(C) KUWAIT'S DEMOCRATIC JALOPY - STILL CHUGGING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001187

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/I, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KW
SUBJECT: (C) KUWAIT'S DEMOCRATIC JALOPY - STILL CHUGGING
DESPITE BUMPS IN THE ROAD

REF: A. KUWAIT 1110

B. KUWAIT 1144

C. KUWAIT 1166

D. KUWAIT 1175

E. KUWAIT 1178

F. KUWAIT 1183

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 14.b and d


1. (S) Summary: Kuwait's developing democracy is undergoing
yet another of the transitional wheezing attacks that seem to
grip it every several years, but it is nowhere near death.
Like the 70's)era Chevrolet Impalas that continue to ply
Kuwait's choked freeways, alongside European sports cars and
super-chromed, souped-up American SUV's, it is a beloved if
increasingly decrepit and outdated model: a jalopy, as it
were, held together by the political equivalent of baling
wire and the occasional hard whack of a spanner, that somehow
manages to keep going, albeit in fits and starts. The Amir
is unlikely to take decisive action any time soon,
recognizing that alternatives to the current scenario will be
difficult and divisive. We will thus see neither a
dictatorship - which would be unworkable - nor a failed
democracy. That said, growing fissures within Kuwaiti
society have become increasingly visible with the current
"crisis" and ultimately may force consideration of major
adjustments, such as constitutional reform or a politically
selected Deputy Prime Minister, hitherto considered off
limits. In the meantime, we assess minimal risk to US
interests in the short term (5-10 years). End summary.


2. (S) Over the past several months, this tiny
constitutional emirate has been buffeted by viral panic
associated with the global financial crisis (and resultant
drop in the price of oil, its lifeblood) compounded by
monumental government ineptitude, from the leadership on down
through the cabinet and parliamentarians. An oft-heard note
in the midst of the political cacophony has been the call for
the dissolution of parliament, for what would be the third
time in as many years, with the concomitant desire that the
Amir elect to rule by fiat, even unconstitutionally. This,
proponents argue, would stanch the growing tide of Salafist
influence and enable the country to reclaim its earlier
reputation as the progressive "Pearl of the Gulf," rather
than continue to lag further behind in infrastructure and
socioeconomic development as its more autocratic neighbors )
notably Qatar and the UAE -- speed ahead.


3. (S) Others argue with equal force that any effort to
constrain or curtail Kuwait's deeply entrenched democratic
dialogue - as embodied in its traditional diwaniyas (the
equivalent of a salon for political discourse, frequented on
a regular basis by tens of thousands of Kuwaiti males,
generally) and its 17 daily newspapers would result in strong
protests and perhaps even bloodshed as government security
forces would be forced to contend with outraged students,
political liberals, Shi'a and newly enfranchised tribals
fearful of losing their claim to a larger piece of affluent
Kuwait's social welfare pie.


4. (S) There are several realities here. First and foremost
is that the U.S. and our entrenched security presence enables
- in the psychological sense - a relatively frivolous
approach to politics. As long as the oil flows out and the
dollars flow in, Kuwaitis can afford to engage in these
parlor games and the Amir can dither over tough decisions
with impunity. After all, what do most Kuwaitis lack for?
Nothing. Many believe the USG is calling the shots in any
event. The Russian Ambassador here asserted the other
evening that "75 percent of Kuwaitis want dissolution, but
they are afraid that you (i.e. the U.S. government) won't
allow it."


5. (S) Our own conversations with a broad range of Kuwaitis
suggests the split may be more along the lines of 50/50, with
political liberals, secularists (if such a term can be used
here) Islamist tribals and Shi'a intellectuals concerned the
U.S. will turn a blind eye to unconstitutional dissolution in
hopes of pushing through projects beneficial to our parochial
interests (such as the Fourth Refinery or long-pending CT
legislation),or in return for continued investment. As this
post has noted earlier (reftels),we bump up against the
horns of a dilemma: Certainly many of our specific interests
would be better served with a more efficient, directive
government, akin to the UAE or Saudi models, at least in
theory and for awhile. But that would undermine our
political assertion that only democracy, in the long term,
mitigates the potential for extremism.


6. (S) The Ambassador has been urged by some parties -

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including at least one member of the ruling Al Sabah family -
to intervene to prevent dissolution, and just as strongly by
others - including the Amir's half-brother and confidant
Shaykh Misha'al - to keep firmly out of the country's
governmental knickers. What has been communicated clearly to
senior leadership by the Ambassador, discreetly, is a request
that they not blindside us, as their most important ally; we
will have a reaction to any unconstitutional dissolution and
it would be best that we have a full context in which to
craft any response. To Shaykh Misha'al, whose influence goes
well beyond his position in the GOK's organizational chart,
the Ambassador has noted that handing our newly elected
leadership an inaugural gift that certainly would be
perceived by many as a huge step backward for an important
regional ally would send a confusing signal, at least.


7. (S) The worst case scenario sketched out by one of the Al
Sabah inner circle known for his occasionally Cassandra-esque
predictions, posits a drawn out unconstitutional dissolution
that "metastasizes" into something resembling a dictatorship,
with an accompanying crackdown on the press and internet
communications, and resultant violent reactions from various
groups. Our analysis is that the habit of democracy is
simply too firmly entrenched for that to occur. The Amir
knows this, and thus the protracted political minuet of the
past few weeks, designed to take the country into the Eid
holiday, a parliamentary recess and ) without embarrassment
- through the January 17-18 Arab Economic Summit here while
he considers his options. He is a wily politician, if not a
decisive leader, and has been quietly and regularly checking
the political pulse of his constituency even as his public
remarks have made clear he will not tolerate an ongoing
situation of rancorous political gridlock.


8. (S) The Prime Minister is universally liked as an
individual and considered too weak to run a government. The
Amir has made clear he has no intention of removing him. So
the alternative, according to some, would be to assign "tough
ministers," in the words of one interlocutor, who will take
on the members of parliament themselves. One individual
cited with some frequency is Ahmad al-Fahd Al Sabah, the
Amir's nephew, President of the National Security Bureau and
an open rival to the PM, known for his influence amongst the
tribals, as well as for his inherent corruptibility given his
relatively impecunious (by Kuwaiti standards) financial
circumstances.


9. (S) Whatever happens, one thing is clear: no matter who
holds the PM's office, the mechanics of Kuwait's democracy
are increasingly incapable of addressing its changing
demographics. Old-style methods of governance, through
consensus and the granting of favors, no longer work to
address the growing demands of an increasingly diverse and
conservative populace, resulting again and again in political
gridlock. Even now, and increasingly, many modalities are
being discussed from reconfiguring the cabinet, to creating
an elective Deputy PM position, to establishing political
parties (not wished by the Al Sabah),to amending the
constitution, to having an elected PM (not wished by most).
There are persuasive pros and cons to be made in each case;
thus we should avoid being prescriptive.


10. (S) When you press the Kuwaitis ) and particularly the
urban, merchant elite ) they really don't want anything to
change. But change is unavoidable. The largely urban
merchant families that characterized Kuwait's demographic 30
years ago have one wife and 2-3 children in whom they invest
heavily in education; the tribal families have 2-3 wives and
5-6 children per wife, with typically lower educational
standards. The pyramid has tipped. Meanwhile, the basic
structure of governance has not changed since 1963, with 50
elected parliamentarians, no political parties, and an
inviolate constitution. So the Amir, it could be argued, has
no alternative but to dissolve parliament in order to set
things straight.


11. (S) Even if the Amir were to take that step - the
preferred route of many avowed cultural liberals - there is a
sense he would still be forced to make concessions to an
increasingly conservative Salafist demographic base, intent
on reforming Kuwaiti society along its religious lines. In
the longer run such a trend could have consequences for our
bilateral relationship, with or without a parliament. No one
believes for a moment that Kuwaitis, whether Salafist or
secular, would ever urge the withdrawal of American troops;
but they could certainly reduce the subsidies granted to us,
or sharply curtail our access and operational flexibility.
Similarly, major deals with American companies, or KIA
investment in the U.S. could be directed elsewhere to appease
elements unhappy with our policies in the Muslim world, and

KUWAIT 00001187 003 OF 003


Palestine.


12. (S) Although it is almost unimaginable to most analysts,
there are incipient whispered suggestions that the
politically decrepit Al Sabah, on whose goodwill we rely, may
have outlived their usefulness and are now more concerned
with controlling Kuwait's wealth than with ruling. For its
part, the ruling family hopes to discover a formula to
invigorate its leadership and dispel the residual ill-will
from the unseemly fashion in which the current Amir unseated
his predecessor, the "non compos mentis" but nonetheless
highly respected Shaykh Sa'ad Al Sabah.


13. (S) But all this is much further down the road. For
now, absent a "Boris Yeltsin" or other energetic reformer and
visionary, this old Chevy will continue to smoke and clank
down the highway. It will be a drawn-out process with no
immediate solution, but neither is it likely to be explosive.
Our role should be to continue to speak out publicly and
clearly about the organic nature of democracies and the need
for the machinery of the process to keep pace with societal
dynamics, and the Kuwaitis' need to accommodate change while
maintaining inherent respect for institutions, rule of law
and the protection of their minorities. Meanwhile we must
sustain our efforts to strengthen those institutions through
educational exchanges, IV programs, government to government
exchanges, NGO's and corporate involvement. There is no
quick fix to societal transition.


14. (C) In the event of unconstitutional dissolution, which
we assume would take place if at all sometime after the
January 17-18 Arab Economic Summit, we believe the
contingency press guidance submitted earlier remains relevant.

Talking Points:

- We have seen reports that the Amir of Kuwait has dissolved
Kuwait's National Assembly for an undetermined period of time.

- Kuwait is an important ally of the United States with a
long and unique tradition of democratic governance. We hope
this will be a temporary measure.

- We are aware that strained relations between the Government
of Kuwait and the National Assembly and the resulting
political paralysis have been a source of frustration for
many Kuwaitis, some of whom have called for the Parliament's
dissolution.

- We strongly support Kuwait's democratic traditions and note
that Parliament is only one part of that equation; democracy
is also about respect for rule of law and institutions.
Honest differences between the executive and legislative
branches should not lead to governmental paralysis.

- We would also hope that Kuwait's well-entrenched freedom of
speech, as represented by its lively press and diwaniya
tradition, will be respected during this period.





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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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JONES