THE DRC'S KIVUS CONFERENCE -- HARBINGER OF PEACE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000005

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SUBJECT: THE DRC'S KIVUS CONFERENCE -- HARBINGER OF PEACE,
TALKFEST, OR TACTICAL PLOY?

Classified By: DCM Samuel Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: The "Conference on Peace, Stability and
Development in North and South Kivu" opens January 6 in Goma
amid great fanfare. President Kabila made the decision to
convene the Conference, which ruling coalition hardliners had
attempted to stall indefinitely in hopes of ending the
insurgencies in the Kivus by military means, only after the
army suffered a humiliating defeat and seemed incapable of
further military action. With little political support in
the Kivus and almost no resources, the Government was unable
to finance and organize the event and has delegated those
tasks to members of Parliament and prominent individuals from
the region, the United Nations and the international
community. Having ceded control over much of the Conference
to others, the Government has limited ability to guide it
towards specific outcomes. The organizers themselves are
unclear as to what they want to accomplish. Just two days
before the conference opens there are no rules of procedure,
no rosters of experts to chair the event's many sessions, and
no lists of topics to be discussed. The Government and the
insurgents continue to re-supply, rearm, and redeploy their
forces; one cannot dismiss outright the hypothesis that the
Government cynically endorsed the Conference as a tactical
ploy to buy time. Participation in the Conference by Senior
Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley will help to
ensure focus and results. We believe the appropriate U.S.
role is to help build confidence among the Conference's many
actors; to propose and win support for processes that will
engage participants after the Conference has ended; and to
work closely with the international community to secure the
resources needed to implement the decisions Conference
members agree on. End summary.

The National Kivus Conference: at long last
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2. (SBU) In early December the Congolese Armed Forces
(FARDC) launched an offensive against the insurgent force in
the province of North Kivu headed by Congolese Tutsi General
Laurent Nkunda. The FARDC was quickly repelled, with
thousands of troops abandoning their units. The total number
of desertions is estimated at 6,000-9,000 individuals.
President Kabila decided shortly after the failed offensive
to convene the long-awaited "Kivus Conference on Peace,
Stability and Development" to bring together representatives
of all sectors, including political officials, tribal
leaders, parliamentarians, ranking clerics, and even
representatives of insurgent groups. Originally scheduled
for December 26, the Conference was postponed until after the
end-of-year holidays due to insufficient lead time to ensure
proper preparation. It is now scheduled to begin Sunday,
January 6, and will last until January 14.

3. (C) The idea of a Conference to help resolve the Kivus
insurgencies (Nkunda's rebel force is but one of a large
number of insurgencies in the two provinces) has been a high
priority for the Congolese government (GDRC) since May, 2007.
Disputes between the executive and legislative branches,
NGO's and other interested parties over the agenda, scope of
work, who is invited to attend, and other contentious issues
resulted in indefinite postponements of the Conference. Many
hardliners in the Kabila government, including late political
advisor Samba Kaputo, Defense Minister Chikez, and special
diplomatic advisor Seraphin Ngwej, were happy to let the date
of the Conference slip further and further away in the hope
that military action would succeed in neutralizing Kabila's
insurgency, which they believe to be the greatest threat
among the many insurgent groups in the two Kivus. The defeat
of the FARDC put into sharp focus the Government's inability
to defeat Nkunda in the short term and the need to prevent
him from making further gains. We believe these
considerations were the key factors in President Kabila's
decision to go forward with the Conference.

Reaching out for assistance
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4. (C) Unable to organize the Conference on short notice and
lacking the resources needed to carry it off, Kabila reached
out to parliament, particularly Chamber of Deputies President
Vitale Kamerhe (himself a native of North Kivu); Azarias
Ruberwa (from South Kivu),a former Vice-President of the
Transitional Government and self-appointed leader of the

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DRC's Tutsi community; and Catholic priest Apollinaire
Malumalu, a North Kivusian who is also the president of the
country's Independent Electoral Council. The organizers have
in turn reached out to the United Nations Mission in the
Congo (MONUC) and the donor community for financial and
technical support. The United States has provided $300,000
to date, primarily to purchase office equipment and provide
clerical services. Other major donors include the United
Kingdom, the EU, and Canada. MONUC will assist with travel
and logistics and will also provide security.


5. (SBU) An appeal for international staff to serve as
facilitators and technical experts was also made. We do not
yet have details on the response to this request. We
understand, however, that the Catholic Church-based conflict
resolution institute Sant' Egidio will provide support. The
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington may also support the
Conference. Many ambassadors to the DRC based in Kinshasa
are expected to attend the opening ceremony of the Conference
in Goma on January 6. We also expect Great Lakes Region
special envoys from Belgium and the European to participate.
Finally, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi
Frazer's Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution, Tim
Shortley, will participate in the Conference from January
10-14.

Are some groups being excluded?
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6. (C) With two days remaining before the Conference opens,
a number of important technical and substantive issues remain
unresolved. In a lengthy meeting with former Vice-President
Ruberwa on January 3, the Tutsi leader painted a shady
picture of poor preparation; uncertainty regarding the
Conference's purpose and goals; strong disagreements over who
should facilitate and chair sessions; attempts to exclude
Tutsis from full participation as officials, experts and
regular attendees; and pressure by the Government to
influence the outcome. Ruberwa asserted that he had argued
strongly for facilitation by outsiders to ensure neutrality
but had been outvoted by Malumalu and Kamerhe, who preferred
Kivusian facilitators. A slate of Conference officials was
agreed on, Ruberwa said, that consisted of Kamerhe, as
president of the conference; Ruberwa, as vice-president and
chair of the "Commission des Sages" (a policy advisory
committee); and Malumalu, as vice-president and head of the
Commission's secretariat.

7. (C) Ruberwa said that the organizers gave their list of
Conference recommendations to Marcellin Chissambo, Kabila's
senior diplomatic advisor, for forwarding to the President.
Chissambo, Ruberwa stated, then drafted a report on the
recommendations reassigning Ruberwa from head of the
"Commission des Sages," a policy body, to become instead head
of the Conference secretariat, a technical body. Chissambo
also reassigned Malumalu to become Conference president.
Ruberwa interpreted Chissambo's move as anti-Tutsi, as well
politically motivated because Ruberwa, alone among the three
organizers, is not a member of a party belonging to the
President's AMP coalition (Alliance pour la Majorite
Presidentielle - a group of several parties that supports
Kabila). By giving both policy jobs to persons who support
the President, Ruberwa argued, Kabila was preventing the
Opposition from playing an important role in the Conference.
(Note: Ruberwa's assertion that Malumalu has political
affiliations is debatable; although criticized by some for
his support of Kabila during the 2006 elections, he was given
high marks by international observers for his role as
impartial president of the National Electoral Commission.
Also, Kamerhe, whose party is a member of the AMP, has
nonetheless strongly opposed many of Kabila's legislative
initiatives as president of the lower house of Parliament.
End note).


8. (C) Ruberwa argued further that the decision to demote
him as a Conference official went far beyond a personal
attack against him as a Tutsi; it was also an effort to keep
Tutsis from playing their rightful role in the Conference.
He asserted that given anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Kivus they
would never be elected by other participants to head
committees or sub-committees nor would they be hired as
technical experts. They should not be allotted the same
participation numbers as other ethnic groups, he insisted,
but instead be given a "special quota" to "ensure equitable

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representation." He also accused the government of naming
only one Tutsi to a minor position in the Conference, a
political person who is a member of a pro-Kabila party.
Ruberwa said he spoke with Kabila on December 24 to challenge
the new designation of officers but has not yet heard whether
his concerns will be met. He informed the Ambassador he is
considering boycotting the Conference altogether and asked
for U.S. intervention vis-a-vis Kabila. We wonder if
Ruberwa, if he attends, plans to withdraw from the Conference
in the event he take exception with any decisions that, he
believes, are unfavorable to his community's interests. This
scenario would seem to be supported by recent communiques
issued by the CNDP, a political organization backing Nkunda,
which has accused the Conference of bias against Tutsis.

What are the Conference's real goals?
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9. (C) Several other technical issues remain unresolved.
According to Ruberwa and other sources, as of January 4, the
Conference does not yet have rules of procedure, rosters of
experts to chair many sessions, or approved lists of topics
to be discussed. More importantly, there appears to be a
lack of focus on goals and outcomes. Ruberwa's thesis is the
Conference's goal is simply "to do whatever is necessary to
end the war." But such a lofty objective requires specific
proposals with details on the roles of concerned parties,
timelines for implementation, benchmarks on progress towards
completion, and projected costs. Instead, based on media
reports and other sources, there is far too much emphasis at
this point on who is qualified to participate in the
Conference; on how competing groups (ethnic, religious,
NGO's, etc.) should be equitably represented; on debates over
causes of the problem rather than on solutions; and on
competing theoretical approaches to resolving problems that
are very concrete and real.

Security concerns
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10. (C) Another major concern relates to security and the
conflict itself. Media reports indicate that the FARDC and a
number of armed groups are taking advantage of the lull in
fighting since the Conference was announced to re-supply,
rearm, and redeploy their forces; one cannot dismiss outright
the hypothesis that the Government cynically endorsed the
Conference as a tactical ploy to buy time. Although there
are no indications any military actions are planned for the
period January 6-14, any slight rise in the political
temperature in the highly-tense province of North Kivu could
result in a flare-up, with deaths and thousands of new
internally displaced persons (IDP's). It is also rumored
that tensions at the Conference itself could lead to violence
in Goma. Embassy has dispatched the RSO to Goma to do a site
survey of Conference locations to ensure that U.S.
participants (the ambassador, senior advisor Shortley and the
Goma political officer) have access to professional advice
should riots or other forms of violence occur. RSO Kinshasa
will remain in Goma as long as he is needed and the situation
warrants.

A strong U.S. role -- critical for success
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11. (C) Participation in the Conference by Senior Advisor
for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley will help to ensure
focus and to make participants aware of the need to achieve
results. Embassy believes the appropriate U.S. role is to
support the GDRC as it endeavors to organize and carry out a
credible Conference. We have done so through USAID and via
expressions of support from the Department's spokesman, the
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and her senior
advisor. We should also help build confidence among the
Conference's many actors as they participate in the
Conference. The presence of the ambassador, the Goma
political officer and senior advisor Shortley will help to
accomplish this. We should propose and win support for
processes that will engage participants after the Conference
has ended. Senior Advisor Shortley will work with Conference
organizers in this endeavor. Finally, we must work closely
with the international community to secure the resources
needed to implement the decisions Conference members agree
on. We note that senior advisor Shortley, supported by

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Embassy Goma officer and USAID and OFDA officers, will remain
in Goma after the Conference is over to begin follow-up work
with Congolese interlocutors.
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