5/4/08 AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH KUWAITI MINISTER OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000509

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KU
SUBJECT: 5/4/08 AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH KUWAITI MINISTER OF
AMIRI DIWAN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D


1. (S) Summary: In a warm and welcoming introductory call,
the Amir's eldest son and Minister of the Amiri Diwan, Shaykh
Nasser, acknowledged embarrassment and a bit of GoK confusion
over the former Kuwaiti GTMO detainee's reported terror
attack in Mosul, and outlined an optimistic economic vision
of a northern Gulf entrepot connecting Asia and the
Mediterranean, to include - at an appropriate time - Israel.
The Ambassador raised the critical need for additional
support for Iraq and flagged Kuwait's trafficking in persons
problem. End summary.


2. (C) Minister of Amiri Diwan (and eldest son of the Amir)
Shaykh Nasser Sabah al-Ahmed Al Sabah warmly welcomed me for
an introductory one-on-one May 4 that lasted nearly two
hours. Shaykh Nasser spoke proudly and with great fondness
of his close friendship with President Bush and the Bush
family, and of the US-Kuwaiti relationship overall. He
shared his vision of Kuwait as the tourists' "gateway to
Mesopotamia," noting that Ur (the birthplace of "father
Abraham") was closer to Kuwait than to Baghdad, and expounded
at length on "the Amir's goal" to see Kuwait reduce its
dependence on oil and return to its mercantile roots. Key to
this would be the development of a major port with
significant storage facilities, linking Kuwait, Iraq and
eventually Iran, which would in turn link - via rail lines
and highway grids - "Asia to Aqaba, and beyond, into the
Mediterranean." An important factor in this regional
integration, Shaykh Nasser pragmatically noted, would be,
"ultimately, of course," the inclusion of Is
rael, and specifically its "Qualifying Industrial Zone," thus
creating a free trade zone linking Palestine, Jordan, Iraq
and Kuwait. The entrepreneur-cum-minister spoke excitedly of
what he claimed was Jordan's new-found capability to produce
uranium from potash, which in turn could be used as the
region migrated from fossil fuel to peaceful nuclear use.


3. (S) Thanking Shaykh Nasser for his country's recent
hosting of the Iraq Neighbors' Ministerial, which had
gathered the largest number of attendees to date, I noted
that I was coming directly from meetings between Kuwaiti
intelligence and Foreign Ministry officials and a U.S. team
led by AMB Satterfield, a senior MNF-1 commander and several
officers and analysts from Baghdad and our Iran office in
Dubai. I shared with Shaykh Nasser our analysis of PM
al-Maliki's recent efforts in Basrah and urged greater
Kuwaiti support for the national government in Baghdad, to
include sending an ambassador. I noted that we similarly
were urging the Iraqis to expedite naming an ambassador to
Kuwait, but meanwhile the GCC states should not lose an
opportunity to influence Baghdad - leaving the field to the
Iranian ambassador there.


4. (S) Alluding to the reported suicide bomber attack in
Mosul by former GTMO detainee and Kuwaiti national Abdullah
al-Ajmi, I stressed that this was a pivotal moment in Iraq,
and that our self-interested GCC partners, themselves
vulnerable to the fallout of a destabilized Iraq infested by
al-Qaeda, needed to do more to prevent the flows of foreign
fighters, particularly when they are known quantities.
Shaykh Nasser visibly winced when I mentioned Ajmi, saying
"This is so embarrassing for us."


5. (S) Continuing, I noted that the American people were
beginning to ask if our Arab partners were as committed to
success in Iraq as we were; if not, they would question why
we remained at great cost to our national well-being. Shaykh
Nasser suggested, "Perhaps you will just have to protect your
friends in the region for now, and hope things work out." I
replied this was not an option; Iraq's stability had direct
bearing on Kuwait's security; we were fortunate the reported
Ajmi event had not been catastrophic for U.S. troops; we
needed Kuwait to support our efforts, especially now as
eradicating al-Qaeda and constraining Iranian influence were
in the balance. The public line that Ajmi had traveled on a
"fake passport" did not ring true; Kuwait had the latest in
passports, with imbedded safety features and bio data.
Shaykh Nasser acknowledged his government was seriously
reviewing the issue, trying to determine how Ajmi had slipped
into Mosul; they were seeking evidence beyond an alleged
phone call from
a friend, and were contemplating sending a forensics team.
Shaykh Nasser suggested Ajmi may have traveled on an

KUWAIT 00000509 002 OF 002


illegally issued passport. (Note: We were subsequently told
by FM Dr. Mohammad (reported septel) that Ajmi had
successfully sued the Ministry of Interior in Kuwaiti courts
for the return of his passport. Dr. Mohammad also stated the
Kuwaitis were hoping for forensic evidence from the U.S.
side. End note.)


6. (C) Continuing on Iraq, I applauded the minister's vision
of a bustling port serving the northern Gulf, but noted that
we first needed a point man on the Kuwaiti side who could
facilitate our joint efforts to clear the Khor Abdallah; I
urged them to focus on this first step. On Iraqi debt, I
acknowledged Kuwait's patience in collecting and urged
creative solutions; Shaykh Nasser pushed back gently,
underscoring the size of the debt and its impact on Kuwait's
credit ratings - "it's on the books" - but suggested Kuwait
and Iraq were looking at joint infrastructure projects, such
as the creation of a northern Gulf "entrepot," which, through
creative profit sharing could lead to a reduction in official
debt.


7. (C) Thanking Shaykh Nasser for his time, I reiterated the
fundamental strength of the relationship, and that I would
speak frankly as a friend who had Kuwait's best interests at
heart, interests I noted we shared. In this vein, I raised
the sensitive issue of trafficking in persons. Acknowledging
that avoiding the exploitation of global flows of relatively
cheap "human capital," refugees from inadequate or failed
economic or political systems, was a challenge we all faced,
I urged greater attention to this problem. During my nearly
quarter of a century working among and with Muslims, I noted,
I had seen the compassionate, charitable and generous face of
Islam; this was the face I hoped to see Kuwait present to the
world. I expressed hope we could work together to remedy the
harsh conditions of so many workers in Kuwait.


8. (S) Comment: "Wishful thinking," i.e. that hoping it's
not so will make it so, whether concerning al-Qaeda, Iraq,
human trafficking, or waning U.S. public support for
defending friends who will not themselves take courageous
steps, seems to be the default mode here; that and the notion
- as perceived to be the case in the lower Gulf states - that
economic development will suffice to make all political
problems go away. Clearly our work is cut out for us here.
End comment.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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Jones