POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF KUWAIT IN RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000411

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AND INR/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2033
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI ECON KU
SUBJECT: POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF KUWAIT IN RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS

REF: A. KUWAIT 0320

B. KUWAIT 0313

C. KUWAIT 0307

D. KUWAIT 0205

Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: With candidate registration commencing on
April 14, Kuwait's electoral field is beginning to take
shape. The GOK is hoping that the new five-district
electoral system will deliver more nationally focused
candidates as well as a more cooperative Parliament.
Islamist candidates stand to benefit in this election from
favorable demographic and social trends as well as a
perception of GOK ineptitude in managing Parliament. The
Shi'a community will likely vote along sectarian lines in
response to perceived GOK heavy-handedness after the Imad
Mugniyah eulogy. Kuwait's tribes are annoyed at the GOK's
unprecedented (albeit unsuccessful) crackdown on tribal
primaries, which has prompted a strong backlash from bedouin
communities and increased the prospects of tribal opposition
candidates. Women are generally not expected to win any
parliamentary seats, although several strong candidates may
boost their chances by teaming with established liberals.
These elections will not affect Kuwait's relations with the
U.S. End summary.

Effects of Redistricting
--------------


2. (C) On August 1, 2006, the Amir issued Law Number 42
reducing the number of electoral districts in Kuwait from
twenty-five to five. The GOK hopes to achieve two objectives
via this electoral redistricting. First, by dramatically
increasing the size of each constituency, the GOK seeks to
reduce the phenomenon of vote buying. Prospective
parliamentarians may no longer secure election by paying off
several hundred voters - their constituencies now encompass
tens of thousands of voters. Second, it seeks to ensure the
election of parliamentarians with broader popular appeal, as
opposed those who represent narrow factional, sectarian or
tribal interests. In addition, with each voter now having
the option of selecting up to four candidates, vice two, the
GOK hopes voters will have more freedom to select a greater
variety candidates.


3. (C) At this stage, it appears unlikely that the May 17
elections will validate these theories. However, post has
observed some general trends in the run-up to the May 17
elections. First, redistricting has apparently not decreased
the incidence of vote buying. Rumors abound of parliamentary
candidates amassing millions of dinars for election rigging.
Current estimates place the value of a single vote at KD
1,000 (USD 3,700). In one instance, an embassy employee was
approached about participating in a vote buying scheme, where
she was promised KD 250 (US 925) for each vote delivered.
The GOK is reportedly attempting to combat this phenomenon by
monitoring candidates' bank accounts, but the authorities
have yet to indict anyone for this offense.


4. (C) Furthermore, factionalism appears to be more
pronounced in these elections. GOK opposition to tribal
primaries (see para 11) has produced a strong backlash among
Kuwait's bedouin communities, which may encourage the
election of more opposition tribal MPs. In addition, the
Shi'a community will likely vote along more sectarian lines
in response to perceived GOK persecution in the wake of the
Imad Mugniyah eulogy (ref B). Islamist candidates are also
increasing their inter-organizational cooperation, creating
pan-Islamist "tickets" in certain constituencies.


5. (C) For general reference, post is including some
observations on each of the five constituencies below:

1st Constituency:

-- 18 residential districts
-- 66,643 registered voters (30,071 male / 36,572 female)
-- Largest Shi'a constituency (44% of total voters)
-- Mostly urban Kuwaitis (68% of total) vs. tribal Kuwaitis
(32%)

2nd Constituency:

-- 13 residential districts
-- 41,367 registered voters (19,263 male / 22,104 female)
-- Sunni urban majority (57%),traditional business and
economic families
-- Competition between the Sunni liberal and the Sunni

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Islamic factions
-- Small pockets of Shi'a (19%) and tribal (15%) Kuwaitis

3rd Constituency:

-- 15 residential districts
-- 58,676 registered voters (25,617 male / 33,057 female)
-- Sunni urban majority (69%),mostly business class with
some tribal elements
-- Traditionally liberal, but trending Islamist
-- Recent inroads by the Islamic Constitutional Movement
(ICM) (i.e. Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood)
-- Some Shi'a (15%),mostly concentrated in Jabriya

4th Constituency:

-- 19 residential districts
-- 93,712 registered voters (39,360 male / 54,352 female)
-- Heavily tribal (74%),though generally pro-government
-- Mutran and Rashayda tribes dominate
-- Recent inroads by the ICM as a substitute for the Salafi
movement

5th Constituency:

-- 23 residential districts
-- 101,296 registered voters (48,876 male / 54,418 female)
-- Heavily tribal (69%)
-- Awazim and Ajman tribes dominate

Islamists
--------------


6. (C) Kuwait's Islamists stand to benefit in this election
from favorable demographic and social trends as well as a
perception of GOK ineptitude in managing Parliament. Well
before Parliament's dissolution, members of the Salafi
Islamic Grouping (SIG) and the ICM began positioning
themselves as champions of transparent governance and
proponents of political reform - to include the legalization
of political parties and opposition to corruption. In
addition, their support for populist measures such as pay
raises for public sector employees and gender segregation at
Kuwaiti universities has broadened their appeal. In
addition, the GOK's highly unpopular decision to raze private
structures built on public land and a proposed Amiri decree
restricting public gatherings (see para 10) have given the
Islamists additional causes to champion this election season.


7. (C) Kuwait's Islamists, particularly the ICM, also benefit
from superior organizational and campaigning ability. In an
April 7 conversation with poloff, ICM Political Relations
Chief Mohammed Al-Dallal noted that the ICM had selected its
candidates before the Amir had even chosen to dissolve
Parliament. According to Dallal, the ICM is planning to
field 12-14 candidates in the upcoming elections. Dallal
also noted that the ICM goes to great lengths to court the
youth vote, and that it will likely be joining tickets with
the SIG and the Shi'a in some constituencies to improve its
chances of victory. Nevertheless, SIG and ICM support for a
constitutional amendment naming Islamic Sharia law as "the
sole source of legislation" in Kuwait prompts many citizens
to question their ultimate objectives.

Shi'a
--------------


8. (C) The Shi'a community represents 30-35 percent of the
population of Kuwait. Recently, it has been energized by
perceived GOK prejudices in the wake of the Imad Mugniyah
eulogy. While the GOK argues that it was protecting national
security interests by arresting and questioning members of
"Kuwait Hizbollah," the Shi'a street feels that the GOK was
settling old scores with former MPs Adnan Abdulsamad and
Ahmed Lari (ref B). Furthermore, GOK detentions of former
Shi'a MPs, prominent social leaders and a Shi'a cleric stoked
Shi'a fears of a broader GOK policy of collective punishment.


9. (C) Based on conversations with Shi'a political and
cultural leaders, it now appears that the Shi'a community
intends to vote along more sectarian lines in the upcoming
elections. The Shi'a hope to elect from 8 to 12 MPs and
intend to push for greater representation in the upper levels
of Kuwait's ministerial hierarchy. Furthermore, the Shi'a
will likely split tickets with other Islamists such as the
SIG and the ICM to increase their chances of election in the
1st, 2nd and 3rd constituencies. In addition, former MPs
Abdulsamad and Lari have become increasingly popular among
the Shi'a because of perceptions of GOK heavy-handedness, and

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are now regarded by some as folk heroes who have confronted
GOK persecution. Nevertheless, there is some division within
the Shi'a community between those who support the
traditional, pro-government, merchant-class MPs and those who
sympathize with the National Islamic Alliance (i.e. "Kuwait
Hizbollah"),as represented by former MPs Abdulsamad and Lari.

GOK-Tribal Conflict
--------------


10. (C) Historically, Kuwaiti tribal councils have
pre-selected their parliamentary candidates via tribal
primaries and then compelled their tribesmen (plus their
spouses) to vote for these candidates in national elections.
The GOK opposes this practice, arguing that it promotes
factionalism, restricts free and fair competition, and
advances candidates whose loyalty belongs to a tribe rather
than to residents of the defined electoral district.
According to the Kuwaiti Elections Law of 1998, participating
in a primary election is a crime. The Council of Ministers
also considered issuing a decree requiring individuals to
obtain a license from the Ministry of Interior before
organizing a public gathering. However, widespread popular
opposition to this move, led by the Islamists and the tribes,
prompted the GOK to shelve this initiative.


11. (C) The GOK has used Kuwait Elections Law liberally to
disrupt tribal primaries since March 19, resulting in a
series of standoffs between the Ministry of Interior and
tribal Kuwaitis. On April 11, Kuwait Special Forces resorted
to tear gas to disperse a group of 1,000 stone-throwing
Kuwaitis from the Awazim tribe, who had earlier been
participating in a primary election. In another incident,
Kuwaiti special forces used tear gas and rubber bullets to
disperse a crowd of 500 Awadi tribesman who were protesting
GOK mistreatment outside the Criminal Investigation
Department. To date, the GOK's unprecedented push against
tribal primaries shows no sign of success.


12. (C) The crackdown has prompted a backlash among Kuwait's
bedouin tribesman, who are threatening to grill interim
Interior Minister Shaykh Jaber Al-Khaled Al Sabah should he
be re-seated at the National Assembly. In addition,
prospective tribal MPs, in cooperation with Islamist
candidates, are threatening to vote down the Amir's April 7
decree and rescind portions of the 1998 Elections Law upon
their return to Parliament. In response, the GOK has
threatened to disqualify parliamentary candidates it deems to
be running on the basis of a tribal primary victory.
Overall, this standoff has been the leading story in the
run-up to the elections and has the potential to encourage
the election of more opposition tribal MPs.

Women
--------------


13. (C) Women represent 55.5 percent of Kuwait's electorate,
outnumbering registered male voters by 200,499 to 161,185.
However, Kuwaiti women were unable to leverage this advantage
in 2006 to elect Kuwait's first female MP, and many political
observers believe that history will repeat itself in the
upcoming elections. Indeed, the prevailing sentiment among
female candidates is that they are running in these elections
to gather experience, but that they don't expect to win any
parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, Kuwaiti women are
fielding some strong candidates, such as Dr. Rola Dashti and
Dr. Aseel Al-Awadhi, who is sharing a ticket with the
pro-government National Democratic Alliance in the third
constituency. Some pundits predict that the best opportunity
for a woman to be elected is to join a strong male ticket.
If that is the case, then 2008 may be an historic year for
Kuwaiti women. Post will provide a further analysis of
Kuwait female candidates septel.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) In the past weeks, the GOK has made several
calculated moves to reassert its authority, such as:
dissolving Parliament, pursuing the Mugniyah eulogizers,
destroying illegal diwaniyas, restricting public assemblies
and disrupting tribal primaries. These moves, while
demonstrating GOK power, have also antagonized large swathes
of the Kuwaiti population and may end up backfiring come May

17. Kuwaiti political observers generally predict a 20-30
percent turnover in the National Assembly, although such
projections are difficult due to the new redistricting
system. In addition, the GOK will likely make several
revisions to the composition of its Cabinet, including a

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potential change in the position of Prime Minister (reported
septel). The outcome of these elections will likely have no
impact on Kuwaiti foreign policy or its relations with the
U.S. End comment.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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Misenheimer