INCREASED FDLR INFILTRATIONS INTO RWANDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000393

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL RW
SUBJECT: INCREASED FDLR INFILTRATIONS INTO RWANDA

REF: 07 KIGALI 0152

Classified By: DCM Cheryl Sim for Reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. Rwandan security officials reported 76
"infiltrations" by Democratic Force for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR) intelligence squads since January 1, with 14
operatives captured, and some killed in firefights with
Rwandan border forces. Accompanying these infiltrations, a
number of FDLR battalions have moved closer to the Rwandan
frontier. Rwandan intelligence officials are concerned that
these infiltrations and border movements may presage attacks
against Rwandan officials and infrastructure located at or
near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). At the Joint Monitoring Group - Envoys Level meeting
in Gisenyi June 4, Rwandan officials requested concerted
efforts by MONUC and the FARDC to move these FDLR battalions
back from the border. These reports, and heightened Rwandan
concern, show the FDLR remains more than a theoretical threat
to Rwandan security. It might prove difficult to restrain a
Rwandan response to an FDLR attack on a high-profile target.
End summary.


2. (C) At the Joint Monitoring Group - Envoys Level meeting
in Gisenyi June 4 (septel),Ambassador Richard Sezibera,
leading the Rwandan delegation, in his prepared remarks said
that there had been 76 infiltrations by FDLR personnel "in
recent months," with 14 persons captured and several killed
in firefights with Rwandan Defense Force border forces.
Sezibera told the assembled delegations that these teams of
"infiltrators" were targeting Rwandan economic interests,
heavily represented at or near the border with the DRC,
including the recently completed methane extraction platform
tethered in Lake Kivu, tourist infrastructure in Gisenyi, and
nearby coffee and tea plantations. He listed six FDLR
battalions that had moved close to the border, at distances
of 10, 15, 30, 40, 47 and 68 kilometers respectively.
Sezibera said these battalions represented significant risks
both to Rwanda's well-being, and to the prospect for peace in
the region, and he forcefully called for MONUC and Congolese
security forces to move these battalions back from border
areas. (Note: at a later closed-door meeting of senior
representatives of the GOR, GORDC, UN, EU and US delegations,
MONUC proposed a coordinated cordon-and-search operation on
both sides of the border; MONUC and the FARDC on one side,
the RDF on the other. Rwandan and Congolese delegations
agreed in principle to this proposal).


3. (C) In a follow-up conversation on the margins of the
meeting, National Security Service External Affairs chief
Joseph Nzabamwita told pol/econ chief that these infiltration
groups crossed the Rwandan border in groups of eight to 10
intelligence operatives, dressed as "ordinary civilians," and
that they dispersed on individual tasks once successfully
across the border. The teams sought information on economic
interests located near the border and on local officials in
the area. While unable to mount conventional assaults across
the border, he said, the FDLR appeared to be planning
isolated attacks on infrastructure points, as well as
targeted assassinations of local officials. The teams
entered both above Lake Kivu in the north, he said, and
through Nyungwe Forest in the south, by way of Burundi.


4. (C) While underlining the clear threat to Rwandan
security, Nzabamwita said that, on average, one or two of the
intelligence teams might be captured by the Rwandan security
forces, one or two might return to the DRC after completing
their missions, but the rest of the operatives remained in
Rwanda and "informally reintegrated," finding their families
and resuming their lives in Rwanda. "We only hear about them
much later," he said.


5. (C) Nzabamwita also briefly addressed the recent
helicopter incident on Rwanda's northern boundary with
Uganda, saying the helicopter had been conducting a "routine
patrol" along the border, and had strayed briefly into
Ugandan territory. "But not 80 kilometers inside Uganda, as
the press said," he remarked. The GOR had immediately
contacted Ugandan security forces to alert them to the
accidental overflight of Ugandan soil, he said, and the
Ugandans had accepted the explanation. Such routine
helicopter flights had been mounted in accord with the
Nairobi agreement, which required Rwandan to exercise greater
oversight of its borders, he added.


6. (C) Comment. Rwanda's brand-new multi-million dollar
methane extraction platform, its large Heineken-controlled
brewery, power lines, several tourist hotels, and many coffee
and tea farms are located right at the Congolese border, many
on the shores of Lake Kivu, a broad expanse of water shared
by the two nations. While the Rwandans have long told us
that they regard the FDLR as incapable of challenging the RDF
in the field, they now express considerable uneasiness at the
prospect of hit-and-run attacks, either across the lake or
through Rwanda's isolated rural areas. We take them at their
word when they tell us several FDLR battalions are now
worryingly near the frontier. It might prove difficult to
restrain the GOR if a successful FDLR attack across the
border damaged one of Rwanda's high-profile installations.
End comment.
ARIETTI