Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KUWAIT557
2008-05-18 11:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:
S/CT DAILEY OFFERS CT COOPERATION; KSS DESCRIBES
how-toVZCZCXRO7015 PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR DE RUEHKU #0557/01 1391102 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 181102Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1471 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000557
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: S/CT DAILEY OFFERS CT COOPERATION; KSS DESCRIBES
CONSTRAINTS
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000557
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: S/CT DAILEY OFFERS CT COOPERATION; KSS DESCRIBES
CONSTRAINTS
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
--------------
1. (S) In separate meetings May 12 with Kuwait State
Security (KSS) and MFA officials, on May 12, S/CT Dailey
briefed on the USG paradigm of counterterrorism (CT) efforts
and urged speedy and transparent information and intelligence
exchanges and tighter border controls. S/CT Dailey also
urged that the GOK not block a pending UNSCR 1267 designation
of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). In
response, KSS Director Muhaylan launched into an historical
overview of what he assessed made Kuwait unique in terms of
CT, complaining of the lack of CT legislation and the media's
role in promoting extremism. "We don't see Al-Qaeda as
Public Enemy Number One," asserted Muhaylan, listing instead
Hizbollah, Iranians in Kuwait, and the potential spillover
from Southern Iraq. He further blamed Kuwait's judicial
system and its noisy democracy as obstacles in effectively
confronting extremists. End Summary.
USG CT Paradigm
--------------
2. (S) In separate May 12 briefings with KSS and MFA, S/CT
Dell Dailey, accompanied by AMB Jones, began by presenting
the USG's approach to CT, describing a pyramid divided as
follow: 'capture and kill' at the top 15 percent; disruption
efforts the following 20 percent; and 65 percent focusing on
1) social diversity 2) economic success 3) political
integration 4) religious persecution 5) ideological
extremism.
Muhaylan's Historical Overview of 'Kuwait's Identity Crisis'
-------------- --------------
3. (S) In response, KSS Director Muhaylan launched into a
lengthy review of Kuwait's historical CT challenges.
Highlighting Kuwait's international make-up, he noted that
there are 127 nationalities represented in Kuwait, and that
the population of expatriates has exceeded the number of
Kuwaitis for over 35 years. He explained that these large
numbers of "outsiders" have had and maintain a high level
influence on Kuwaiti society. In particular, he discussed
how the influx of a half million Palestinians after 1948
"influenced the mentality" of Kuwaitis by introducing
Ba'athism and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies. He noted that
Kuwait had always been subject to the influence emanating
from Iraq, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and that the growth of
extremism, militarism and fanaticism in these three immediate
neighbors had compelled the GOK to take a unique approach to
terrorism.
4. (S) Muhaylan suggested that Kuwait suffers from a
cultural/religious identity crisis; 70% of Kuwaitis of
Arabian peninsula descent adhere or look to Saudi tribal or
Wahhabi influence, while the nation's Arab Shi'a population
looks to Marj'iyyah (religious reference points) in Najaf or
Kerbala, Iraq, and its Persian Shi'a to Iranian institutions
in Qom, Iran. He added that Kuwaitis had been seduced by
Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Pan-Arabism, only to feel betrayed by
Arabs, particularly Iraqis and Palestinians, when Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. Now, he concluded, Kuwaitis
are struggling to define themselves in terms of the ongoing
discussions of clashing civilizations.
Al-Qaeda not Public Enemy Number One
-------------- --------------
5. (S) As a result of this history, Muhaylan said "We don't
see Al-Qaeda as Public Enemy Number One." Instead, he listed
chief threats to Kuwaiti security as Hizbollah, Iranians in
Kuwait, and potential spillover from Southern Iraq.
Impasse between Legislative and Executive Bodies
-------------- --------------
6. (S) As a defense of GOK failings on CT, Muhaylan
explained that candidates in the upcoming May 17 elections
are keeping KSS and other security services distracted by
engaging in illegal primaries or vote-buying schemes. He
lamented that the "parliamentary candidates are breaking the
very laws that former MPs made." He indicated current
clampdowns on election infractions are ineffective because
although Kuwait has "good laws" on the books, the executive
body lacks will and vision and the judicial body is
ineffective.
KUWAIT 00000557 002 OF 003
Need for Legislation/Press Promoting Voices of Extremists
-------------- --------------
7. (S) Muhaylan lamented the lack of adequate legislation to
fight terrorism and stated that Kuwaiti courts are not
equipped to prosecute terrorists since a dissolution of
security courts after the 1991 liberation. He assessed that
Kuwait,s concern with speech and press freedoms has
overridden state security and charged that local press plays
an active recruitment role for young jihadists, citing
sympathy-garnering interviews with former GTMO detainees as
an example, as well as a recent local newspaper interview
with UNSCR 1267 designee Mubarak Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bathali,
for which Al-Bathali was allegedly paid 300 KD. (USD 1,125).
(Note: Al-Bathali was arrested for his remarks and held for
four days--the maximum one can be held without charge--and
then released. End note). He complained, "We end up
fighting the Ministry of Justice, and not the extremists."
Need for Speed and Transparency
-------------- --------------
8. (S) AMB Jones and S/CT Dailey stressed the need for
stronger bilateral cooperation and sharing of information and
intelligence. Explaining how extremists exploit governmental
bureaucracies, through fast-moving technologies, i.e. the
internet, S/CT Dailey urged Muhaylan to keep communication
lanes open, reducing delays in sharing information from days
to hours and minutes.
9. (S) While extolling recent Kuwaiti initiatives to combat
money laundering, Dailey called for the GOK to expand its
oversight into foreign charities that receive Kuwaiti
donations and to deal directly with other nations where
charities receive Kuwaiti funds. He called for increased
support for the Kuwait Central Bank's Financial Intelligence
Unit. He also extended offers of joint training at the
national and regional level, showcasing the three most
popular courses provided by the USG: cyber security, incident
response, and leadership responsibility in crisis management.
RIHS Designation: "Individuals Gone Astray"
-------------- -
10. (S) Acknowledging that the GOK might not support a UNSCR
1267 designation of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society
(RIHS, a Kuwait-based charity),and USG inability to release
classified material that demonstrates RIHS connections to
terror facilitation, Dailey urged that the GOK at least not
block designation at the UNSC. KSS officers pushed back,
noting that the RIHS was associated with the GOK and
therefore any effort to designate would damage the GOK's
reputation as well. Muhaylan argued that such designation
might have been necessary 18 months earlier, but the GOK had
since created a national oversight committee, with members
from the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance. "Select
individuals were the problem;' Muhaylan said, 'not the
institution itself." AMB Jones noted that this matter would
be raised during the June 1 visit of Treasury Secretary
Paulson.
Need for Tighter Controls
--------------
11. (S) AMB Jones concluded the meeting by reiterating the
need for greater transparency and speedier communication
between KSS and its Embassy liaisons. She urged tighter
border security and stressed the need for GOK oversight and
reviews of the status of all former GTMO detainees as well as
jihadists known to have participated as foreign fighters
outside of Kuwait.
MFA Response
--------------
12. (S) S/CT Dailey delivered the same brief to the MFA,
eliciting from Ambassador Khaled Muqamis, Director of MFA's
Follow-up and Coordination Department and Ambassador Ali
Al-Sammak, Director of the Americas Department, a promise to
contact the Ministry of the Interior and ask that
Al-Bathali's passport be confiscated. (Note: The FM was
tied up with the Lebanon crisis and unable to attend. End
note.) Muqamis also stressed that the GOK would continue to
monitor the former GTMO detainees and that the GOK was
currently looking for a mechanism to integrate them back into
society. He contended that the GOK is "very strict" and will
take the issues conveyed seriously, noting that the GOK was
KUWAIT 00000557 003 OF 003
seeking a means to circumvent parliament in establishing a
rehabilitation center. (Note: AMB Jones informed these MFA
officials that, per her previous conversation with KSS,
Al-Bathali had been released from detention. End note).
13. (S/NF) The participants of the meetings, which took
place at Kuwait State Security (KSS) Headquarters and MFA
included:
U.S.
Ambassador Deborah K. Jones
Ambassador Dell Dailey S/CT
GRPO Head
Tom Rosenberger (notetaker)
KSS
MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security
Affairs and de facto KSS Director
KSS Officers, names not provided
MFA
Ambassador Khaled Al-Muqamis, MFA Follow up and Coordination
Department
Ambassador Ali Al Sammak, MFA Director, the Americas
Department
14. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/CT Dailey.
********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
JONES
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: S/CT DAILEY OFFERS CT COOPERATION; KSS DESCRIBES
CONSTRAINTS
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
--------------
1. (S) In separate meetings May 12 with Kuwait State
Security (KSS) and MFA officials, on May 12, S/CT Dailey
briefed on the USG paradigm of counterterrorism (CT) efforts
and urged speedy and transparent information and intelligence
exchanges and tighter border controls. S/CT Dailey also
urged that the GOK not block a pending UNSCR 1267 designation
of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). In
response, KSS Director Muhaylan launched into an historical
overview of what he assessed made Kuwait unique in terms of
CT, complaining of the lack of CT legislation and the media's
role in promoting extremism. "We don't see Al-Qaeda as
Public Enemy Number One," asserted Muhaylan, listing instead
Hizbollah, Iranians in Kuwait, and the potential spillover
from Southern Iraq. He further blamed Kuwait's judicial
system and its noisy democracy as obstacles in effectively
confronting extremists. End Summary.
USG CT Paradigm
--------------
2. (S) In separate May 12 briefings with KSS and MFA, S/CT
Dell Dailey, accompanied by AMB Jones, began by presenting
the USG's approach to CT, describing a pyramid divided as
follow: 'capture and kill' at the top 15 percent; disruption
efforts the following 20 percent; and 65 percent focusing on
1) social diversity 2) economic success 3) political
integration 4) religious persecution 5) ideological
extremism.
Muhaylan's Historical Overview of 'Kuwait's Identity Crisis'
-------------- --------------
3. (S) In response, KSS Director Muhaylan launched into a
lengthy review of Kuwait's historical CT challenges.
Highlighting Kuwait's international make-up, he noted that
there are 127 nationalities represented in Kuwait, and that
the population of expatriates has exceeded the number of
Kuwaitis for over 35 years. He explained that these large
numbers of "outsiders" have had and maintain a high level
influence on Kuwaiti society. In particular, he discussed
how the influx of a half million Palestinians after 1948
"influenced the mentality" of Kuwaitis by introducing
Ba'athism and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies. He noted that
Kuwait had always been subject to the influence emanating
from Iraq, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and that the growth of
extremism, militarism and fanaticism in these three immediate
neighbors had compelled the GOK to take a unique approach to
terrorism.
4. (S) Muhaylan suggested that Kuwait suffers from a
cultural/religious identity crisis; 70% of Kuwaitis of
Arabian peninsula descent adhere or look to Saudi tribal or
Wahhabi influence, while the nation's Arab Shi'a population
looks to Marj'iyyah (religious reference points) in Najaf or
Kerbala, Iraq, and its Persian Shi'a to Iranian institutions
in Qom, Iran. He added that Kuwaitis had been seduced by
Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Pan-Arabism, only to feel betrayed by
Arabs, particularly Iraqis and Palestinians, when Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. Now, he concluded, Kuwaitis
are struggling to define themselves in terms of the ongoing
discussions of clashing civilizations.
Al-Qaeda not Public Enemy Number One
-------------- --------------
5. (S) As a result of this history, Muhaylan said "We don't
see Al-Qaeda as Public Enemy Number One." Instead, he listed
chief threats to Kuwaiti security as Hizbollah, Iranians in
Kuwait, and potential spillover from Southern Iraq.
Impasse between Legislative and Executive Bodies
-------------- --------------
6. (S) As a defense of GOK failings on CT, Muhaylan
explained that candidates in the upcoming May 17 elections
are keeping KSS and other security services distracted by
engaging in illegal primaries or vote-buying schemes. He
lamented that the "parliamentary candidates are breaking the
very laws that former MPs made." He indicated current
clampdowns on election infractions are ineffective because
although Kuwait has "good laws" on the books, the executive
body lacks will and vision and the judicial body is
ineffective.
KUWAIT 00000557 002 OF 003
Need for Legislation/Press Promoting Voices of Extremists
-------------- --------------
7. (S) Muhaylan lamented the lack of adequate legislation to
fight terrorism and stated that Kuwaiti courts are not
equipped to prosecute terrorists since a dissolution of
security courts after the 1991 liberation. He assessed that
Kuwait,s concern with speech and press freedoms has
overridden state security and charged that local press plays
an active recruitment role for young jihadists, citing
sympathy-garnering interviews with former GTMO detainees as
an example, as well as a recent local newspaper interview
with UNSCR 1267 designee Mubarak Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bathali,
for which Al-Bathali was allegedly paid 300 KD. (USD 1,125).
(Note: Al-Bathali was arrested for his remarks and held for
four days--the maximum one can be held without charge--and
then released. End note). He complained, "We end up
fighting the Ministry of Justice, and not the extremists."
Need for Speed and Transparency
-------------- --------------
8. (S) AMB Jones and S/CT Dailey stressed the need for
stronger bilateral cooperation and sharing of information and
intelligence. Explaining how extremists exploit governmental
bureaucracies, through fast-moving technologies, i.e. the
internet, S/CT Dailey urged Muhaylan to keep communication
lanes open, reducing delays in sharing information from days
to hours and minutes.
9. (S) While extolling recent Kuwaiti initiatives to combat
money laundering, Dailey called for the GOK to expand its
oversight into foreign charities that receive Kuwaiti
donations and to deal directly with other nations where
charities receive Kuwaiti funds. He called for increased
support for the Kuwait Central Bank's Financial Intelligence
Unit. He also extended offers of joint training at the
national and regional level, showcasing the three most
popular courses provided by the USG: cyber security, incident
response, and leadership responsibility in crisis management.
RIHS Designation: "Individuals Gone Astray"
-------------- -
10. (S) Acknowledging that the GOK might not support a UNSCR
1267 designation of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society
(RIHS, a Kuwait-based charity),and USG inability to release
classified material that demonstrates RIHS connections to
terror facilitation, Dailey urged that the GOK at least not
block designation at the UNSC. KSS officers pushed back,
noting that the RIHS was associated with the GOK and
therefore any effort to designate would damage the GOK's
reputation as well. Muhaylan argued that such designation
might have been necessary 18 months earlier, but the GOK had
since created a national oversight committee, with members
from the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance. "Select
individuals were the problem;' Muhaylan said, 'not the
institution itself." AMB Jones noted that this matter would
be raised during the June 1 visit of Treasury Secretary
Paulson.
Need for Tighter Controls
--------------
11. (S) AMB Jones concluded the meeting by reiterating the
need for greater transparency and speedier communication
between KSS and its Embassy liaisons. She urged tighter
border security and stressed the need for GOK oversight and
reviews of the status of all former GTMO detainees as well as
jihadists known to have participated as foreign fighters
outside of Kuwait.
MFA Response
--------------
12. (S) S/CT Dailey delivered the same brief to the MFA,
eliciting from Ambassador Khaled Muqamis, Director of MFA's
Follow-up and Coordination Department and Ambassador Ali
Al-Sammak, Director of the Americas Department, a promise to
contact the Ministry of the Interior and ask that
Al-Bathali's passport be confiscated. (Note: The FM was
tied up with the Lebanon crisis and unable to attend. End
note.) Muqamis also stressed that the GOK would continue to
monitor the former GTMO detainees and that the GOK was
currently looking for a mechanism to integrate them back into
society. He contended that the GOK is "very strict" and will
take the issues conveyed seriously, noting that the GOK was
KUWAIT 00000557 003 OF 003
seeking a means to circumvent parliament in establishing a
rehabilitation center. (Note: AMB Jones informed these MFA
officials that, per her previous conversation with KSS,
Al-Bathali had been released from detention. End note).
13. (S/NF) The participants of the meetings, which took
place at Kuwait State Security (KSS) Headquarters and MFA
included:
U.S.
Ambassador Deborah K. Jones
Ambassador Dell Dailey S/CT
GRPO Head
Tom Rosenberger (notetaker)
KSS
MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security
Affairs and de facto KSS Director
KSS Officers, names not provided
MFA
Ambassador Khaled Al-Muqamis, MFA Follow up and Coordination
Department
Ambassador Ali Al Sammak, MFA Director, the Americas
Department
14. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/CT Dailey.
********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
JONES