Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KINSHASA274
2008-03-19 16:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

SHORTLEY BRIEFS P3+2+MONUC FOLLOWING MEETINGS WITH

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO MARR MOPS CG RW UN 
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VZCZCXRO9432
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0274/01 0791606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191606Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7698
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000274 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MARR MOPS CG RW UN
SUBJECT: SHORTLEY BRIEFS P3+2+MONUC FOLLOWING MEETINGS WITH
NKUNDA AND KIGALI

REF: A. KIGALI 165


B. KINSHASA 215

C. KINSHASA 190

Classified By: A/DCM D. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b&d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000274

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MARR MOPS CG RW UN
SUBJECT: SHORTLEY BRIEFS P3+2+MONUC FOLLOWING MEETINGS WITH
NKUNDA AND KIGALI

REF: A. KIGALI 165


B. KINSHASA 215

C. KINSHASA 190

Classified By: A/DCM D. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b&d)


1. (C) Summary. AF Senior Adviser Tim Shortley briefed P3 2
ambassadors March 7 in Kinshasa on his talks with Nkunda and
Kigali the previous week. Shortley confirmed that Nkunda had
agreed to rejoin the Goma process. Shortley stressed that
the international community must treat Nkunda in a way that
gives the peace process the greatest chance of success, even
if it may leave unresolved -- at least for the moment -- the
question of "justice." He said Foreign Minister Murigande
told him Rwanda is working up a list of 10 priority
genocidaires. SRSG Alan Doss highlighted the need for MONUC
to deal with ceasefire violations involving the CNDP and
PARECO, the possibility of an independent investigation into
the Kalonge massacre, and diplomatic and military options for
dealing with the FDLR. End summary


2. (C) Tim Shortley, A/S Frazer's Senior Adviser for Conflict
Resolution, briefed P3 2 ambassadors and senior MONUC
officials March 7 at MONUC-Kinshasa on his meetings earlier
in the week with Nkunda and in Kigali (ref A). The meeting
was chaired by SRSG Alan Doss, with DRSG Ross Mountain, Force
Commander General Babacar Gaye and numerous counselors
sitting in. Ambassadors from the U.S., Belgium and South
Africa participated, as did the French and British DCMs.

Nkunda
--------------


3. (C) Shortley said he had warned Nkunda that the CNDP had
an image problem internationally and would suffer serious
consequences if it remained outside the Goma process. He
told Nkunda the USG was increasingly frustrated with his
actions. He stressed that he would not be negotiating
Nkunda,s particular grievances, but would treat them in a
separate track to enable the CNDP to rejoin the Goma process.
Shortley said Nkunda appeared to respond well both to the

attention and Shortley,s tough line. He agreed that the
CNDP would rejoin the process and appeared to put a great
deal of stock in commitments made by the international
facilitators to act as a bridge between him and the GDRC.


4. (C) Shortley and the ambassadors discussed how the
international community should view Nkunda: as a signatory
to a peace process who can expect protection as long as he
remains involved, or simply as a war criminal. Shortley
argued that the international community should treat Nkunda
whichever way allows the Goma process the greatest prospect
of success. He noted that if Nkunda does not have confidence
in the international facilitators, he will not remain in the
Goma process. If the international community insists on
"justice" for Nkunda before peace, he will have no reason to
participate.


5. (C) The Belgian ambassador praised Shortley,s work,
calling it a confidence-building measure of its own. He
asked whether Nkunda is acting in good faith, or stringing
everyone along. He argued that the GDRC needs to show more
flexibility in its dealings with Nkunda. Shortley noted that
Nkunda had transformed his role from military commander to
political leader. In the sense that Nkunda sees a political
future for himself and is looking for the peace process to
succeed, he is acting in good faith. He also understands
that the international community could force him to face some
kind of judicial process in the future. Shortley said Nkunda
told him he would deal with that situation when it comes.
Responding to a question from the South African ambassador,
Shortley said Kabila would prefer that Nkunda just leave the
country to "cool off."

Kigali and Goma
--------------


6. (C) Shortley also briefed the group on his March 6
meetings in Kigali, where he briefed Foreign Minister Charles
Murigande on his talks with Nkunda and discussed FDLR issues
(ref A). He noted Murigande had emphasized that Rwanda
wanted an immediate Security Council vote on the FDLR
resolution (since achieved) and a joint plan with the DRC to
put an end to the FDLR threat. Murigande told Shortley
Rwanda is working up a short list of 10 priority genocidaires
and wants to move forward on re-establishing bilateral

KINSHASA 00000274 002 OF 002


relations and increased economic cooperation with the DRC.
Shortley said he delivered a strong message about putting an
end to Rwanda,s haggling over JMG Task Force minutes (ref B).


7. (C) Shortley said Rwanda was interested in increasing
dialogue with MONUC on DDRRR issues, and hoping for a
"cocktail" of international assistance to move the Nairobi
process forward, including FARDC training and increased
intelligence coordination. Shortley emphasized that MONUC is
now carrying the burden of implementing Nairobi, and said the
international community needs to bolster MONUC, the DRC and
Rwanda in order to move forward.


8. (C) Following his trip to Kigali, Shortley met with North
Kivu humanitarian and NGO representatives in Goma. He said
they asked for more briefings on the Goma process from MONUC
and other international facilitators. Some are also calling
for access to CNDP-controlled areas, and Nkunda appears to be
opening that door.

MONUC views
--------------


9. (C) Following Shortley's briefing, SRSG Doss underscored
several points related to Goma and Nairobi. First, MONUC
must deal with CNDP and PARECO ceasefire violations and may
have to deploy additional troops to fill gaps that PARECO in
particular might otherwise occupy. He acknowledged an
independent inquiry into the Kalonge massacre (ref C) could
be an option, noting that MONUC,s human rights office could
not re-open its own investigation. He stressed that MONUC
must actively address potentially inflammatory rumors in
order to maintain effective crisis control.


10. (C) Doss noted that the Nairobi process has suffered due
to the current focus on Goma. The long Rwandan list of
genocidaires also set back efforts: the DRC now blames
Rwanda for undercutting its outreach efforts to the FDLR, and
suspects Rwanda would prefer that FDLR members remain on
Congolese territory. He stressed that all parties must keep
up diplomatic pressure on the FDLR. He acknowledged the need
for a military option but emphasized that any campaign
against the group would have to take into account the
potential impact on the local population.


11. (C) DSRSG Ross Mountain emphasized that a strong DDR
program must be funded and ready to process ex-combatants
when they begin demobilization through the Goma process. He
noted the present inadequacies of the Congolese DDR program
and pointed out that it had only avoided being overwhelmed
because of the sluggishness of the Goma process talks.
GARVELINK