
relaying information without breaking any laws, and advised
him to use the Kuwaiti intelligence apparatus to push the
drive for new CT legislation.
Former GTMO Detainees
--------------
7. (S) Muhaylan contended that the USG presented a double
standard in its requests for more intelligence on Kuwaiti
nationals and its demands for prosecution of suspected
terrorists because "not one word" of evidence on eight
Kuwaiti former GTMO detainees has been shared with KSS. He
asked for information that the GOK can use to prosecute other
detainees or suspected terrorists. APHSCT Wainstein agreed
to review GTMO-related information sharing with CT partners
upon his return to Washington.
Kuwaiti Democracy 101
--------------
8. (S) Muhaylan contended that democracy in Kuwait began
its descent into chaos after the liberation of Kuwait in
1991. From that time, legislative anti-terror efforts were
scaled back to protect freedom of speech, the Kuwait State
Security Court was dismantled, and suspected terrorists were
set free for lack of criminal evidence. He expressed little
hope for new CT legislation in the near future, because the
dysfunctional relationship between MPs and the Cabinet
ensures that any such initiative would be stillborn. Though
he had hoped for a new, more collaborative Parliament, he was
profoundly disappointed that the May 17 election produced an
even more recalcitrant body than before. (Ref C)
GOK CT Actions
--------------
9. (S) Muhaylan cited some CT efforts undertaken recently by
the GOK:
--A Kuwaiti team visited terrorism rehabilitation centers in
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and submitted a report to the GOK
assessing the viability of developing such a center in
Kuwait.
--All mosques in Kuwait must now have KSS approval for Imams.
--All foreign teachers must now have KSS approval.
Saudi Radicals Influence Kuwaiti Extremists
-------------- --------------
10. (S) Muhaylan opined that radicalization in Saudi Arabia
has directly affected the Kuwaiti outlook on extremism;
religious hard-liners in Kuwait are inspired and motivated by
fatwas issued by Saudi clerics. Due to passport control
system flaws and family connections on either side of the
border, many Kuwaiti extremists--as described by
Muhaylan--have dual Saudi/Kuwaiti nationality, enabling easy
passage between the two countries, and creating difficulty
for Kuwaiti authorities in reconciling watchlist names with
documents.
Profiles of Kuwaiti Extremists
--------------
11. (S) Muhaylan profiled Kuwaiti extremists as young, high
school dropouts with no standing in the community or
potential for the future. Compared to jihadists from the
earlier stages of OIF, he described the new generation of
extremists as less impassioned and less able to seduce
vulnerable recruits. He added that, since most Gulf recruits
for Al-Qaeda are tasked with suicide operations in Iraq, they
are taking another look at Afghanistan as a battlefield to
prove their valor in combat.
Downplaying Mohammed Al-Dossary's Role
--------------
12. (S) Muhaylan downplayed the role of Kuwaiti suspected
terrorist facilitator Mohammed Al-Dossary, whom he described
as psychologically ill, stating that earlier reports
exaggerated his connections to Syrian terrorist, Abu Ghadiya.
He added that Al-Dossary's current activities in Syria were
limited to the shoe trade with Syrian merchants.
Border Concerns
KUWAIT 00000694 003 OF 004
--------------
13. (S) Muhaylan claimed that, because of improvements in
border monitoring, Kuwaiti jihadists have found it
increasingly difficult to cross into Iraq via Saudi Arabia
and Syria. This, he added, has opened up concerns that
Kuwaiti jihadists now travel through Bahrain and the UAE en
route to Iraq or Afghanistan. He added that the MOI was
modifying controls on sea borders, with new abilities for
close, far and land monitoring, with hopes to be fully
operational by 2009.
Charities
--------------
14. (S) APHSCT Wainstein emphasized the importance of
cooperation efforts in identifying charities used in whole or
in part to fund terrorism. He noted the disparity of views
on this matter, but urged more operational officer level
cooperation, promising continued efforts to encourage more
transparency and cooperation.
Future Scenarios
--------------
15. (S) Muhaylan stated that Kuwaitis do not understand the
terror threat that faces the country and speculated on likely
scenarios:
A. Kuwait suffers a major catastrophe.
B. (Sarcastically) Kuwait adopts the Jordanian model of
repeatedly dissolving parliament to intentionally exhaust and
bankrupt candidates.
C. The Amir dissolves the Parliament unconstitutionally
(i.e. without the required new elections within 60 days) and
begins issuing, by decree, CT laws that allow the GOK to
bring to justice suspected terrorists.
"Subverting Democracy" the Best Course for Kuwait?
-------------- --------------
16. (S) Muhaylan remarked that the best solution is an
unconstitutional dissolution of Parliament by the Amir.
However, he contended should this action take place, the GOK
would have to endure USG condemnation for subverting
democracy.
Comment
--------------
17. (S) Ironically, Muhaylan blasted the Ambassador halfway
through the meeting for the recently published TIP report
placing Kuwait on Tier III. Claiming that Kuwait's human
rights protections were the best in the GCC, Muhaylan faulted
the USG for relying on unsubstantiated press reports and said
the GOK had discovered that the various human rights groups
operating in Europe had proven ties to Islamic extremists.
End comment.
18. (S/NF) The participants of the meeting, which took place
at Kuwait State Security (KSS) Headquarters, included:
U.S.
Ambassador Deborah K. Jones
Kenneth APHSCT Wainstein, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Nicholas Rasmussen, Senior Director for Combating Terrorism,
NSC
John Duncan, Director for Combating Terrorism, NSC
Kate Gladney, Aide to APHSCT Wainstein
GRPO Head
Tom Rosenberger (notetaker)
KSS
MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security
Affairs and de facto KSS Director
KSS Officers, names not provided
19. (U) This cable has been cleared by APHSCT Wainstein.
********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s
KUWAIT 00000694 004 OF 004
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
MISENHEIMER