Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KINSHASA448
2008-05-19 18:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

NKUNDA PUSHES FOR ACTION ON AMANI, NAIROBI

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE 
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VZCZCXRO7958
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0448/01 1401802
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191802Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8017
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000448 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT: NKUNDA PUSHES FOR ACTION ON AMANI, NAIROBI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000448

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT: NKUNDA PUSHES FOR ACTION ON AMANI, NAIROBI


1. (SBU) Summary: At a meeting in Kitchanga (Masisi Territory) on
May 17, Laurent Nkunda told U.S. Goma Rep and Facilitation members
that he wants to be fully involved in the success of the Amani
Program, that the Kinshasa government is moving too slowly on
amnesty legislation and financial support for the Goma process, and
that the U.S. should be "more visible" in implementing the Nairobi
Communique and the Goma Agreement. Nkunda was in Kitchanga for
"sensitization" (awareness campaign) and was speaking especially to
IDP's who had been displaced from the area, of whom (he says) about
30% (around 12,000) have now returned. He pushed for the immediate
staffing of implementation cells at the provincial level to prepare
for disengagement and "brassage," and said he was ready immediately
to clear land at Kimoka for the meeting center/peace camp. He had
derisive words for President Kabila, PARECO and the FARDC, but did
not raise the sensitive topic of Bosco, and was for the most part
relaxed and congenial. End summary.

Saturday House Call
--------------


2. (SBU) Nkunda had called U.S. Goma Rep Nicholas Jenks on May 13,
and requested a meeting at Kilolirwe on May 17. Jenks invited the
Facilitation to come along, but logistical errors and poor
communications delayed the mission, which Nkunda finally directed to
Kitchanga. He was gracious and inclusive, raising issues tailored
to the full Facilitation: Jan Edward Craanen (Dutch Special Envoy),
LTC Jean-Luc Covolan (EUSEC),Niklas Bennwik (Sweden),Archibald
Moiwo (MONUC),and Jenks and Jim Panos (U.S. Goma Office). CNDP's
humanitarian coordinator, Dr. Alexi, and political cadres Kambasu
and Betrand and Major Seraphin flanked the Chairman.

Organizing on the Ground
--------------


3. (SBU) Nkunda said he was satisfied with the CNDP's active
sensitization that brought him to Kitchanga at the head of a march
of 30,000 people a few days ago. This bore no resemblance to the
tame "sensitization" of actual CNDP troops that Facilitation reps
observed last week in Mushaki, Mutanda and Bihamwe, but Nkunda's
vision of the Goma process heavily implicates the civilian
population. He said that the main obstacles to IDP return are: (1)

roadblocks (GDRC/FARDC does not want them to return); (2) hostile
propaganda from the GDRC; and (3) PARECO (which does not want them
to return either). For these reasons Nkunda is creating "comites de
base" incorporating both returning IDP's and the local population,
to facilitate their reinsertion.


4. (SBU) Nkunda is impatient that the provincial cells provided for
by the JTCPS Commission are not yet remotely functional, and said
that they need to be stood up immediately to start doing their jobs.
His version of the cells differs from the simple "execution" role
that the Commission talked about for the provincial commissions and
their dependent "cells." He envisages empowered cells that feed
information and recommendations up to the JTCPS, and do the real
work on the ground; he even intends to lead one of the cells, so far
unspecified. By his own admission, this activism is compensation
for his physical absence from Goma that security conditions
dictate.

His Enemies
--------------


5. (SBU) Nkunda freely cites examples of the hostility surrounding
him on the eve of disengagement. Most obvious to him is FARDC-FDLR
collaboration, and the fact that the GDRC "had troops to attack me,
but never the FDLR," and the contention that the troops going to
Walikale stopped in Hombo, a known FDLR center, and spent several
nights there undisturbed. CNDP charges that the Kinshasa government
is "not engaged," is not giving Amani enough money, and retains
political prisoners in jail while the parliament takes its time in
debating and enacting an amnesty law that will allow the movement's
members to circulate freely and prepare for brassage and
reinsertion.


6. (SBU) Nkunda at one point tore into Kabila, calling him a kid who
only knows how to lash out, had hit Bemba even with ambassadors in
the house, strikes people in Bas Congo for no defensible reason, and
of course targets Nkunda himself. He said that going to Kisangani
while FDLR are running around the DRC with arms is not an option.
If they were disarmed, even not repatriated but neutralized and held
in a camp somewhere, his attitude might be different.


7. (SBU) Nkunda cited one reported example of nefarious PARECO-FDLR
collaboration. The FDLR reportedly told Mugabo (PARECO/Hutu
faction) that it wanted PARECO to make sure that the FARDC did not
deploy in Loashi or Kibua; both of these are important military

KINSHASA 00000448 002 OF 002


centers for the FDLR, and PARECO reportedly did so.

Private Grief and Public Complaints
--------------


8. (SBU) The Chairman talked about 50 members of his family who
were killed en masse in the mid 1990's. He also talked about his
son who suffered machete blows to the head that led to traumatic
epilepsy. He said that before the FDLR came to Congo, there were no
real problems being a Tutsi in the DRC. There was certainly
harassment, but never killing. Since 1994, things have been
different, and in Nkunda's words, it is open season on the Tutsis.


9. (SBU) Nkunda believes that it is very important to begin
construction on the Kimoka meeting site/peace camp. Once it is
established, he will be able to go to Kimoka and participate in the
Amani process, even without an amnesty law and with an arrest
warrant still over his head. In addition, it can be a place for the
JTCPS to work. He thinks a simple installation will do, with tents,
latrines, a water pump and generator. It can and should be set up
expeditiously. He offered to bring a battalion to Kimoka to help
clear the site.


10. (SBU) He and others complained about the Sake road-block.
Numerous CNDP cadres have been stopped at this roadblock and
detained. Kambasu had to call Colonel Delfin to get released on one
occasion, and there was an incident in which a civilian rode a horse
from Kirolirwe down to Sake, and the horse and rider were detained
illegally by the FARDC. This roadblock and another on the Rutshuru
road are overdue for removal, he said. (Note: U.S. facilitation, en
route to Kimoka tomorrow, will check out this roadblock, which Gen
Mayala says is not a FARDC but rather a municipality roadblock. End
note).

The Partners' Roles
--------------


11. (SBU) The U.S. Goma Rep updated Nkunda on the status of the
Kalonge investigation and Canada's possible role in it, and also
talked about Rewards for Justice, the upcoming UNSC sanctions
resolution, and donors training the RRF. Nkunda acknowledged that
these were positive moves, but refrained from discussing them.


12. (SBU) After the group meeting Nkunda commented separately to
Jenks that "the U.S. is a country with soul, whereas the Europeans
are more attached to their economic interests. The Europeans are
playing two agendas in the Goma/Nairobi processes, and trying to
bring the Americans along unwittingly." He said that he would have
preferred to meet with Jenks alone, to talk over some ideas for
making the U.S. role more visible. Jenks replied that the U.S. is
in lock step with the Europeans on Goma and Nairobi, and would not
deviate. He understood the point, and said that that was indeed the
way to go, but that it would also be good if the U.S. were "more
visible."


13. (SBU) Comment: This was an engaged, helpful and rational
Nkunda. It is clear that one of his intentions was to tell the
Facilitation that CNDP was taking sensitization and the Amani
process seriously. His plan to lead one of the North Kivu "cells"
is a surprise and a fascinating one. It also points up the need to
establish Kimoka as soon as possible, despite resistance to this
idea within MONUC that must be overcome. CNDP did show their
positive engagement in this meeting, and they clearly expect the
GDRC and the Facilitation to reciprocate on their parts of the deal.
End comment.

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