AMB SATTERFIELD BRIEFS GOK ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS

S E C R E T KUWAIT 000512

SIPDIS
NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
NEA/ARP, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PARM PBTS PINR KU
SUBJECT: AMB SATTERFIELD BRIEFS GOK ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS

Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------


1. (S) In a nearly four hour session with Kuwaiti MFA and
security officials, S/I Satterfield and team briefed on
developments in Iraq, with particular focus on progress made
re Sunni outreach/reconciliation and significance of Basrah
confrontation between PM Maliki and Iraqi Security Forces and
violent elements of the Jaysh al-Mahdi, including the
Iranian-backed "Special Groups". The team underscored the
strategic importance for Kuwait and GCC states of the strong
reaction by Maliki and the Iraqi(including Shia) street
against the violence perpetrated by Iran,s surrogates.
Support from all political elites in Iraq, notably Sunni
Tawaffuq leader al-Hashimi, for Maliki was running very
strong. This was a moment of opportunity for Iraq,s Arab
neighbors "for their own sake" to step forward with support
and encouragement for the positive developments now taking
place. The GOK side responded with skepticism, asserting
that they understood the situation in the south very well and
dismissing Basrah events as inter-Shia political fighting
that did not alter their assessment of Maliki as a sectarian
leader. End summary.

Progress on the Ground
--------------


2. (S) S/I Ambassador David Satterfield, leading a USG
delegation from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad,
Multi-National Forces-Iraq, and Washington analysts, on May 4
briefed senior Kuwaiti MFA and Intelligence officials on
progress in Iraq. Satterfield and team underscored the
urgency of Arab support and engagement with Iraq, briefing in
detail on the progressive evolution of security post-US surge
and Sunni "Awakening" movement and the resultant emergence of
positive but still fragile political dynamics at national and
provincial levels. PM Maliki and the GOI were acting with
greater cohesion and confidence as a "national" government,
although much more needed to be done to advance the rule of
law and the provision of essential services. Reconciliation
efforts, all but non-existent seven months ago, were now
moving forward. These steps needed to be nurtured and
sustained, but the progress was real. Similarly real and
highly significant for the strategic interests of the US and
our partners in the region, Maliki and the GOI were now
engaged in a confrontation with the most violent Shia militia
elements backed by Iran.

Iran Facing Choices
--------------


3. (S) Satterfield and team underscored that Maliki's
intervention in Basrah had weakened and made more vulnerable
Iran's position both in southern Iraq and throughout Iraq.
Iran does not want to place the Iraqi government or Shia
street in a position where they must choose between the U.S.
and Iran, or indeed between the Government of Iraq and the
Government of Iran. But Iranian overplaying of its hand in
Iraq through backing of violent groups no longer under any
meaningful Iraqi control "including Muqtada al-Sadr" was
leading to just such choices. Iran wanted to continue to
deal with Iraq as it dealt with Hizballah in Lebanon and
radical Palestinians in Damascus; preferring to advance its
interests through violent factions and surrogates rather than
on a state-to-state basis. Iran wanted to have it both ways:
to have good relations with the GOI and at the same time
support armed elements outside the control of the state.
This duality had to come to an end. What had happened in
Basrah, if sustained and presented as the Iraqi state
establishing control over the country rather than as a Shia
political struggle for power would be a very significant step
forward for Iraq and the region.


Basrah, A Critical Development
--------------


4. (S) Satterfield and MG Robeson explained that Maliki's
actions against the Basrah armed groups in late March took us
all by surprise. We had been urging the GOI to act in Basrah
for a year; what had changed was Maliki,s realization that
the situation there "security/political/economic" was out of
control and a danger to the Iraqi state as a whole. While
the military campaign could have been better prepared and
resourced, the JAM in the end stood down and allowed the ISF
to establish control in Basrah and Umm Qasr port. Most
important, the Shia and broader Iraqi street in the south and
in Baghdad rallied to support the PM "the simple fact that
the GOI at long last took action to defend citizens from the
depredations of criminal and violent elements had prompted an
emotional and positive response. And Iraq,s political
leaders, including Tariq al-Hashimi, had also come to the
PM,s side. This broad political backing needed to be
translated, Satterfield noted, into concrete progress on all
fronts: reconciliation, security, and further establishment
of government control and rule of law. National feelings and
resentment of Iran,s actions were running high; these too
needed to be translated into lasting measures to affirm the
role and presence of the Iraqi state.


5. (S) In response, GEN Suleiman Al-Muhaylan asked if JAM
was "defeated" in Basra. Satterfield and Robeson explained
that while Iraqi forces had done very well, considering the
difficulty of the undertaking, the real consequences of
Basrah should be measured in political terms --and in that
sense Basrah was indeed a 'victory" for the Iraqi government
and a set-back for violent elements and their Iranian
backers. Suleiman noted that (Fadilah-backed) Basrah
governor Muhammad Wa'ili -- who had just been in Kuwait --
was intentionally left unaware of the pending use of force
and suggested that Wa,ili represented more of a positive
element in Basrah than did Maliki,s military intervention.
In a digression, he also spoke of how both Arab and Persian
Shia adhere more to the Marja (religious leadership in Shia
Islam) in Iraq, than they do in Iran, suggesting that once
stable, Iraqi Shia
may have broader regional influence. MG Khalid Al Sabah, was
skeptical of the degree of success in Basrah and of Maliki's
leadership ability, calling the previous Maliki-led Karbala
initiative a "disaster." KSS also queried whether the GOI
policy would force the Badr Organization and other Shia
militias apart from the JAM to disband, and predicted that
the militias would evolve and change tactics, taking their
lead from the Hezbollah experience in Lebanon. GEN Suleiman
assessed that Iran is "playing a game in southern Iraq in its
desire to be a regional "superpower." He said that Iran's
focus is mainly on the south, and to date, showed little
interest in expanding its influence to the middle and
northern parts of Iraq. Satterfield reiterated that Iran
posed a political and security challenge throughout Iraq -
and to the region and international community as well.


6. (S) MFA Follow-up and Coordination Director Amb. Khaled
Al-Muqamis queried the "absence" of U.S. forces in Basrah
since 2003, laying blame for the current security situation
on U.S. forces and lack of USG planning. MG Robeson
reiterated that while the situation in Basrah had called for
attention for at least a year, what was significant was
Maliki's decision to act.

"Awakening" Movements Gradually Embraced By GOI
-------------- --


7. (S) Don Blome, Co-chair of the Force Strategic Engagement
Cell at Embassy Baghdad, highlighted for the group the recent
success of the Sunni Awakening Movements. He detailed the
growth from 4,000 to over 100,000 "Sons of Iraq," who are now
playing a pivotal role in stabilization efforts in Iraq. The
key to the success of the effort, he explained, has been the
buy-in of Maliki for the initiative and the gradual
integration of the "Sons" into the GOI's security forces and
overall security plan. A significant result in this program,
he stated, is a growing wedge between local
participants--some of whom had previous
involvement in insurgencies--and their extremist leaders
currently outside of Iraq. The exploitation of this
disconnect is resulting in the marginalization of terror
groups that were active in Iraq until recently. The end
result, he concluded is progress towards building nationalism
among those potentially and previously disenfranchised by the
GOI.

Plea for Arab Representation in Baghdad
--------------


8. (S) Recalling similar appeals from the President, VP, the
Secretary, Ambassador Crocker and many other senior USG
officials, Satterfield emphasized the need for Arab
representation in Baghdad and active engagement with the GOI.
MG Robeson and Satterfield explained that regardless of the
outcome of the upcoming November U.S. Presidential elections,
Iraq is likely to witness a drawdown in the number of U.S.
troops, highlighting the sense of urgency for collective
stabilization efforts. MG Robeson noted "if you had an
Ambassador in Iraq, you would have more visibility on this
(the urgency of the situation)."

Next Steps
--------------


9. (S) In response to Satterfield's recommendations on
needed actions to contribute to the stabilization of Iraq,
such as establishing a presence in Iraq, developing
information and intelligence channels, and moving the GOI
from Iran, Muqamis said that the official position of the GOK
is "supportive of a stable Iraq." He then expressed his
personal doubts and suspicions regarding dealing with Iraqi
leaders, calling all senior leaders "liars" and suggested
that the USG cultivate more "middle" leaders - an apparent
reference to former PM Ayad Allawi. Satterfield responded
that "middle" leaders such as Allawi would have a greater
role to play if they focused their efforts on the political
process in their own country rather than touring through the
region appealing for external support to be placed in power
in Baghdad.

GOK Needs Greater Control of Would Be Freedom Fighters
-------------- --------------


10. (S) Satterfield concluded by saying that USG and Iraqi
forces are taking the fight to AQI in Mosul. AQI is
diminished, but still a lethal force and it is incumbent upon
Iraq's neighbors to prevent the flow of Foreign Fighters into
Iraq. Alluding to the GOK's failure to effectively monitor
and prevent travel of former Kuwaiti GTMO detainee Abdullah
Al-Ajmi (who allegedly carried out a suicide attack in Mosul
in late April),and two other Kuwaitis, Satterfield said that
Kuwait must ensure that terror suspects not travel and
further disrupt progress in Mosul and added that "We wish
Damascus took this more seriously, but we must be able to
rely on Kuwait and Iraq,s other Arab neighbors."

Comment
--------------


11. (S) The Kuwaiti intelligence and foreign affairs
interlocutors showed interest in the developments in Iraq as
outlined by the USG team, but appeared to hold to the
assessment that recent progress is not sufficient to warrant
a dramatic reassessment of events in Iraq or of PM Maliki's
leadership. The absence of the FM was unfortunate, as he is
a senior ruling family member and key decision-maker. In his
MFA stead were two office directors who are typically not
proactive or influential with the FM. End comment.

Participants:
--------------


12. (S/NF) The participants of the 3.5 hour meeting, which
was held as Kuwait Security Services (KSS) Headquarters
included:

U.S.
Ambassador Deborah Jones
Ambassador David Satterfield, NEA/I
MG Mastin Robeson, J-5 Plans, Strategic Assessments
Don Blome, Force Strategic Engagement Cell, U.S. Embassy
Baghdad
Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Issues, U.S. Consulate Dubai
Joe Forcier, GRPO Head
Tom Rosenberger (notetaker)

GOK
MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security
Affairs and de facto KSS Director
MG Khalid Al-Jarrah Al Sabah, Head of Kuwait Military
Intelligence (J2)
KSS Deputy Director Number One Ahmad Al-Ajil
BG Abdullah Rashid, Deputy Director General Number 2 for
Administration and Intelligence
KSS Iraq Department Chief Colonel Fayiz Bu Hamid
Ambassador Muqamis, MFA Follow up and Coordination
Department
Ambassador Ali Al Sammak, MFA Director, the Americas
Department
KSS Chief of Non-arab Liaison LTC Ali Al-Mutawwa
(Translator)


14. (U) This cable has been cleared by Amb. Satterfield.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
Misenheimer