JAMAICA: INPUT FOR CARIBBEAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000487

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS CENTRAL AMERICAN CARIBBEAN BASIN COLLECTIVE FOR INFO

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR - MICHAEL FORTIN, JOE TILGHMAN WHA - GIOVANNI SNIDLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL MASS MOPS ASEC SNAR PBTS DHS JM XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: INPUT FOR CARIBBEAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT

REF: A. STATE 51747 (151536Z MAY 08)

B. PORT OF SPAIN 170 (101533Z APR 08)(NOTAL)

C. BRIDGETOWN 237 (072131Z APR 08)(NOTAL)

Classified By: DCM JAMES T. HEG, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

Summary
--------------

1.(C) This cable provides Embassy Kingston's response to
reftel (A),"Caribbean Security Assessment." Post believes
that augmentation of USG assistance in the following areas
would benefit Jamaica and the region, and ultimately improve
U.S. security:

-- upgrade of the Jamaican Immigration Service's entry/exit
system, ENTRIX;

-- improvement of passport issuance integrity;

-- development of a regional data sharing capacity for
fingerprints, with linkage to the U.S. to permit regional
governments to send inquiries through for verification by
U.S. databases;

-- assessment of needs to determine how the region s customs
services could be linked together to share shipping
information similar to the Automated Targeting System (ATS)
used by the Container Security Initiative (CSI).

-- establishment/coordination of a force of U.S. polygraph
experts drawn from all USG agencies on whom regional
governments could call to conduct vetting of personnel;

-- provision of fixed wing surveillance aircraft and night
vision equipment.

End Summary.

Current Security Activity
--------------

2.(C) The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) is actively engaged
with its international partners to detect and deter
international criminal organizations from operating in
Jamaica. It has had success over the last five years in
raising the cost borne by traffickers to transit cocaine
through Jamaica, resulting in a significant decrease in
traffic levels. Jamaica is a Container Security Initiative
(CSI) and Mega Ports partner nation, and U.S. Customs
inspectors are operating in Jamaica with only limited
resistance. The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF)'s Military
Intelligence Unit continues to monitor the island for
terrorist activity. The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is
unfortunately riddled with corruption.

3.(C) There are a few effective units within the JCF: the
Major Investigations Task Force; the Fugitive Apprehension
Unit; the Narcotics Police Vetted Unit; and Operation
Kingfish, which has taken on all intelligence collection for
the JCF. A new Commissioner of Police was named in December,
2007, and he and the GOJ are committed to a remaking of the
force over the next three years. As police corruption is
addressed, the JCF will hopefully become a better, more
committed partner in combating international criminal
organizations. The Immigration and Customs services also are
handicapped by corruption. The Custom Service's Contraband
Enforcement Team recently lost its Director and Deputy
Director -- the former to retirement, while the latter
resigned to become an ICE investigator. Both decided to
leave CET because they could not continue to fight against
the Commissioner of Customs, who is widely believed to be at
the center of the Service's corrupt operations. National
security efforts also are constrained by the country's
onerous debt burden: at almost 130 percent, Jamaica's
debt-to-GDP ratio is among the world's highest.

4.(C) The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Kingston
Country Office (DEA/KCO) has an outstanding long-term
relationship with the Jamaica Constabulary Force Narcotics
Unit (JCF/NU). Over the years, DEA/KCO has provided
financial, experiential, and academic support to the JCF/NU,
which they always have embraced; they have matured in their
ability to effectively combat illicit drug trafficking. The
DEA/KCO has benefited from the free flow of information and
evidence sharing, which has led to the successful
investigation and prosecution of several infamous Jamaican
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) impacting the USA.


Augmentation of Current Security Efforts
--------------

5.(C) Post believes that an augmentation of U.S. assistance
in the following areas would benefit Jamaica and the region,
and ultimately improve U.S. security:

(A) the Jamaican Immigration Service's entry/exit system,
ENTRIX ) a U.S ) IOM Funded system, is running over
capacity. The GOJ does not have funds to upgrade the system.
Because its data storage server is overflowing, the Service
recently made the decision to erase all 2005 entry-exit
records. In addition, because the ENTRIX system is running
over capacity, there is no real-time data sharing between the
ports of entry (Kingston, Montego Bay, Ocho Rios) and the
central server. It is entirely feasible, therefore, for a
wanted individual or terrorist to enter, transit, and exit
Jamaica without his/her name coming up. Data is only
downloaded into the system when it recycles at night. The
system also does not have the ability to link to watch lists,
such as INTERPOL red notices, Persons of Interest and
Fugitives list, which are being held by the Joint Regional
Communications Center (JRCC) in Bridgetown. The Immigration
Service is seeking assistance to upgrade ENTRIX capacity.
Post recommends support of this request to ensure
preservation of historical data, the ability of the system to
perform real time data inquiries, and the possible linkage of
ENTRIX to the JRCC for watch list inquiries.

(B) The Immigration Service does not have adequate passport
security. The actual passport books and processing of
passports meets current international standards, i.e. machine
readable, biometric passports. However, officers within the
passport agency are selling valid Jamaican passports using
false identification information to criminals. For example,
on May 15, Kathy Nelson, wanted by the U.S. Marshal's
Service, traveled from Nevada and attempted to enter Jamaica
using a valid Jamaican passport that had her photo in it but
under another name. The passport was issued in Jamaica and
mailed to Ms. Nelson in the United States. Post recommends
measures to improve passport issuance integrity, e.g.:
collection of additional biometric data such as fingerprints
to verify identity, which then could be cross checked against
the Jamaicans' digital fingerprint database; vetting of
immigration staff to weed out corrupt individuals; and a
needs assessment to determine ways in which the immigration
service could improve its passport integrity.

(C) Jamaica's current digital fingerprint database does not
cross check criminal inquiries against the database's civil
records (which are held for only 30 days because of a lack of
storage capacity). The GOJ currently is working on an MOU
with the UK to share this database and send inquiries to the
UK for name checks. Post would see value in: 1) developing
regional data sharing capacity for fingerprints; and 2)
linking that to the U.S. to permit regional governments to
send inquiries through for verification by U.S. databases.
This database, if shared with the U.S., could also benefit
our consular operations in decreasing the likelihood that we
would issue valid travel documents to known or suspected
criminals. Currently, our systems here only catch criminals
known to U.S. databases.

(D) Jamaica's Customs Service has no digital database to
collect, store, sort, or profile incoming, transit, or
outbound cargo, nor does the service have any capacity to
track shipments by shipper. Currently, when ships arrive at
Kingston Terminals, the officers manually inspect them and
keep notes on random pieces of paper. There is no data
sharing between customs and the police department, and no
network of regional contacts to verify that the manifest and
shipper information does not change from island to island.
Post recommends a needs assessment to determine how the
region s customs services could be linked together to share
shipping information similar to the Automated Targeting
System (ATS) used by the Container Security Initiative (CSI).

(E) Ad hoc vetting of select units within the police,
military, customs and immigration service has occurred over
the last two years. Each time this vetting occurs, there is
a scramble to identify USG agencies with available polygraph
experts. As corruption is not unique to Jamaica but is
pervasive within the region, Post recommends that a regional
strike force of polygraph experts from all USG agencies be
established on whom local governments could call to conduct
vetting of personnel.

(F) Jamaica has neither adequate fixed wing surveillance
aircraft, nor night vision equipment, which inhibits its
ability to interdict incoming contraband and prevents it from
participating more fully in regional operations.

Current Funding levels
--------------

6.(SBU) Jamaica currently benefits from the following
programs:

INCLE ) Counter-narcotics and anti-crime ) FY09 ) 850K
IMET ) International Military Education and Training ) FY09
750K
FMF ) Foreign Military Financing ) FY09 800K
NADR ) Counter-terrorism training ) FY09 (at present,
zeroed out; anticipate restoration to 500K)

Training effectiveness for Police/Military
--------------

7.(SBU) The JDF takes advantage of numerous U.S. training
opportunities. Our IMET program is a core part of their
officers' and NCOs' professional development, and is now
their main commissioning source for officers entering the
force (through OCS). The JDF also benefits from JCETs, ship
visits, and training in support of Operation Enduring
Friendship. The JDF uses the training they receive, and it
has made a difference in their organization.

8.(SBU) DS-funded training programs have been positively
received and utilized by the Jamaican Constabulary Force
(JCF). One course entitled the Management of Major Events
was used successfully during the Cricket World Cup, held in
Jamaica in 2007. Another recent course was Weapons of Mass
Destruction, which coordinated Jamaican police, military,
fire/rescue forces, and hospital and medical service
professionals to overcome man-made disasters. This
introduction and cooperation also could be used to handle
natural disasters, such as hurricanes, fires and earthquakes.

9.(SBU) Three established programs in Jamaica which have a
regional impact, and for which U.S. support has been
requested, are:

-- the University of the West Indies (UWI) Masters Program in
National Security and Strategic Studies;

-- the Junior Command and Staff Course, which targets
development of junior officers from throughout the region;

-- the National Security and Strategic Studies Program, in
which current and near-future senior leaders of the regional
security apparatus participate.

History of effectiveness w/in region
--------------

10.(SBU) The JDF performs well in the multi-national
exercises in which it participates: Tradewinds, PKO N, and
Fuerzas Comandos. JDF participants are recognized as
professional and are looked up to by other Caribbean nations.
The relationship between the DEA/KCO and the JFC/NU has
facilitated the implementation of several technological
investigative programs which have significantly impacted and
disrupted the modus operandi of multiple large-scale
international Jamaican DTOs. DEA/KCO is operationally
satisfied with the quality of work produced by the JFC/NU.

Weaknesses in Cooperation and Information Sharing

11.(C) The JDF's use of CNIES has been constrained because
of the limited U.S. resources supporting counter-drug
operations in Jamaican waters. The Operation Riptide
scheduled for Aug 08 will be the first one since 2005.
JOHNSON