Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KIGALI741
2008-10-17 11:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kigali
Cable title:  

PEACE, STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, NOT WAR, ARE

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO RW 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0741/01 2911134
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171134Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5701
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0318
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0417
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1229
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2004
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0556
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0331
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1336
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0590
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0167
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000741 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO RW
SUBJECT: PEACE, STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, NOT WAR, ARE
RWANDA'S REAL INTERESTS

REF: A. KINSHASA 0884

B. KINSHASA 0875

C. KIGALI 710

D. 07 KIGALI 0631

Classified By: CDA Cheryl Sim for Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000741

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO RW
SUBJECT: PEACE, STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, NOT WAR, ARE
RWANDA'S REAL INTERESTS

REF: A. KINSHASA 0884

B. KINSHASA 0875

C. KIGALI 710

D. 07 KIGALI 0631

Classified By: CDA Cheryl Sim for Reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. Absent significant ethnic cleansing of
Rwandaphone populations in eastern Congo, or a serious attack
by the FDLR across the border, the Government of Rwanda (GOR)
will likely keep its cool, keep its policy focus on
development, and grit its collective teeth as it exchanges
allegations of misbehavior with a Congolese government it
disdains. Another foray into military adventurism in the
Kivus is not on President Kagame's "to do" list -- his vision
of Rwanda is as a peaceful entrepot of effective government
and a destination for private investment that leads to to
ever-greater integration in the East African Community. To
reach its long-term development goals, Rwanda needs a Congo
that can provide security in the eastern region, govern
itself well and make mutually-beneficial deals. However, we
agree with our colleagues in Kinshasa (ref B) that multiple
efforts must be made by the international community to
counsel and insist on peace, and both governments must be
brought to see the meritss of cooperation or, at least, a
respectful coexistence. End summary.


2. (C) Rwandan officialdom has viewed the rising tide of
rumor, accusation and extremist statements emanating from the
eastern Congo and senior Congolese officials with alarm,
dismay, irritation and finally anger, as it sees itself again
and again accused by Congolese officials of stage-managing
events it contends are clearly beyond its control. The
recent Congolese photographs that purportedly "prove" Rwanda
Defence Forces (RDF) are supporting Laurent Nkunda have been
met with equal amounts of disdain and grim humor (FYI: some
of the obvious mistakes in the photos include Rwandan money
that has been out of circulation since the genocide;
consistent misspellings of "Rwanda Defence Forces"; a
military ID card that has mixed English/French and notes
blood type as "inconnue" when in fact the RDF has a very
thorough blood screening/typing effort related to HIV/AIDS

programs; rifles that are not issued to the RDF and/or in
terrible condition; and out-of-use documents with dates
altered to read 2008. End FYI). Most observers here have
commented that if the DRC is going to make the effort to
fabricate this alleged "proof," its efforts are woefully
amateurish.


3. (C) The previous and seemingly growing progress between
the two nations, on view as late as the Joint Monitoring
Group Envoys Level meeting in Gisenyi in June of this year,
has been replaced by emotional charges and counter-charges.
Unfortunately, the only regular dialogue between the two
nations has become the sterile and low-level exchanges of the
JMG Task Force, where a focus on scoring minor procedural
points appears to be the chief past-time. Nevertheless, the
Government of Rwanda (GOR) believes it is appropriate for DRC
to request MONUC to activate the Joint Verification Mechanism
(JVM) to look into what the DRC contends are Rwandan misdeeds
inside the DRC. Special Envoy Richard Sezibera has for
months suggested that DRC complaints be directed to the JVM.
As for the GOR using the JVM to investigate Rwandan concerns
QAs for the GOR using the JVM to investigate Rwandan concerns
related to Rwandans who are allegedly missing, detained or
reporting abuse in the Goma area, Sezibera told Charge the
GOR prefers to try to use bilateral means first (and has
exchanged testy diplomatic notes with the DRC on the issue of
the missing) before taking the allegation to the JVM. He
added, however, there are a number of issues that Rwanda has
asked the JVM to look into that have not been addressed.


4. (C) Rwanda's chief accusation (in accord with its
long-standing complaint, now apparently accepted by many
observers -- ref C),is that some elements of the Congolese
armed forces (FARDC) co-exist and regularly cooperate with
and supply the FDLR. While grudgingly acknowledging the
international community's growing recognition of this
phenomenon, Rwanda wants more: statements from western
governments acknowledging this point; meaningful action to
separate the two forces, and effective operations to
dismantle the genocidal FDLR. Add to the mix the GOR's
long-standing suspicion that MONUC forces assist or ignore
FDLR operations, and there is long-simmering anger and

contempt for what the GOR frequently describes as the inept
and self-dealing activities of the international presence in
the DRC.


5. (C) However, notwithstanding its concern about the
situation on the ground in eastern Congo and its irritation
with the GDRC, the Rwandan government has great policy focus
and strict discipline at senior levels, and subordinates do
not act without clear authorization from above. President
Kagame has determined that the GOR/RDF will not intervene in
the Congo, and that remains Rwandan policy. In his recent
interview with the Belgian newspaper Le Soir, Kagame
disavowed any personal interest in events in the Kivus. This
may not be literally true, but his remarks reflect the
conscious decision of the Rwandan government to stay on its
side of the border. Additionally, Kagame and his senior team
are well aware of what their last foray into military
intervention in the DRC cost Rwanda on all fronts, and Kagame
has a proven track record of learning from his past mistakes.


6. (C) Rwanda's immediate future lies to the east (ref D),
and the growing integration of the East African Community,
with the relatively well-functioning economies of Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania as essential elements in an expanding
local economy and rising foreign investment. Rwanda
ultimately sees itself as a bilingual entrepot between
Anglophone East Africa and Francophone Central Africa, and it
needs a stable and peaceful Congo if its development needs
are to be fully realized. Plans for rail links, a new
airport, and a growing financial sector require the nearby
resource-rich Congo to be accessible from Rwanda. Rwanda
needs a Congo that can stand on its feet and make
mutually-beneficial development deals. Continual turmoil in
the Kivus is the opposite of what Rwanda wants and needs.


7. (C) Two things, however, could affect this policy thrust:
a large FDLR incursion, perhaps striking at Rwanda's growing
tourist and energy infrastructure along Lake Kivu; or
significant ethnic cleansing of Congolese Tutsis. We have
seen one late September incursion by a small FDLR force that
wounded one and killed another Rwandan, and we have the
reports mentioned above of missing Rwandan citizens who
apparently crossed into the Kivus on legitimate personal
business. These incidents do not of themselves change the
Rwandan policy equation, but escalations of either could
bring a very different Rwandan response. We have reports
that some FDLR formations are quite close to the Rwandan
border, and Rwanda has shifted troops to meet this perceived
threat. In some places, the FDLR and RDF are now reportedly
facing each other in close proximity.


8. (C) Comment. We agree with our colleagues in Kinshasa
that concerted efforts must be undertaken now to avoid any
further escalation of tensions on either side. The Joint
Monitoring Group and Tripartite-Plus sessions, jointly
scheduled for mid-November in Kigali, will be useful. A
revived Joint Verification Mechanism (something the Rwandans
have been calling for, for quite some time) could provide an
avenue for rational examination of reported incidents.
Restoration of diplomatic ties would provide a bilateral
avenue of communication that is sorely needed. Like Embassy
Qavenue of communication that is sorely needed. Like Embassy
Kinshasa, Embassy Kigali would welcome colleagues interested
in obtaining a first-hand view of the situation from this
side of the border. End Comment.


SIM