JAMAICA: EXTRADITION OF DRUG KINGPIN NEMBHARD --

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000677

SIPDIS

INL/LP BOZZOLO WHA/CAR KHARNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: SNAR PREL SOCI KCRM JM CO XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: EXTRADITION OF DRUG KINGPIN NEMBHARD --
NOT AS EASY AS IT LOOKED

REF: A. ASDAR -- JULY 11

B. KINGSTON 619

Classified By: NAS Director Andrea M. Lewis for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: On the morning of July 4, Drug Kingpin
Norris "Dido" Nembhard and four co-conspirators lost their
final appeal and were eligible for extradition. Following
maneuvers by defense attorneys to delay the extradition long
enough to mount what would likely have been an unsuccessful
appeal to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom, they
departed Jamaica on July 11. The inter-agency cooperation at
post could not have been better: DEA, ICE, NAS, RSO and U.S.
Marshals all deserve kudos. End Summary,

Background on Defendants
========================


2. (C) The DEA Kingston Country Office (KCO) conducted a
multi-national and multi-jurisdictional operation targeting
Northern Colombia based and Jamaica based drug transportation
organizations. The Jamaican targets of this operation
centered on Norman Ramcharan, Leebert Ramcharan (named by
President Bush as a drug kingpin on June 1, 2004) Norris
Nembhard, and two of Jamaica's top ten targets, Robroy
Williams and Donovan Williams. These Jamaican nationals and
their organization were responsible for transporting
multi-ton quantities of cocaine via go-fast vessels from the
north coast of Colombia to the Caribbean for subsequent
transshipment to the United States. Approximately 600
kilograms of cocaine were seized in Jamaica during joint
operations conducted by the DEA and the Jamaica
Constabulary Force (JCF). Leebert Ramcharan, Norris Nembhard,
Donovan Williams, Robroy Williams, Herbert Henry,
Vivian Daley, Glenford Williams and Luis Miguel Avila-Arias
were indicted in 2004, and were arrested by Jamaican
authorities without incident in 2004. Ramcharan and Donovan
Williams were extradited to the U.S. in 2007.
In May 2008, Ramcharan was sentenced to 35 years in Federal
Prison; Williams received a 27 year sentence one month later.


U.S. Law Enforcement was prepared for a July 5 extradition
============================================= ==============


3. (C) After four years of waiting for the case to wend its
way through the legal system, in May, the KCO received
advance notice from its sources that Nembhard and his
co-conspirators were scheduled for a July 4 hearing, which
was their "final appeal." DEA agents and the Marshals began
coordination with the Jamaica Constabulary Force and Jamaica
Defence Force to plan the extradition. Because of concerns
about last minute maneuvers by the Defense teams to prevent
extradition, DEA had arranged to have one of its own aircraft
take the five prisoners off island on July 5. In late June,
just prior to the extradition hearing, the DEA Country
AttachQ and Marshals staff met both with the Commissioner of
Police and the Director of the Office of Public Prosecutions
to update them on the USG's intention to move the defendants
as soon as possible after the hearing.


4. July 4, all the Jamaican defendants lose. Having seen
the successful and swift extradition of Leebert Ramcharan and
his co-indictee Donovan Williams, in March 2007, an action
which prevented a collateral court from interceding on their
behalf, the defense teams for Nembhard and his crew were
ready. As soon as court pronounced them eligible for
extradition, defense council hand-delivered requests for an
extraordinary hearing by Attorney General/Minister of Justice
Dorothy Lightbourne, something permitted under Article 7 of
the Extradition Act. Because the Attorney General granted
the special hearing, DEA had its aircraft stand down; the
plane was then scheduled to return on July 14. (Note:
Avila-Arias, who is Colombian, won his appeal and has been
released into Jamaican Immigration Custody for deportation
from Jamaica. The KCO continues to work through its
counterparts in Miami and Columbia to ensure Avila's arrest
when he returns to Columbia for extradition to the United
States.)


5. (C) Lightbourne told the NAS Director on July 14, that she
felt that to be fair her initial reaction was to grant the
defense a verbal hearing. After taking the weekend to mull

it over, and realizing that the defense council would just
talk her to death, she ordered them to present their claims
in writing, which they did.


6. (C) On July 7, the Marshals and DEA were hearing rumors
that the hearing with Lightbourne was scheduled for later
that same week. The Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of
Justice confirmed for the NAS Director that Lightbourne would
hear the case on July 10. Knowing that the DEA aircraft was
not available until July 14, the Marshals requested
assistance from ICE in securing an aircraft, in case the
extradition's were ordered before the 14. July 7 found the
Director of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, Paula
Llewelyn working through her channels to ensure that any
defense hearing would not be ex-parte. Through the NAS
Director, Llewelyn advised the embassy to not make any
entreaties directly to the Minister of Justice, requesting
that the U.S. instead allow the DPP to represent our interest
with the Minister. This is the same advice that she had
earlier passed to the KCO. As this was the first test of
Prime Minister Golding's government on a high-profile
extradition, based on Llewelyn's advice, Post began to work
other political channels leaving Lightbourne alone.


7. (C) Based upon a request from the Marshals, on July 7, the
DCM contacted the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
National Security to express our concerns regarding the
extraordinary hearing and our hope that Lightbourne would
uphold the Appeal's Court ruling granting extradition. The
call was fortuitous, for that same morning, the Minister of
National Security had called a meeting of his senior staff to
discuss the extradition. One member of the Senior Staff, the
Director for Policy, Ann Marie Barnes, was personally
interested in the extradition, as her husband Karl Williams
was the officer who arrested Nembhard in 2004 on the U.S.
warrant. Williams and Barnes by extension as his spouse, who
recently had received threats from Nembhard's family related
to the extradition case. On July 8, the Permanent Secretary
informed NAS Director that the Minister of National Security,
Trevor MacMillan, was fully behind the extradition.


8. (C) July 8, the Minister of Justice signed the first
surrender order, for Vivian "Jungo" Dally, who waived his
right to a special hearing. On the 9th, Minister Lightbourne
signed three more orders: for Robroy "Spy"
Williams; Herbert "Scary" Henry; and Glenford "Toe" Williams.
However, Nembhard's order remained unsigned. On July 09,
Lightbourne received copies of Nembhard' defense motion
requesting leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The
Permanent Secretary told the NAS Director that afternoon that
"these attorneys have to realize that this is serious
business, and the games have to stop." Late that evening,
the ICE AttachQ received a call from MacMillan notifying us
that Lightbourne was prepared to sign Nembhard's order. He
asked ICE to "take out the trash."


9. (C) On July 10, Lightbourne, fed up that Nembhard's
defense team was "playing games with her" just to delay her
hand long enough for the court to hear his motion for an
appeal to the Privy Council, signed Nembhard's surrender
order. Had the court heard and approved the motion for
appeal to the Privy Council, it would have issued an order
staying Lightbourne's power to extradite the prisoners. This
appeal would likely have been futile, as the Council had
ruled in late 2007 that it would not hear extradition cases.
However, as it would have taken months for the Council to
rule, it would have forestalled Nembhard's transfer to the
United States. Lightbourne told the NAS Director, on July 14,
that she was comfortable signing the order, as in her view,
none of the defense motions had any merit.


10. (C) On July 10, as a further delay tactic, Nembhard's
council requested the opportunity to "talk to U.S. law
enforcement." That same day, DEA, ICE, RSO and U.S.
Marshals, in collaboration with the Jamaica Constabulary
Force, Fugitive Apprehension Team (JCF-JFAT) and Jamaica
Defense Force (JDF) finalized their operational plan for the
extradition. That evening, the ICE AttachQ received a call
from the Minister of National Security, urging us to have the
prisoners removed ASAP. The Minister also informed the ICE
AttachQ that he and Minister Lightbourne had been threatened
with death if the extradition were to take place. The
Minister told ICE he was taking steps to provide additional

security to all who were under threat. Based on that call
ICE contacted the CBP plane and the schedule for departure
was moved up by a few hours.

Extradition occurs on July 11
=============================


11. (C) July 11, with the CBP plane on its way, DEA, ICE, RSO
and U.S. Marshals assembled at Kingston's airport. After the
prisoners were moved, Nembhard's defense council arrived at
the prison with copies of the defense motions, which were not
accepted. At 11:55, the ICE AttachQ reported "wheels up" to
Ambassador Johnson. Throughout the day Nembhard's Defense
team continued to demand information on his location,
eventually going to the press. Since the extradition became
public, the Defense team has continued to try to stir up
public opinion against Lightbourne, but to little effect.


12. (C) Post Comment: This was the first high-profile
extradition executed by the Golding government. Lightbourne,
who comes from private practice as a defense attorney (mostly
civil cases),places particular emphasis on the protection of
human rights and upholding fairness in judicial proceedings.
Her natural inclination to "give the defense every
opportunity" was used against her at first by Nembhard's
council. Post believes that Minister of National Security
Trevor MacMillan was instrumental in stiffening Lightbourne's
spine between July 5-10 when she signed the extradition
orders. It is a very good sign that she apparently now
understands the gamesmanship that goes on in Jamaica, and has
stated that she will not wait to sign any future surrender
orders because she has no interest in giving defense lawyers
so much latitude in the future. End Comment.

MOSS