SPECIAL ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S JANUARY 12 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000047

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SIPDIS
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PINR PHUM CG
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S JANUARY 12 MEETING WITH
INSURGENT LEADER GENERAL LAURENT NKUNDA


Classified By: DCM Samuel Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) On January 12, Tim Shortley, Senior Adviser for
Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer for Conflict Resolution
met with General Lauren Nkunda at his request and the request
of President Kabila,s staff. The objectives of the meeting
were to understand Nkunda state of mind and readiness for
peace in advance of the Peace, Security and Development
Conference and to seek his commitment to end the conflict
through dialogue and implementation of the U.S. brokered
agreement between the GDRC and Nkunda reached in December

2007.

The State of Nkunda
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2. (C) Nkunda arrived for the meeting alone wearing a newly
purchased suit. Nkunda,s outlook had matured since his
victory in Masisi in early and mid December. Nkunda fully
understood the extent of damage that had been inflicted on
the FARDC and the political implications that have led to the
hastily called Peace, Security and Development Conference.
With increased pressure on the government to call for a
ceasefire and the opening of the conference, Nkunda,s sights
have already moved beyond the peace, security and development
conference and were now focused on the make up of the
technical commissions that are expected to discuss security
and political modalities of disengagement, brassage/DDR and
CNDP leadership status. Beyond his own problems, Nkunda was
eager to discuss how to solve the problems of North Kivu and
at the national level.


3. (C) Nkunda suggested that if the government did not allow
him to integrate that he was ready to depart Masisi and take
up other work. Without saying what he would do, he indicated
that he was ready to move on to more political work.
However, he refused to discuss exile claiming again that it
is against the constitution (per Article 30). Instead he
said that he and the CNDP should benefit from Amnesty for
insurrection (versus crimes against humanity etc...) and be
integrated either into to the army is allowed to move about
freely.

Ending the Conflict
--------------


4. (C) Nkunda repeatedly stressed that he was ready to end
the war, saying "the war is a problem of integration that can
not be solved militarily and requires a political solution."
He warned, however, that if the GDRC restarts the war, that
he will not stop and follow the FARDC all the war back to
Goma. Nkunda underscored that he has been trying to protect
the cessation of military operations (the undeclared
ceasefire) by not responding to FARDC provocations. However,
he said that he is engaged daily with PARECO and FDLR around
Karuba and is expressed his frustration that the government
continues to prosecute the war through its proxies even with
the announced cessation of military operations and the
conference.


5. (C) Looking beyond the possibility of an agreement in the
coming days, Nkunda emphasized that he wanted the technical
commissions, discussions to begin right away. We serious
preparations and a robust effort, Nkunda believed that all
modalities could be finalized in a matter of weeks. Nkunda
stressed that if the GDRC was serious about the modalities
for agreeing to disengagement, brassage/DDR, rehabilitation
of rank and amnesty for insurrection as well as other
technical military issues, and the meetings were well
facilitated, peace could be found very quickly. Nkunda (as
well as the GDRC) agree that the redeployment of MONUC to
positions inside his lines of control should occur
immediately after the conference. The redeployment serves
the purpose of undermining his reasons for taking up arms by
protecting the populations in Masisi and Rutshuru, ensuring
that goods and services continue to flow and that government
administration and relief and stabilization support can be
provided.

Conclusion
--------------


6. (C) Nkunda's refusal to discuss exile and the request of
amnesty was a result of his military victory in December and

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his good standing presently. However, Nkunda's favorable
position to finalize an agreement in the coming days and
reach agreement on the modalities of disengagement and
disarmament through the technical commission provided an
opening if the government chooses to accept. Shortley
pressed Nkunda on many points to include potential ICC
indictments, UN human rights efforts focused on Nkunda as a
result of crimes against humanity or child soldiers, and the
publication of the Congolese warrants. Nkunda, however,
remained defiant. He demands a formal process to reach an
agreement with the government and to finalize modalities to
implement the agreement.


7. It remains to be seen if the government will directly
engage with Nkunda, a precondition for Nkunda to finalize an
agreement, or provide the process that is necessary to
discuss modalities of implementation for the security and
political issues agreed in the plan.
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