TIM SHORTLEY MEETS FOREIGN MINISTER AND GREAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000165

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM RW
SUBJECT: TIM SHORTLEY MEETS FOREIGN MINISTER AND GREAT
LAKES ENVOY


Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Senior Envoy for Conflict Resolution Tim
Shortley and Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Charles
Murigande and Great Lakes Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera
March 6 to discuss rebel Congolese militia leader Laurent
Nkunda, the Kivus Peace Process and the Nairobi Agreement,
and next steps in bringing about the disarmament and
demobilization of the FDLR. The Rwandans welcomed the return
of Nkunda's CNDP to the peace process, noted continuing
difficulties in engaging the DRC government on the Nairobi
Agreement, called attention to what the GOR considered to be
obstructionist behavior by MONUC in the surrender of FDLR
cadres, and agreed that a "cocktail" of efforts toward
dismantling the FDLR was the proper way to proceed. End
summary.


2. (C) Senior Envoy Shortley began the meeting with
Murigande and Sezibera (also attended by National Security
External Affairs Chief Joseph Nzabamwita and USAID Officer
Nicholas Jenks) by explaining the welcome return of Laurent
Nkunda and his CNDP political formation to the Kivus peace
process. Shortley relayed that his essential message to
Nkunda had been simple -- his future lay in being a
constructive participant in the peace process, and he needed
to act accordingly. Shortley also spoke of his concern at
the slow pace of implementation of various mechanisms under
the Kivus peace process, and the need for the GOR to engage
closely and cooperatively with the Congolese government. The
mutual suspicion of the two governments had to be overcome.
Particularly unhelpful had been recent sessions of the
Nairobi Agreement's Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) task force,
in which large amounts of time had been spent on intensive
examination of minutes -- this had to cease.


3. (C) Murigande welcomed increased engagement by the USG
in the Kivus. He regarded the problem of mutual suspicion to
be central to the lack of progress on the ground in the
Kivus, and agreed that Nkunda needed to show concrete
involvement in the peace process, to both further that
process, and avoid providing the Congolese government with an
"excuse" to take no action against the FDLR. Nkunda was
being "demonized" by NGOs in the Kivus, and the Congolese
government was tempted to shift its focus to Nkunda, rather
than the agreed-upon effort against the FDLR. Nzabamwita
briefly mentioned intelligence reports the GOR had received
that the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) were engaged in
planning attacks against Nkunda, rather than preparing for
the March 15 start of operations against the FDLR.


4. (C) Ambassador Sezibera spoke at some length upon the
unhelpful behavior of various MONUC officials and forces when
FDLR cadres attempted to surrender. For example, sometimes
MONUC forces refused to accept their surrender, and sometimes
MONUC demobilization officers lacked sufficient vehicles or
communication gear to reach the FDLR deserters. Much more
needed to be done by MONUC to process those FDLR personnel
already attempting to give themselves up. Nzabamwita noted
that Felicien Mureramanzi, former FDLR deputy commander in
South Kivu, who had surrendered to the GOR on February 28,
had confirmed that hard-core FDLR commanders kept their
had confirmed that hard-core FDLR commanders kept their
subordinates from deserting with brutal disciplinary tactics,
including execution. Yet, these commanders were aware of the
increased focus by the international community on confronting
the FDLR, and were closely watching the March 15 deadline for
FARDC operations. Pressure on the FDLR, said Murigande,
could split the FDLR command structure from the
rank-and-file, and desertions would increase.


5. (C) Ambassador Arietti noted recent discussion in several
fora on the need for a "cocktail" of actions against the
FDLR, including the forthcoming Security Council resolution,
the push to sanction several top FDLR commanders and
officers, and the effort by the Congolese government to talk
with several FDLR splinter factions to encourage their
surrender. Shortley noted the USG intention to begin
military training for FARDC forces, and the recent visit of a
psy/ops team to plan operations in the Kivus. Murigande and
Sezibera agreed on the need for just such a "cocktail"
approach, with MONUC increasing its efforts as well.


6. (C) Shortly explained his plan to address NGOs in Goma to
explain USG policy, then to meet with President Kabila. The
USG message to Kabila would be: we will work on progress with
Nkunda, while your government focuses on the FDLR. The USG
would not participate in the Congolese government's planned
discussion with FDLR splinter groups in the Kisangani, but
would issue a statement to support it. Murigande again
welcomed USG engagement with the Congolese government, and he
and Sezibera said they would speak with their delegation to
the JMG task force to counsel appropriate behavior (while
noting that part of the problem was that, with no progress on
the ground in the Kivus, the JMG had little or nothing to
do).


7. (C) When asked by Ambassador about the proposed March
25-27 dates for the Tripartite-Plus summit in Bujumbura,
Murigande said the dates were in principle acceptable, but
noted that a March 19 East African Community summit might
slip. He would advise when the EAC dates were firmed up.


8. (C) Comment. As in the past, the Rwandans reaffirmed
their commitment to the Nairobi Agreement and to the peace
process in the Kivus, indicated their frustration with what
they considered to be MONUC's lack of real focus on the FDLR,
pledged to work as best they could with the Congolese
government, and agreed that a "cocktail" of measures in the
Kivus and by the international community offered the best
opportunity for progress. They have seen many previous plans
go unfulfilled, but they also realize that the current
efforts by the USG and others represent the best chance in
some time for real peace in eastern Congo. End comment.




ARIETTI