Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KIGALI615
2008-09-10 12:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kigali
Cable title:  

SHORTLEY MEETS SENIOR RWANDAN OFFICIALS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR MASS MOPS RW 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0294
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0387
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1200
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1971
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0024
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0526
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0153
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000615 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MASS MOPS RW
SUBJECT: SHORTLEY MEETS SENIOR RWANDAN OFFICIALS

Classified By: CDA Cheryl Sim for Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000615

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MASS MOPS RW
SUBJECT: SHORTLEY MEETS SENIOR RWANDAN OFFICIALS

Classified By: CDA Cheryl Sim for Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In conversations with Senior Advisor for Conflict
Resolution Tim Shortley, Rwandan officials agreed that CNDP
forces should pull back from forward positions gained in last
several days in eastern Congo. While denying any special
links with Nkunda forces, they agreed to send messages to
Congolese contacts regarding the need to lower tensions in
the region. Rwandan officials also concurred that reducing
the numbers of participants in Joint Monitoring Group (JMG)
and Tripartite-Plus sessions could increase communication,
cut down on posturing, and advance the peace process. A
separate quiet channel of communications with the Congolese
would also be useful, they agreed. On Rwanda's options for
transferring the USG 30 million dollar donation of equipment
to its forces in Darfur, the Rwandans opposed any effort to
send the gear through Port Sudan, much preferring either
airlift to Darfur or combined road and air transport by way
of Uganda and southern Sudan. They expressed concern about
UN support for the full deployment of four Rwandan battalions
to Darfur, and would receive a UN technical group September
8-10 to discuss relevant issues. End summary.

Rwanda Will Help Lower Tensions in the Kivus
--------------


2. (C) In meetings September 5-6 with Senior Advisor Tim
Shortley, Chief of Defense Staff General James Kabarebe,
Director of Military Intelligence General Jack Musemakweli,
Great Lakes Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera, and Internal
Security Secretary General Ambassador Joseph Mutaboba,
Rwandan officials agreed on the need to lessen tensions in
the Kivus and urge a CNDP retreat from positions it had taken
in the lasts several days in North Kivu in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). In a joint meeting September 5,
Kabarebe and Musemakweli agreed to pass messages to the FARDC
on the need to lower tensions, but contended that Rwanda had
limited influence over the CNDP. Kabarebe noted that Rwanda
had "its own problems to worry about" in building a better

military, and he did not take keen interest in the many minor
fluctuations of fortune in the Kivus, leaving his senior
staff, especially Musamekweli to follow developments there.
The RDF, according to Kabarebe, is fully occupied with
security for the upcoming September 15 elections and Darfur
deployment planning. "If the Congo does not intrude on our
concerns, we do not get involved," added Musemakweli. Both
men noted the propensity for rumors to flow uninterruptedly
in Kinshasa, and for the DRC government to encourage rumors
that put Rwanda in a bad light. Each thought the intentions
of the Congolese government in the Kivus were unclear, with
the "military option" still attractive to President Kabila
and his advisors. With specific regard to the FDLR, Kabarebe
reiterated that the group poses no serious threat to Rwanda,
but "if they poked their noses across the border" during this
electoral period, the RDF was ready.


3. (C) Shortley described his recent trip to the DRC,
including Goma, where rumors were running rampart concerning
RDF troops and General Kabarebe entering the DRC to support
QRDF troops and General Kabarebe entering the DRC to support
the CNDP. Expressing concern about MONUC's role in spreading
the rumors through its reporting mechanisms, Shortley noted
that Embassy Kigali had helped squelch the Kabarebe rumor by
pointing out the General had been present in Kigali as the
Chair of the East Brigade Conference and had met with UN SRSG
for the Great Lakes Doss the same evening. Shortley also
shared with the two generals, "evidence" FARDC officers had
given to him that they believed proved the RDF had forces in
North Kivu. Both explained that individuals wearing jungle
fatigues proved nothing, and added that through
happen-stance, the customs authorities at the Kigali airport
had found a shipment of fatigues destined for the DRC
fatigues destined for the DRC - it was not clear for whom,
however. Given the rumors flowing, Kabarebe agreed with
Shortley's suggestion that speaking directly with his DRC
counterpart would help clear @Qr/bQ#8m[QQoy in the
scheduled rotations of Rwandan troops to Darfur this fall.
The RDF had no equipment shortfalls (counting Dutch trucks
and Chinese APCs enroute to Rwanda),and was anxious to see
the thirty million dollar USG contribution of equipment sent
to Darfur along with the four rotating battalions. However,
said Nyamvumba, the RDF was worried that the UN was not fully
committed to the deployment, for reasons not fully understood
(budgetary? he wondered). For example, the UN was now saying
that, rather than transfer four 800-man battalions, as Rwanda
had planned and trained to do, Rwanda must swap its 680-man
battalion in Darfur with a similarly-sized battalion. From a
training and unit-cohesiveness perspective, this made no
sense, he said. However, a UN team would arrive to assess
Rwanda's readiness to deploy, and this would put into clearer
focus the UN concerns, he noted (Note: RDF concerns about the
UN visit lessened when the team arrived and began work).
Nyamvumba hoped that Rwandan could transfer the USG equipment
by a more direct route than Dar-es-Salaam to Port Sudan and
then by road to Darfur. There was every reason to believe
the Sudanese government would stop the equipment somewhere
after Port Sudan (although he noted his surprise when the
Sudanese recently released Rwandan equipment kept in
El-Fashir for some time). Perhaps a combination of travel by
road to Uganda and then air from southern Sudan could be
employed for the equipment, he said.

Comment
Defense (CHOD) meeting planned for September 17-18 in
Kinshasa, Kabarebe indicated he had not made up his mind to
attend.


4. (C ) In a follow-up meeting on September 6, Musamekweli
(who had participated in the September 1 Joint Monitoring
Group Special Envoy's meeting in Kinshasa),the general told
Shortley that he was confident Kabarebe would reach out to
his FARDC counterpart. On the CHOD, Musamekweli stated he
would participate in the September 15-16 pre-meetings and
believed Kabarebe would attend as long the DRC guaranteed his
safety. Shortley noted that overnight a new rumor emerged out
of Tanzania that purported the CNDP was seeking an
independent "East Congo." Musamekweli said he had not heard
that, but said it did not make sense that the CNDP would
issue something out of Tanzania and noted that the rumor was
likely just one more in the current DRC-rumor campaign.



5. (C) In a later joint meeting with Sezibera and Mutaboba,
the two men agreed that a U.S. initiated back channel to
Kinshasa could be useful, if the right personality were found
to conduct the communications. They also agreed that a
reduction in the numbers of persons participating in
multi-lateral and bilateral exchanges, such as the JMG and
Tripartite-Plus sessions, could mean franker discussions,
less posturing, and greater cooperation. They wondered if
the upcoming JMG and Tripartite-Plus sessions could be
combined or linked in some manner in November, with
restricted participation, and open and closed sessions. A
continuing problem, in seeking to hold these various meetings
and make progress, they said, was the willingness of the
Congolese government to engage in "disinformation." "They do
it as a habit," said Sezibera, commenting on the MONUC report
that General Kabarebe had addressed CNDP cadres in North
Kivu. "Someone has to tell Kinshasa that we are not the
puppet masters" for the eastern Congo," he added.


6. (C) The two men also cautioned that President Kabila's
commitment to a political solution in the Kivus, with the
disarmament of the negative forces, was not at all clear.
FARDC units were not led by those formally in command, but by
operatives in direct communication with Kinshasa. Ties
between the FARDC and the FDLR continued. The government's
willingness to truly reform the military was always in doubt.
But the GOR would continue to participate in the search for
peace, and seek useful understandings with the Congolese
government. "Our own problems fully occupy us," said
Sezibera, "but we engage with them."

Rwanda Ready to Deploy, Prefers Direct Route to Darfur for
New Gear
-------------- --------------


7. (C) General Patrick Nyamvumba, logistics chief for the
RDF, said that his forces were ready to deploy in the
scheduled rotations of Rwandan troops to Darfur this fall.
The RDF had no equipment shortfalls (counting Dutch trucks
and Chinese APCs enroute to Rwanda),and was anxious to see
the thirty million dollar USG contribution of equipment sent
to Darfur along with the four rotating battalions. However,
said Nyamvumba, the RDF was worried that the UN was not fully
committed to the deployment, for reasons not fully understood
(budgetary? he wondered). For example, the UN was now saying
that, rather than transfer four 800-man battalions, as Rwanda
had planned and trained to do, Rwanda must swap its 680-man
battalion in Darfur with a similarly-sized battalion. From a
training and unit-cohesiveness perspective, this made no
sense, he said. However, a UN team would arrive to assess
Rwanda's readiness to deploy, and this would put into clearer
focus the UN concerns, he noted (Note: RDF concerns about the
UN visit lessened when the team arrived and began work).
Nyamvumba hoped that Rwandan could transfer the USG equipment
by a more direct route than Dar-es-Salaam to Port Sudan and
then by road to Darfur. There was every reason to believe
the Sudanese government would stop the equipment somewhere
after Port Sudan (although he noted his surprise when the
Sudanese recently released Rwandan equipment kept in
El-Fashir for some time). Perhaps a combination of travel by
road to Uganda and then air from southern Sudan could be
employed for the equipment, he said.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) While the Rwandans seemed relaxed and unconcerned by
recent developments in the Congo, General Kabarebe's feigned
lack of interest may be a bit of bravado; they are following
events closely. However, they remain committed to the JMG
and Tripartite-Plus processes (slimmed down),with a possible
U.S. back channel route to more fruitful discussions. On
Darfur, the Rwandans hope for a more effective route for
peacekeeping equipment, equipment they believe they will
employ to very good use. End comment.



SIM