Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KUWAIT48
2008-01-10 20:18:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

GOK PROVIDES NEW ASSURANCE ON GTMO ON EVE OF POTUS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDRG PTER KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9044
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0048/01 0102018
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 102018Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0571
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0577
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000048 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDRG PTER KU
SUBJECT: GOK PROVIDES NEW ASSURANCE ON GTMO ON EVE OF POTUS
VISIT

REF: A. KUWAIT 0012

B. 2007 KUWAIT 1651

Classified By: CDA Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
-------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000048

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDRG PTER KU
SUBJECT: GOK PROVIDES NEW ASSURANCE ON GTMO ON EVE OF POTUS
VISIT

REF: A. KUWAIT 0012

B. 2007 KUWAIT 1651

Classified By: CDA Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (S/NF) The Kuwaiti message in para 3, delivered to Embassy
Kuwait after-hours on the evening before President Bush's
January 11 arrival, is a last-second GOK attempt to define a
positive basis for discussion of the GTMO detainee question.
It constitutes both an official response to the U.S. demarche
delivered 20 November 2007 (which expressed U.S. concern over
GOK laxity, including international travel by at least one
former detainee (ref b)),and also the "clarification" of GOK
measures to monitor and control transferred GTMO detainees
promised to CDA by MFA U/S Jarallah on 31 December (ref a).
The President's impending visit galvanized GOK attention on
this issue after a six-week delay; but we are also aware that
recrimination and finger-pointing among security and
intelligence authorities delayed final clearance of the text
over the past week.


2. (S/NF) While Kuwaiti leaders understand that POTUS will
not (as an op-ed piece suggested this week without humor) be
bringing the four remaining Kuwaitis from Guantanamo aboard
Air Force One, it is certain that the Amir will ask POTUS to
transfer them. He may assert that the President "promised"
this to him in a previous meeting (as several senior GOK
officials have repeated to us this week),and will certainly
assert that the GOK has in place measures satisfying the U.S.
requirement that transferred detainees not be permitted to
become a threat. As a basis for that assertion, this Kuwaiti
presentation falls short. Notably, it (a) promised, but does
not provide, the requested update on all eight previously
transferred detainees; and (b) fails to express any
commitment to develop a program to re-educate and
re-integrate GTMO detainees into society--as the Saudis and
others in the region have done--despite having taken some
tentative, initial steps in this direction.


3. (S/NF) Some Kuwaiti commentators are calling for

success/failure of the January 11-12 POTUS visit to be judged
the degree of 'progress' concerning GTMO detainees. While
this theme has limited resonance with the Kuwaiti public,
many MPs sympathize with such a view. Accordingly, post
recommends that the U.S. side (a) welcome this GOK message as
a positive acknowledgment that Kuwait's own performance will
be a key factor in any future transfer decision regarding the
four Kuwaitis at GTMO; (b) stress the importance of both
tighter control and improved transparency and information
sharing on the eight previously transferred detainees (nb:
Kuwaiti intelligence authorities became aware of a former
detainee's travel outside Kuwait weeks before admitting it to
U.S. counterparts); (c) express expectation that the promised
status report on previously transferred detainees will be
shared soon, and will be followed by periodic updates; (d)
urge the Kuwaitis to create an effective program to
rehabilitate detainees and other terrorist sympathizers; and
(e) encourage GOK public statements that emphasize
U.S.-Kuwait CT cooperation, including on the GTMO issue, and
that refrain from making GTMO a litmus test. End Summary and
Comment.



4. (S/NF) Below is the text of the MFA dipnote with
"clarifications" of the GOK policy regarding former GTMO
detainees.

Begin text:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveys its highest regards
to Embassy of the United States and Kuwait and refers to the
meeting between the Under Secretary and the Embassy's Charge
d'Affaires on 20 November 2007, in which a paper from the
Department of State was presented containing information on
the presence of one of the former Kuwaiti detainees in
Guantanamo, in addition to other inquiries regarding this
subject.

The Ministry is pleased to append below a clarification on
the afore-mentioned subject.

Complimentary opening.


KUWAIT 00000048 002 OF 003


Response of the Kuwaiti side
to the paper presented by the American Embassy on
20 November 2007

With reference to the paper presented on behalf of the U.S.
State Department containing a request for information on the
measures adopted by the Kuwaiti side toward the eight
citizens released from Camp Guantanamo and subsequent
measures adopted by the Kuwaiti government regarding them
based upon the pledges made to the U.S. Government's
delegation that visited Kuwait in March 2007, and the several
queries contained in the aforementioned paper which
characterized the measures taken toward those who were
transferred as "regrettable" and insufficient. In the
interest of furthering cooperation in this matter, the
Ministry would point out the following explanations:

One. Regarding Saad Madhi Al-Azmi, who was reported by the
Department of State as having left Kuwait and settled in
Yemen:

Follow-up on the aforementioned subject was conveyed by the
security authorities in a meeting with an American Liaison
Officer, who was provided with private information on the
subject as follows:

--In April 2007, an acquittal order was issued in the name of
the aforementioned person in the case involving Guantanamo
detainees (training and membership in terrorist groups
abroad); and pursuant to the final judgment issued regarding
him, the orders banning his travel were lifted. As a
security procedure on the part of the Kuwaiti side, the
above-person's name and information were added to the
surveillance and monitoring list.
--More than one authority can take the decision to lift a
travel ban (Ministry of Justice, Criminal Investigations
Department, Kuwait State Security (KSS),the Department for
the Implementation for Judicial Rulings). It is the right of
each authority, according to its jurisdiction, to enter or
remove any person's name from the travel ban list according
to the laws pertaining to each (authority).
--In mid-July 2007, information came to light that the
afore-mentioned person was in Yemen to visit his Yemeni wife.
It became known that he departed to the State of Qatar on 9
July, 2007 and he left from there to Yemen.
--In August 2007, KSS discussed that issue, and why he was
there, with the U.S. Liaison Officer.
--No information was available to the Kuwaiti side indicating
that Saad Madhi Al-Azmi wanted to meet terrorists inside or
outside of the country. A follow-up of his local activities
remains underway.
--The afore-mentioned subject came back to Kuwait from Yemen
on 19 September 2007. Based upon a previous agreement, the
afore-mentioned subject and the other individuals transferred
from Guantanamo were entered into the daily surveillance
list.

Two. Regarding the U.S. Government's concern about the
heightened security threat that transferring the others could
pose, and the Government of Kuwait's commitment to take the
necessary security measures:

--We would like to state that the Government of Kuwait is
committed to taking the necessary security measures to ensure
security of the country for citizens and residents.
According to previous meetings with U.S. Government
representatives, the Government is committed to carrying out
its commitment with regard to implementing security measures
pertaining to those persons and maintaining security
oversight over them.

Three. The U.S. Government's request to provide current
whereabouts of the eight former detainees, including Saad
Madhi Al-Azmi:

--We would like to state that the former detainees are
presently in the country and we will provide you with a
report on their status at a later time, noting that one of
the former detainees, Nasser Najr Balod Al-Mutairi, died of
pulmonary disease subsequent to his transfer.

Four. The U.S. Government's request for a description of the
additional measures that Kuwait will take to mitigate:

1. The security threat the former eight detainees pose.

2. The additional threat posed when the other four detainees
are transferred.

KUWAIT 00000048 003 OF 003



--The concerned Kuwaiti authorities will provide the U.S.
security authorities through their representative at the U.S.
Embassy with any information on the eight citizens.
--KSS will follow up on the activity of the four detainees
who will be transferred to Kuwait. The intentions of those
detainees can be assessed after their return to the country
and follow up with them to ascertain any desire on their part
to return to any suspicious activity in the future.
--Immediately upon receiving the four detainees who are now
at Guantanamo Detention Camp, the investigative procedures
and referral to the public prosecutor will begin, and they
will be in custody for the duration of the trial. They will
be entered into the travel ban list for the duration of the
trial and the pronouncement of final legal judgments with
regard to them.
--In case they are released, they will be subject to constant
surveillance, the type and nature of which will vary as per
the analysis and assessment of the officials in charge.

End Text.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
MISENHEIMER