CHARGE'S OCTOBER 31 VISIT TO GOMA IN THE AFTERMATH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000962

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S OCTOBER 31 VISIT TO GOMA IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE FARDC'S COLLAPSE IN NORTH KIVU

REF: KINSHASA 960

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Samuel Brock for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Goma remains calm, but with fewer people on
the streets. The FARDC has effectively collapsed in the
region, leaving Nkunda in control of large swaths of area
north and west of Goma. Nkunda will most likely not attack
Goma, as the city does not threaten his operations in North
Kivu. Nkunda may try to curry favor with the international
community by presenting himself as the "protector of
international aid organizations." The CNDP is expected to
establish its own administrative apparatus in the region,
potentially spawning a kind of "Congolese Kosovo." Unless
the EU sends a military force to the region, there is no
military solution; but the price that the GDRC would have to
pay for a negotiated settlement--perhaps by appointing Nkunda
as a government minister or a regional military
commander--may be too high for Kabila. The question of how
the FDLR will react in the CNDP's newly-conquered territory
is still open. The status quo could go on indefinitely. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) On October 31, Charge accompanied A/S Jendayi
Frazer, NSC Africa Director Bobby Pittman, and AF Senior
Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley to Goma to
assess the security, political, and humanitarian situation on
the ground. SRSG Alan Doss also traveled with the delegation
to Goma. Following are Charge's observations on the security
and political situation.

Security Situation
--------------


3. (SBU) Goma appeared calm, but with fewer people on the
streets and fewer stores open than normal. Stationary MONUC
tanks and soldiers on patrol were a frequent sight on the
city's streets. After evaluating the situation, A/RSO and
Charge agreed that USG TDYers in Goma should be allowed to
return to Goma during daylight hours. Post's EAC
subsequently agreed with this recommendation (reftel).

Political Situation
--------------


4. (C) The FARDC has almost completely collapsed. The CNDP
is now in undisputed control of a vast area to the north and
west of Goma. It is probably unlikely that Nkunda would move
to take Goma at this point, as the city does not represent a
threat to his troops or his recently acquired territory.
Most renegade FARDC elements, who engaged in "shooting and
looting" have either fled Goma, blended into the local
population, or were killed by police officers or the rump
Congolese army still loyal to the regime.


5. (C) It is also unlikely that Nkunda will want to risk
provoking the international community by engaging directly
with MONUC, something that any effort to take Goma would
surely entail. MONUC would also protect the Goma Tutsi
community, should anti-Tutsi riots erupt. Finally, Nkunda
will continue to benefit from a large "fifth column" of CNDP
supporters in Goma, a force he can call on as needed to
counter anti-Tutsi violence.


6. (C) Nkunda suddenly has a tremendous new source of income
and good will: his forces control all access to and from IDP
camps and the CNDP can now extract "taxes" from humanitarian
organizations brining in supplies and food. Alternatively,
Nkunda could opt to cultivate good relations with the aid
organizations by exempting them from "taxation" and
protecting them and the IDP's from bandits and other
predators. Nkunda will probably burnish his image with the
international community as a "protector of the NGO's and
IDP's." The CNDP also controls the trade routes for the
lucrative mineral trade between Uganda/Rwanda and the DRC,
and will now have much easier access to arms through these
countries.


7. (C) The CNDP territory will, of course, remain outside
the jurisdiction of the GDRC. The rebel group will probably
name CNDP mayors, police chiefs and administrators, replacing
whatever national and provincial authorities were in place
before October 29. In short, the territory could become a
kind of "Congolese Kosovo."


8. (C) Absent an EU-led military force, there is no way to
dislodge Nkunda militarily. Negotiations therefore present

KINSHASA 00000962 002 OF 002


the only real path to bring this area back under GDRC
control. The cost to the GDRC would be high--perhaps making
Nkunda a minister or regional military commander--a price
that Kabila is probably unwilling to pay. Thus, the status
quo could continue indefinitely.


9. (C) A big question remains unanswered: what will be the
fate of FDLR forces in the CNDP's newly-expanded territory?
While it is difficult to predict at the moment, the answer is
probably mixed. Some, particularly those with commercial
operations and who were not directly involved in the 1994
Rwandan genocide, may enter into business relationships with
the CNDP. Others, with more to lose or with an ideological
viewpoint, may choose to fight the CNDP.
BROCK