INFORMATION ON SOURCE OF POLITICAL IMPASSE IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AND INR/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2033
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI ECON KU
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON SOURCE OF POLITICAL IMPASSE IN
KUWAIT (C-NE8-00589)

REF: A. SECSTATE 37854

B. KUWAIT 0320

C. KUWAIT 0313

D. KUWAIT 0307

E. KUWAIT 0043

F. 07 KUWAIT 1760

Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for reason 1.4 (b)


1. (S) Summary: The Kuwaiti Cabinet's mass resignation and
the Amir's subsequent dissolution of Parliament represent the
widely expected culmination of a contentious and
dysfunctional relationship between the GOK and Parliament
going back several years. In the short term, the dissolution
provides the opportunity for new parliamentary elections and
the potential for an improved relationship between the
Cabinet and Parliament. In the long term, this latest
parliamentary crisis is just one of many that have played out
over the past 30 years, from which there will be no lasting
damage done to Kuwait's democracy, its stability or its
bilateral relationship with the United States. Further
analysis of the upcoming elections and the potential impact
of Kuwait's electoral redistricting will be reported septel.
End summary.

Dissolution Widely Expected
--------------


2. (C) Relations between Kuwait's executive branch and
Parliament have been consistently tense since the current
Amir, Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al Sabah, came to power in
January 2006. Parliamentarians have kept the GOK on the
defensive with accusations of corruption and mismanagement,
and the GOK's efforts to recapture the initiative were
largely ineffective. This impasse produced a series of
"grillings" (interpellations),both threatened and actual,
against government ministers. As a result, five ministers
resigned or were forced out from January to October 2007.


3. (C) Due to this contentious relationship, Parliament was
largely ineffective and failed to pass much needed political
and social reform legislation. Meanwhile, MPs demonstrated a
disturbing preference for constituent pandering and
politically motivated grillings, as opposed to tending to the
people's business. Consequently, Kuwaitis of all stripes
became disenchanted with the previous Parliament and were
anxious for the Amir to resolve the impasse via a
constitutional dissolution of the National Assembly. The
Kuwaiti populace had generally expected this move toward the
end of 2007 (ref F),and in particular during the grilling of
Education Minister Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh in January 2008 (ref
E). The Cabinet's mass resignation on March 17 (ref D)
therefore came as no surprise to the Kuwaiti populace.

Al Sabah Dynamics
--------------


4. (S) Whether the cabinet's mass resignation was dictated by
the Amir or by other factions within the Al Sabah family is
unclear. Nevertheless, a parliamentary dissolution was the
only logical outcome of this action. The eventual
dissolution on March 19 (ref B) was generally met with a
sense of relief among the Kuwaiti populace, who welcomed Al
Sabah leadership in resolving the crisis. However, the
long-term effects of these events on Al Sabah prestige within
Kuwait and the resolution of internal factional differences
within the royal family remain to be seen.


5. (S) Nevertheless, the royal family will be under close
scrutiny for its selection of ministers after the elections.
Many Kuwaitis have been critical of the ruling family's
selections in the past, complaining that the ministers'
backgrounds oftentimes bore no relation to their portfolios.
The ministers consequently made easy grilling targets for MPs
bent on exerting pressure on the government. Many Kuwaitis
hope that the Al Sabah have internalized this lesson and will
appoint more competent ministers, relative to their
portfolio, in the coming National Assembly.


6. (S) Of particular popular interest is the selection of the
next Prime Minister. While interim PM Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah
seems the logical choice, many Kuwaitis criticize him for not
providing stronger leadership during the last National
Assembly. Instead, some Kuwaitis believe Deputy National
Guard Commander Shaykh Mish'al Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al Sabah
will assume this duty because of his more forceful approach
and his reputed ability to keep wayward MPs in line. Others
speculate that the Amir's strongman, Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd

KUWAIT 00000410 002 OF 002


Al-Ahmed Al Sabah, currently president of the National
Security Bureau, will take up this role, although this
scenario is less likely because of his previous difficulties
as Energy Minister.

Election Outlook
--------------


7. (C) Irrespective of past political difficulties, the
current mood in Kuwaiti is one of enthusiasm - for both the
parliamentary elections under the new districting system and
the potential for a fresh start in the National Assembly.
Kuwaitis across the spectrum are uncertain how the new
electoral districting system will impact the elections.
Nevertheless, it appears likely that Shi'a will vote along
more sectarian lines due to recent unrest in the wake of Imad
Mugniyah's assassination (ref C),and that the Islamic
Constitutional Movement (i.e. Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood) may
enjoy greater success due to their superior organizational
and campaigning ability. Salafis and tribal candidates may
also make gains due to Kuwait's overall demographic and
social trends.


8. (S) Because of a ban on political parties, it is unclear
what the Al Sabah are doing, if anything, to support the
election of pro-government MPs. Stalwarts such as Jassem
Al-Khorafi and Mohammed Al-Sager do not appear to be in
danger of losing their seats, but face new challenges in
reaching out to constituents in the new five district
constituency system. These two candidates hailed from
traditionally pro-government constituencies, but they must
now court bedouin and tribal voters as well since their
constituency has expanded. These latter constituents have
proven easily swayed by the rhetoric of less responsible MPs
who campaign on popular issues such as consumer debt
forgiveness, increased stipends for Kuwaiti citizens and the
protection of personal property built on public lands.


9. (S) In addition, widespread rumors of election engineering
and vote buying have lead to familiar calls for Al Sabah
family operatives such as Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd, Shaykh Athbi
Fahd Al-Ahmad (the Amir's nephew) and Mohammed Abdullah
Al-Mubarak (the grandson of Amir Mubarak the Great) - the
so-called "trio of corruption" - to leave the country.
Nevertheless, vote buying does appear to be reaching historic
proportions in Kuwait, with votes rumored to be worth KD
1,000 (USD 3,700) a piece. Interestingly, some embassy
employees reported recruitment attempts to assist in vote
buying schemes.

Overall Impact
--------------


10. (C) This is the fifth parliamentary dissolution in Kuwait
since 1976, and the second since 2006. As such, this
dissolution continues a broader trend of political impasse
followed by parliamentary dissolution. Importantly, the Amir
opted to dissolve Parliament constitutionally and call for
elections within 60 days, as is his right. This move
reaffirmed the Amir's commitment to the democratic process,
and demonstrates the overall health of Kuwait's conspicuously
untidy democracy. Regardless of the outcome of the elections
on May 17, the Al Sabah will remain firmly in charge and
firmly committed to its bilateral relationship with the
United States.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
Misenheimer